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Sin as £ Problem of Twentieth Century Systematic 
Theology 
Sally Elizabeth Alsford 
ABSTRACT 
The argument of my thesis concerns the understanding 
of the doctrine of sin in systematic theology, and, as 
a corollary of this, the scope of the doctrine in 
terms of its content. My argument is that the 
doctrine of sin is particularly prone to being defined 
with a strictness or narrowness which causes it to 
lose much of its meaning; that such limiting treatment 
tends to be accompanied by distorted relationships 
with, or over-determination by, other key doctrines, 
particularly that of salvation; and that it is helpful 
to see this tendency as a failure to see sin as a 
symbol with a complex of meanings, this complex being 
essential to the doctrine. 
A brief introductory survey of the usual perspectives 
on sin and of recent monographs firstly indicates the 
major issues raised by sin. Then more detailed 
analysis of the work of Barth, Brunner, Rahner, 
Pannenberg and Ricoeur provides examples of different 
methods of dealing with sin and leads to the 
conclusion that the tension between freedom and 
inevitability is essential to the doctrine of sin: it 
is part of sin's meaning and attempts to suppress, 
explain or relocate it lead to unacceptable tensions 
elsewhere. The use of Ricoeur's analysis of the 
symbolism of evil as a critlcal tool demonstrates the 
significance of the Adamic narrative for Christian 
doctrine, and the way in which its neglect can lead to 
the acquisition of ideas characteristic of 
non-Christian mythologies. The positive suggestion of 
the thesis is that sin should be seen as a tensive 
symbol incorporating a wide complex of meanings and 
involving a specific mythology of "the beginning" and 
that its paradoxical nature should be maintained as 
indicating a conflict within humanity, and seen in 
relationship to the suffering of God in Christ. 
Sin as 9 Problem of Twentieth Century Systematic 
Theology 
Sally Elizabeth Alsford 
PhD 
University of Durham, Department of Theology 
1987 
"Nothing, to be sure, is more of a shock to 
us than such a doctrine, and yet, without 
this mystery, which is the ~ost 
incomprehensible of all we should be 
incomprehensible to ourselves. The knot of 
our condition takes its tw1sts and turns in 
this abyss, so that man is more 
inconceivable without the mystery than this 
mystery is inconceivable to man." 
Pascal, Pensees 434. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. 
No quotation from it should be published without 
his prior written consent and information derived 
from it should be acknowledged. 
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For Michael 
And with thanks to 
Prof. s.w. Sykes. 
The copyright of this thesis re~ts with the 
author. No quotation fr~m it should be 
published without her prior ~· 1tten consent 
and information derived ••nffi it ~hould be 
acknowledged. 
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CHAPTER ONE. 
METHODOLOGY. 
1. Argument 
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The argument of this thesis relates to the methods by which a 
doctrine of sin is constructed in a range of modern systematic 
theologies, and, as a corollary of these methods, the scope 
which such a doctrine is permitted to have. Sin is a doctrine 
which has always raised questions about crucial areas of 
Christian theology and thus has a vital role to play within such 
a theology. Sin also is a doctrine which has always involved 
tension and paradox corresponding to the tension and paradox 
inherent in the human being: as finite and self-transcending, as 
experiencing evil beyond control and yet as experiencing also 
personal guilt. My argument is that the doctrine of sin is 
particularly prone to be defined with a strictness or narrowness 
which causes it to lose much of its essential meaning; that such 
limiting treatment tends to be accompanied by distorted 
relationships between the doctrine of sin and other key 
doctrines, particularly that of salvation; and that it may be 
helpful to see this tendency as a failure to treat sin as a 
symbol with a complex of meanings, expressed partly in its 
mythology this complex of meanings being essential to the 
doctrine. 
Limiting treatments of sin involve narrowness of content 
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about which various writers have been concerned (1): limitation 
to individual rather than corporate, active rather than passive, 
the broader categorisation of sin as negative rather than 
positive, action rather than essence. It involves the 
antagonism rather than the synthesis of Protestant and Catholic, 
Christian and classical views of humanity and sin(2), and the 
resolution into one or other pole of the paradox between freedom 
and necessity, a paradox which is recognised by a fairly wide 
range of scholars as being essential, in some form, to the 
doctrine of sin(3). However, on a more fundamental level than 
this, sin's "sphere of operations" within theology may also be 
limited. Sin is, in the most basic terms, a discontinuity of 
some kind between humanity and God. This discontinuity may be 
in the areas of knowledge, morality, experience, being or 
relationship. If it is assumed £ priori that there is 
epistemological continuity between human beings and God - that 
the human being has an innate or natural knowledge of God - then 
the effect of sin upon knowledge or rationality will be limited, 
and similarly with other areas. In more practical terms, if it 
is assumed that the human being's agency through reason is the 
key factor in his or her recognition of revelation then the 
effect of sin on rationality is likely to be limited. Again, if 
sin is assumed always, of necessity, co involve personal 
individual guilt then sinfulness cannot be antecedent to action, 
or truly "shared". 
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My concern with the limitations of treatments of sin in 
such ways as those outlined above is based on an understanding 
of sin as having a breadth corresponding to the breadth of human 
beings and their situations, just as salvation does, and as 
involving essentially the basic paradox of inevitability or 
antecedence and human responsibility and agency. Such an 
understanding seems to me to be necessary for a balanced and 
symmetrical relationship between the doctrines of sin and 
salvation and to be true to the way people experience 
themselves. Suppression or "ironing out" of the paradoxical 
elements in the doctrine seems to result in their emergence 
elsewhere in a systematic theology, in the doctrine of God or of 
creation, for example. However, my aim is not just to criticise 
current doctrines of sin but to understand why this occurs and 
what effect it has on theology: how the doctrine of sin "works". 
Thus my argument is also that a view of sin as a symbol, using 
Paul Ricoeur's exposition, involving a tensive complex of 
meanings which are expressed partially in the mythology of "the 
beginning", helps us to understand the systematic functioning 
and the problems of sin. 
2. Method 
My method is an important part of my thesis and not merely the 
"scaffolding" upon which I build my argument. In terms of its 
method, this thesis is both an exploration of the doctrine of 
sin in this century and a systematic experiment in the critical 
use of Ricoeur's work and of my own argument as outlined above. 
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My aim here is to understand the "shape" of the doctrine: its 
key issues and problems, its systematic relationships within and 
implications for Christian theology, the issues which impinge 
upon it and are determinative for it and the particular 
significance of twentieth century views. One fundamental 
constraint, however, imposed itself at an early stage in the 
investigation, when a decision was taken not to give extended 
treatment to the relationship between the Christian doctrine of 
sin and the developing understanding of humanity in the social 
sciences. From the middle of the nineteenth century it became 
apparent that Christian theologians and thinkers could not avoid 
taking some kind of account of evolutionary theory and its 
implications for the Christian doctrines of creation and the 
fall. Of the results of this confrontation we will see some 
evidence in Appendix A. There has been less explicit 
consideration given to social anthropology, sociology and 
psychology although these disciplines have significant and 
controversial things to say about human nature as physical and 
biological and yet as also "spiritual" or "transcendent" in some 
way, about the human being's experiences of guilt and shame and 
the way such experiences are coped with, as for example in 
mythology and symbolism. Pannenberg is, on the whole, an 
exception in exhibiting a seriousness about alternative modes of 
understanding of humanity in the human sciences, and we will 
outline his approach in Chapter Four. There is also a 
specialist literature consisting for the most part of articles 
written about sin from a medical and psychological perspective 
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(cf. Appendix A). That the systematic theologies treated in 
this thesis have been extensively influenced by developments in 
the social sciences is beyond doubt. But so complex is the 
internal history of the various disciplines and sub-disciplines, 
and so ambiguous are their relationships with theology that it 
appeared to be the task of a different investigation 
specifically oriented in that direction. That is not to say 
that the present thesis is written on the assumption that 
systematic or dogmatic theology is a self-contained enterprise. 
On the contrary, it will emerge at various points in the 
analysis that a complementary investigation is required for a 
more complete picture to emerge. The consciously adopted 
de-limitation of this present work is not such, however, as to 
prejudge the outcome of such a further study. 
It seems helpful to understand the doctrine in terms of 
questions and answers, considering the questions raised by sin 
and the types and sources of answers given in the Christian 
tradition and in contemporary theology. So, for example, the 
overlapping problems raised by sin throughout the early 
centuries and through to the reformation were: What is God's 
relationship to sin? Does he al:ow or ordain it: What is the 
level of human responsibility for and involvement in sin? Is it 
a power or a decision, is the human being active or passive? Is 
sin something positive or negative, something humanity has or 
something it lacks, a power or a vitiation? What is the real 
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nature of sin? Pride or concupiscence, dominance of the 
fleshly, earthly, animal? A state or an act? How and why did 
sin come into existence? How is it to be dealt with, from God's 
point of view and from the human point of view? Do human beings 
sin? Why? What about babies? Some of these issues were 
historically important for apologetic reasons in view of the 
challenge of Manicheism and Marcionism, and their range 
indicates the significance of the doctrine within the various 
disciplines differentiated in our own century Of 
anthropology, philosophy, metaphysics and systematic theology. 
They thus highlight the interdisciplinary as well as the 
systematic relationships and implications of the doctrine. Part 
of my analysis will be concerned with seeing whether or not the 
questions which sin raises have changed significantly in our 
century and whether or not the answers and their sources have 
changed. I will myself be asking whether there are any 
recognisable trends, what the task of the twentieth century 
systematician is with respect to sin, and whether theology has 
come up witf, anything new in its re-formulation of the problem. 
As I have indicated my methodological tools include my own 
argument about sin: i.e. I will be examining various doctrines 
of sin in terms of their breadth and their relationships to the 
doctrine of salvation and to human beings' experience of 
themselves in this century. This need not be a circular 
process, but is presented in the form of a systematic experiment 
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or a working hypothesis. This hypothesis may in the end fail 
either as a critical tool or as a structural principle for the 
doctrine's further development, but if this is the case, the 
experiment should still be instructive and of constructive use, 
as with scientific experimental method. My analysis is also 
based on Paul Ricoeur's analysis of the symbolism of evil.(4) 
The following outline of Ricoeur's thought will be more fully 
explored in Chapter Five, and my use of it will be justified or 
shown to be inadequate as the thesis proceeds. One of the 
crucial problems of sin which I have noted already is the 
tension between responsibility and inevitability. Ricoeur 
maintains that this tension - the tension of the ''enslaved will" 
is essential to the idea of sin. This is both the conclusion 
to his analysis of the symbolism of evil and part of his 
hermeneutical decision to treat the ethical vision of humanity 
and the Genesis myth, according to which fallibility is not 
equivalent to fault, as his centre of perspective. With regard 
to the former, Ricoeur's analysis concentrates largely on the 
various myths of "the beginning". He isolates four types, the 
theogonic or "chaos" myth, in which creation, as the overcoming 
of chaos, is salvation; the tragic, where fault and existence, 
the divine and the diabolical, are not ultimately distinguished; 
the orphic, for which physical and finite existence is the 
punishment of exile; and finally the 
"anthropological myth par excellence". 
Adamic myth, the 
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With regard to his hermeneutical stance, Ricoeur isolates 
the Adamic myth as the Christian myth of the beginning and as 
therefore iconoclastic towards the alternative myths in 
important although not in all- respects.(5) If this is so 
then Ricoeur has provided a fascinating analytic tool, 
especially in view of the predominant ambivalence about the 
significance of Genesis in formulations of the doctrines of 
humanity and sin. It may well be the case, for example, that in 
the absence of a doctrine of creation based in some way on 
Genesis, an alternative doctrine is assumed implicitly or 
explicitly which has more in common With one of the 
"non-Christian" myths than with the Adamic. Such an analysis 
might thus throw doubt on the thoroughly Christian nature of 
such a theology and of such a doctrine of sin. 
Arising out of this use of Ricoeur is the consideration of 
language. An examination of the way a particular theology 
treats the word sin will bring together Ricoeur's ideas and my 
own argument about the scope of sin. Subsumed under this 
examination is the problem of distinguishing between sin and 
original sin and between sin and ev~~- Beyond the fact that 
theology tends to talk about sin ant original sin, and 
philosophy about evil, my selection cf material does not 
distinguish between sin and original sin. The selection depends 
rather on the relevance of the material to the kinds of 
questions sin raises. I will consider in Chapter Six the 
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argument that sin should be seen as a sub-category of evil(6), 
which will also be addressed by the practical use of my 
understanding in the course of the thesis. It would not be 
appropriate to attempt to "define" sin and thus to discuss its 
relationship to evil at this point, because my understanding of 
this question will develop with and be dependent on the thesis 
as it proceeds. This issue is thus deferred until the final 
chapter (pp.305f) when it can be considered in the light of the 
analysis and conclusions of the intervening chapters. I will 
look at my selection of material per se in the final section 
outlining the chapters. 
3. Presuppositions 
I have already indicated the critical use of my own argument and 
that of Ricoeur. However the presuppositions behind my critique 
obviously extend beyond this use and should be outlined at this 
point. I say obviously on the basis of two theses. The first 
is Polanyi's thesis of tacit knowledge, which leads him to 
assert that the act of knowledge is unavoidably personal: 
... when we accept a discovery as true we commit 
ourselves to a belief in all those as yet undisclosed, 
perhaps as yet unthinkable consequences ... 
... We indwell the external particulars and comprehend 
the mind which itself dwells in the particulars. Both 
the indwelling and the comprehension are tacit, 
creative acts of the knower.(7). 
In the second place, I take as axiomatic Barth's theological 
assertion that theological existence should be determined by the 
concrete involvement of the theologian. Barth is concerned, 
according to his exposition in Evangelical Theologv. An 
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Introduction, that theology should be presented as an element of 
real life. He observes: 
In spite of all our warnings it might still seem to be 
an abstract scheme or an hypostasis. It might even 
seem like one of the nameless virgins found on the 
facades of many medieval churches: whether clever or 
foolish they are all the same made of stone. This 
impression must not go unchallenged. Evangelical 
theology is always a history; it takes place in flesh 
and blood, within the theologian in the narrower and 
broader sense of the term ... (S) 
Having acknowledged that I have presuppositions which function 
in my critical analysis, this is not the place for any defence 
or discussion of these presuppositions as such, despite the 
importance of such debate. Again, this would be a different 
thesis. However, recognising that such presuppositions cannot 
be assumed as inviolable or as £priori true, they must function 
in this thesis, as elsewhere, as a working hypothesis, an 
experimental framework - the basis of the systematic experiment 
I have outlined above (p.9f). 
My working hypothesis is this: that Scripture can be taken, 
in some sense, as a whole, that - specifically in relation to 
humanity and sin - it presents a picture coherent and cohesive 
enough to be the basis of and norm for Christian theology. This 
is a hermeneutical decision to treat Scripture as the inspired 
word of God and as such as capable of coherent explanation; it 
is the kind of hermeneutic decision which Charles Wood 
discusses.(9) It involves a view, similar to that of Wood, of 
the canonical function and status of Scripture, affirmed as the 
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canon of Christian understanding, as its source, record and 
judge. This is also similar to Brevard Childs' understanding of 
the canonicity of the Old Testament: 
The heart of the canonical process lay in transmitting 
and ordering the authoritative tradition in a form 
which was compatible to function as Scripture for a 
generation which had not participated in the original 
events of revelation. The ordering of the word for 
this new function involved a profoundly hermeneutical 
activity, the effects of which are now built into the 
structure of the canonical text. For this reason an 
adequate interpretation of the biblical text, both in 
terms of history and theology, depends on taking the 
canonical shape with great seriousness.(lO) 
The picture derived from such a ''canonical" understanding 
of Scripture requires hard and detailed work in the areas of 
biblical criticism and exegesis but the broad outlines of the 
picture are as follows. First, sin is seen as an important and 
serious problem and obstacle, in relation to both God and 
humanity. This seriousness is treated not in its own right but 
in a relation of symmetry to God's purpose o¥ salvation in 
Christ, a symmetry which is necessary for a correct 
understanding of both. Second, sin in Scripture is operative in 
all the various spheres of human beings' behaviour with regard 
to society and to God, their relationships with community and 
with God, thelr attitudes and knowledge, their situ~ion in and 
relationship to the natural and physical world. It is also 
operative on the level of human nature as determined in various 
ways, as well as on the level of human nature as 
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self-determining. Third, the picture of sin relates essentially 
to the way human beings actually are and experience themselves 
to be. I would therefore expect a "Christian" or "Scriptural'' 
doctrine of sin to be meaningful and, to some extent, verifiable 
in terms of the experience of twentieth-century men and women. 
As Ricoeur puts it, referring to his idea of sin: 
In fact, the symbol used as a means of detecting and 
deciphering human reality, will have been verified by 
its power to raise up, to illuminate, to give order to 
that region of human experience ... (ll). 
The designation of these presuppositions as a "working 
hypothesis" indicates that their truth is not assumed 9 priori. 
Their claim to truth is itself implicitly part of the thesis and 
they are open to criticism in terms of their usefulness and 
coherence as analytical and critical tools and as structural 
bases. In both cases they will be open to criticism on their 
own terms, that is in their relationship to the doctrine of 
salvation and the seriousness with which sin is taken in that 
relation as well as in their relevance to men and women's 
experience. 
It is also important to note here that although these broad 
outlines are assumed from the outset, my method will be to try 
and understand the doctrine of sin and the problems associated 
with it by seeing how the doctrine functions in the context of a 
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systematic theology, resisting the impulse to ''define" sin in 
terms of its specific meaning and allowing the significance and 
"shape'' of the doctrine to emerge from an analysis of its 
interrelationships with other doctrines. 
4. Outline of Chapters 
Chapter Two, "The State of the Question'', serves as an 
introduction to the doctrine of sin and to the nature of my 
interest in it. The purpose of this chapter is to acquire a 
preliminary sense of the more influential and persistent ideas 
about sin in the Christian tradition, the issues and motivations 
involved in their development and expressed in their various 
forms, the process and the significance of the development of 
various doctrines of sin. 
This will be done, by outlining the classical perspectives 
on sin, as represented by the debate between Augustine and 
Pelagius, by the reformers, particularly Calvin and the Catholic 
formulations of Trent, and by Schleiermacher. This background 
is indispensable for the later discussion of twentieth century 
theology because it sets the agenda for contemporary discussion 
of sin. There has been considerable discussion since 
Schleiermacher in the form of monographs. This monograph 
tradition tends to look at sin from very specific perspectives 
(for example, sin and evolution, sin and psychology) rather than 
seeing the doctrine in a broad theological perspective, and it 
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is too diverse to be included in the thesis. It is, however, 
significant, indicating as it does the persistence of the 
problems of sin and the importance of approaching these problems 
from a contemporary perspective, and contributing different 
ideas both as to the nature of the problems and to possible 
solutions. This material is indicated in Appendix A. 
After this introductory and necessarily cursory chapter, 
which will begin to indicate the parameters of the discussion, I 
will analyse the work of five major thinkers over the next three 
chapters. Again I begin with a disclaimer about my purpose. 
Obviously no treatment of any one of these five men in the space 
of 100,000 words would be adequate as an exposition of their 
thought. However what is at issue here is not the theology of 
Karl Barth or Karl Rahner, or even their doctrines of sin, per 
se, which would also call for a far lengthier discussion. It 
is, rather, different ways of dealing with sin which are at 
issue. I am concerned with the shape the doctrine takes in view 
of differlng motivations and methodologies: with the questions 
which sin raises and the way in which they are answered in the 
light of various presuppositions and understandings of theology 
as a whole; with the way the doctrine relates to the 
understandings of the relationship between finite and infinite. 
The focus of my attention is on the way in which the system 
"works'', rather than on what the system is in itself. The five 
thinkers I will be examining are test cases or examples. My 
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method here is like that of David Kelsey, in The Uses of 
Scripture in Recent Theology, in that the chosen theologians 
represent significantly different ways of understanding sin: 
"What is important is the options they illuminate not the 
theologies they represent." (12) 
The focus of this thesis is, accordingly, upon the way sin 
functions in a specific writer's thought and on its systematic 
interrelationships, rather than on a doctrine in isolation. I 
start with two writers of dogmatics, Karl Barth and Emil 
Brunner, and look at how the doctrine of sin is worked out in 
such a context. Apart from their significance here as dogmatic 
theologians, they are also significant in representing a 
theological reaction against the supposed optimism of 
liberalism.(l3) Within this framework there are conflicts 
between them in the area of anthropology, so that they represent 
significantly different responses, from a dogmatic and 
"neo-orthodox" standpoint, to optimism about humanity. 
My fourth chapter is devoted to the Lhought of Karl Rahner 
and Wolfhart Pannenberg. These two might seem to be rather 
unlikely companions. They are, however, both representatives of 
a more metaphysical concern with theology, as well as of two 
very different reactions to neo-orthodoxy, particularly that of 
Barth, and to subjectivity in theology. Rahner reacts by 
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further subjectivism and Pannenberg by turning to history. Here 
we have two different responses, from a metaphysical standpoint, 
to nee-orthodoxy; and it emerges, as part of that response, that 
the need for the apologetic application of theology is 
recognised, so that anthropology is vitally important for both 
Rahner and Pannenberg. In particular both are concerned about 
the human being as the knowing subject. 
My fifth chapter examines Paul Ricoeur's ideas about sin 
(ideas which have already been used as a critical tool in 
chapters three and four) and considers the potential of these 
ideas for contributing to our systematic understanding of sin. 
Ricoeur's work on sin arises from his existential concern with 
human being and experience and with language as the expression 
of this being(l4). Sin is of particular interest to Ricoeur, as 
a philosopher, as an example of the process of symbolisation by 
which human experience is expressed and explored as a 
hermeneutic and linguistic test-case - and as a vital factor to 
be taken into account in any philosophical account of human 
being and knowledge - it is also an existential issue. This 
chapter will briefly consider Norman Perrin's work on the 
kingdom of God as a theological application of Ricoeur's ideas 
and it will draw together the results of my use of Ricoeur in 
chapters three and four. 
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In the use of Barth and Brunner, Rahner and Pannenberg I 
will compare the different theologies to some extent, and one 
particular point of comparison will be to see where the 
discontinuity which sin involves is located, externally to human 
beings or within them. The differences in the section headings 
under which this material is presented are a result of different 
emphases in the material itself and are thus indicative of the 
particular concerns of the theologians in question. 
This typology of dogmatic, metaphysical and existential 
thought is intended as a broad categorisation, not a strict 
system of labels, and it arises specifically from the doctrine 
of sin. Obviously there may be ways in which the categories 
overlap and the theologians fit into different categories in 
different respects. What I have in mind particularly is the 
view of the task and method of theology, and as part of that, 
the place given to anthropology. So for Barth and Brunner, 
theology is the systematisation and proclamation or exposition 
of reveJation in Scripture and in Christ, and anthropology is a 
doctrine among and defined in relationship to other doctrines. 
For Rahner and Pannenberg anthropology is crucial to the 
theological task, which has to do with the very process of 
knowledge. For Ricoeur theology has to do with human beings' 
experience of themselves - anthropology must be central - and it 
has to do with the interpretation of symbols, the explication of 
the meaning of revelation. 
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These studies are neither exhaustive with respect to the 
theologies concerned, nor to all the possible doctrines of sin. 
However, they will, it is hoped, give us an understanding of the 
shape of the doctrine and "how it works", as well as 
demonstrating something of how Ricoeur's innovative treatment of 
the symbolism of evil might be useful as a critical tool in a 
systematic context. Chapter Six will take the thesis beyond 
this to some extent, considering a further range of theologians 
who have written specifically on sin and have tried to find a 
new way of answering old questions, It will make some 
suggestions about the results 
constructive theology. 
of this exploration for 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
THE STATE OF THE QUESTION. 
In this chapter we will consider the interpretation of sin 
within the Christian tradition, in order to gain an overview of 
the way the doctrine has been seen, its significance within 
Christian theology, and the problems with which it is 
associated. We will be concerned with the concrete terms in 
which sin has been defined and with the "shape" of the doctrine. 
By "shape" I mean the ramifications of sin: systematic 
interrelationships between sin and other Christian doctrines, 
the questions which sin is seen to raise and to answer and the 
main determinants in the definition and development of the 
doctrine. Such a general review will obviously be far from 
exhaustive and will indicate more lines of thought than can be 
pursued in a single thesis. But my specific aim is to gain an 
idea of the shape of the problem and thus to make a preliminary 
survey of some of the options. This will be achieved by 
outlining the classic perspectives on sin, introducing thereby a 
few individuals who have had a decisive influence on Christian 
understandinss of sin. 
By way of introduction to this survey it is worth noting 
that doctrines of sin are almost universally seen as a problem. 
There is a turbulent history of "strenuous, emotional debate" 
which has been "continually waged throughout the entire history 
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of the Church and her theology".(l) The consensus is not only 
that the doctrine is problematic but also, at least implicitly, 
that the doctrine is important and the problems therefore 
genuine and significant. There is a wide contemporary concern 
about sin representing, moreover, a range of very different 
standpoints. The fall and redemption have been described as the 
two pillars of the Christian faith, an attribution of great 
significance.(2) Kierkegaard referred to sin as a dogmatic 
problem, but one that cannot be explained by dogmatics(3) and 
Berkouwer describes it as a "peculiar" problem.(4) J.Orr, from a 
very conservative perspective maintained that sin is seriously 
changed, weakened and sometimes almost obliterated because of a 
general departure from the principles of divine holiness and 
moral law(5), and E.Cherbonnier also talks of an eclipse of the 
biblical understanding of sin because of the intrusion into 
Christian thought of pagan concepts of God.(6) 
Contemporary Catholicism sees sin as a problem requiring 
new interpretation and this debate is evidenced by a number of 
articles such as those of J.W.Glazer and K.F.O'Shea(7), the 
former being motivated by pastoral interests and the latter 
taking into account modern psychology. There is a particular 
concern about the communitarian nature of sin, which represents 
an important shift in contemporary Catholicism.(B) 
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As an example of a psychological and medical perspective 
Karl Menninger asks Whatever Became of Sin? He analyses and 
opposes the ''disappearance" of sin and the corresponding 
re-allocation of responsibility.(9) Seward Hiltner, from a 
similar medical and psychological standpoint, maintains that 
insights from medicine, including psychiatry, can help to 
counter distortion of the Christian doctrine of sin.(lO) 
These references indicate some of the wide contemporary 
interest in sin, which is recognised as a problem within 
different areas of Christian thought. Having noted this concern 
we will go on to examine the way in which sin has been, defined 
in various traditional perspectives. Here we propose to include 
the following: the perspectives of A. the Augustine- Pelagius 
debate, B. Augustinian and reformation pessimism, seen here in 
Calvin and Calvinism, c. the traditional Catholic and 
Protestant views, D. liberal optimism and the turn to the 
subject seen in Schleiermacher. These perspectives will 
introduce other issues which are crucial in contemporary 
analysis the understanding of sin as privative or negative, 
and the Christological understanding of sin - as well as the 
issues which are more obviously cent·al such as free will and 
determinism. 
The classical perspectives on sin. 
A. Augustine Versus Pelagius 
30 
The conflict between Augustine and Pelagius is well known in 
general terms at least, as one of the most significant, bitter 
and persistent debates in Christian theology, and Augustine's 
doctrine has had undeniable influence through the centuries, 
both as type and as anti-type. In apologetic terms, Augustine's 
doctrine was developed through the various conflicts of his life 
including that with Pelagius. Against the Manichees he was 
concerned to deny evil a substantial, independent existence; 
against the Donatists, to stress its universality and 
persistence; finally, against Pelagius, to assert its universal 
and enslaving nature and power. However it is also important to 
see the doctrine of sin in the context of Augustine's total 
system. Indeed, this approach will be consistent with 
Augustine's own platonic understanding of the importance of the 
harmony of the universals, rather than the particulars, which 
appears in Christian terms as the idea of "nature'' - the 
harmonious unity of creation and God's will.(ll). 
Augustine's doctrine of God strongly reflects the influence 
of both his platonic and his anti-Manichean thought. God is the 
supreme and ultimate good and "Being", "yea, the height of 
substance and only true substance of the reasonable 
creature."(l2) In fact, these two are synonymous because being, 
existence, is good per se. This means that creation is good not 
only because of its origin in God's will but because it exists 
and thus partakes of God's being. God's nature and will and 
31 
Nature itself represent one continuous state of affairs, unified 
and harmonious. Into this everything must be fitted coherently 
- no dualism is possible. However Augustine does not carry this 
through in seeing nature as an emanation of God, but 
distinguishes sharply between God and humanity. The basis of 
this distinction is that humanity was created not out of God's 
own substance but ex nihilo. This provided Augustine with his 
defence against any ascription of evil to God.(l3) It follows on 
from this that if existence is good, non-existence, or rather 
defection from the good, is evil. Pelagius' conviction is 
ironically also basically the same: the essential goodness of 
God, and so of his creation. For Pelagius however this 
essential goodness extends to humanity, which is affected and 
infected by sin, but is not fallen, as for Augustine. Pelagius 
also declared that sin is negative, a privation or lack, not an 
entity. Whereas in Augustine this leads to ambiguity over the 
reality of sin (see below) for Pelagius it leads to a more 
straightforward denial of the corruption of human nature. The 
goodness of God's being and creation, along with the appeal to 
his omnipotence and his good, if sometimes mysterious, purposes 
is the closest Augustine comes to explaining why the fall 
occurred. Although he is not particularly concerned with such 
an explanation for its own sake, the idea is very important as 
the ultimate origin of evil. Because humanity was created ex 
nihilo, it will inevitably tend not only to mutability and 
corruptibility but to defection from being back to nihil. 
Augustine depends so heavily on this basic idea that Lacey has 
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been led to suggest that he verges on treating nihil as a real 
state of existence.(l4) However Augustine does explain that 
something as insubstantial as a defection can have substantial 
effects, like not eating(l5). 
The other doctrine which has a key place in Augustine's 
thought and in the debate with Pelagius is that of free-will. 
Will is one of the terms which Augustine uses in a very 
particular way and it is also related to goodness. Will is a 
vital part of human nature and even whilst being at his most 
emphatic about grace during the controversy with Pelagius 
Augustine insisted on the place of human will.(l6) However what 
he means by will is a dynamic conception related specifically 
both to action, and to God's will. It is willingness or 
unwillingness to do something and is related to a human being's 
prior disposition - it is good or bad rather than neutral. So 
while Augustine insists repeatedly that will is freedom from 
compulsion or force, it is determined by the strongest motive 
and is limited by the options available. This in turn leads to 
a very significant view of freedom, which is, for Augustine, not 
equilibrium or choice but possession of a motive or value strong 
enough to determine inherent human instability. So through the 
fall human freedom was not lost, but changed. While Adam's 
freedpm was the freedom to accept or not accept God's grace in 
order to be good, his choice to abandon this gift and defect 
from the good is inherited by all humanity.(l7) For Augustine 
33 
although this is loss of choice, it is not loss of "free will". 
Indeed, the sense of choice is itself a symptom of the 
distintegration of the human will. In his final and glorious 
state the redeemed human being will be involved with the object 
of his or her choice, i.e. God, in such a way that no other 
choice is conceivable, and incapacity for sin will be the 
natural state.(l8) This, for Augustine, is real freedom. So the 
freedom of will which humanity now possesses is freedom from 
righteousness and the determination which will always has is 
evil. (19) Augustine therefore has no need to try and avoid 
saying that humanity is in a situation of necessity (20) because 
for him this is not a violation of free will or humanity. He 
amplifies this at times by talking about the delight human 
beings take in sinning which is evidence of their willingness, 
but with or without such willingness, prior to God's grace, the 
human being is subjected to the necessity of concupiscence, of 
which more shortly. 
Pelagius' view of freedom is diametrically opposed to that 
of Augustine, and this is at the root of the difference between 
them. For Pelagius, to say that a human being is a sinner 
presupposes responsibility, and responsibility, in turn, 
presupposes freedom. Freedom, for Pelagius, means equilibrium 
and the ability to choose. Human nature is essentially 
unimpaired, and all sin is thus deliberate. So Pelagius 
obviously rejects Augustine's doctrine of original sin and even 
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more emphatically that of original guilt - a contradiction in 
terms for Pelagius. His motivation in this instance, in his 
insistence on responsibility and freedom of will, was a concern 
with practical Christianity, with the necessity for human beings 
to ''work out their own salvation". He acknowledged that human 
nature including the power to do good, was of course a gift of 
God, but he insisted that the will to do good and the attainment 
of good are both under human control. Pelagius admitted some 
determination of situation of the human race, through example 
and habit. This could be interpreted as coming close to a 
social interpretation of original sin, but Pelagius consistently 
insisted on sin as a voluntary and individual determination of 
the will. The reign of sin in the world makes it difficult for 
human beings to live without sin, and it is unlikely that even 
the converted will succeed in doing so, but Pelagius insisted on 
the possibility, demonstrated in the Old Testament, of living 
sinlessly. Pelagius could not really explain why human beings 
always sin, or how sin came to "reign" in the world if human 
beings have free will, nor could he explain the power of 
instinct, desire and circumstances to influence actions and 
choices in a way which throws doubt on such a declaration of 
indeterminacy. N.P. Williams points out that Pelagius' 
indeterministic anthropology necessitates a purely exemplarist 
soteriology, which cannot be admitted as true to Scripture or to 
Christian tradition. It also, as Williams notes, had the effect 
of increasing the seriousness of sin in making every fault or 
failure into a conscious and deliberate act of sin against God. 
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However, if the debate led Pelagius to the extremes of his view 
it also led Augustine to the other extreme. 
For Augustine, sins of weakness are inevitable because of 
the persistence and power of concupiscence. 
concupiscence tends to be associated with sexuality 
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and this 
is the most notorious aspect of Augustine's thought - in fact it 
is really human beings' instability and disharmony, chiefly the 
disorder of their senses in rebellion against their mind and 
self-control. This state is the "law of sin" - not sin as such. 
It is a penal state, which means that it can still be seen as 
part of God's order and harmony, as a manifestation of his 
justice. Augustine insists that God's justice cannot be 
understood in terms of human justice(2l), it is not an abstract 
thing but indicates the correct state or relationship of things 
within the created order, the subjection of things, lower to 
higher, flesh to spirit, soul to God.(22) This understanding of 
justice is thus Augustine's explanation for the condemnation of 
all humanity "in Adam". It is part of the harmonious justice of 
the universe that punishment, in the form of concupiscence, 
should be received where it is due. The reason why it is due to 
all on account of the one man's fault is that Adam's fault is 
per se the fault of every human. Augustine's reliance on the 
idea of seminal identity again reflects his concern with the 
universals rather than particulars: "By the evil will of that 
one man all sinned in him, since all were that one man, from 
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whom therefore, they individually derived original sin." 
Coupled with this explanation is the most important, though not 
the only, outworking of concupiscence in the form of sexual 
libido, as the supreme example of human senses overcoming 
rationality. This idea really backs up that of seminal 
identity. Human beings cannot escape original sin just because 
they are human but because their descent from Adam was through 
carnal generation, prompted always by concupiscence.(23) 
This is an area of tension in Augustine's thought. Firstly 
in his integration of platonic and Christian ideas of God, the 
biblical ideas of God's love and mercy rather lose out in the 
face of his justice. Secondly his explanation of the 
relationships between sin, justice, responsibility etc., seem to 
get tied in knots. He insists that responsibility is necessary 
for sin to be sin(24), -an early statement, but consistent with 
later views where he states that actual sin is not a necessary 
factor in the condemnation of human beings: "He that is begotten 
is no sinner as yet in act and is still new from his birth; but 
in guilt he is old."(25) Thus guilt is not dependent on sin but 
on concupiscence which is only improperly called sin.(26) So 
Augustine cannot maintain that guilt is necessarily connected 
with individual responsibility.(27) The only sense in which it 
is "guilt" is because each human being possesses it (i.e. 
concupiscence) through carnal generation. However carnal 
generation itself, as prompted through concupiscence is a penal 
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state.(28) Augustine is saying that original sin is necessary to 
make sense of God's punishment, but it is itself a state of 
punishment. There are two clear reasons, at least, why 
Augustine continued to maintain such a difficult explanation. 
His insistence on original sin, firstly, he saw as necessary to 
explain the need of newly-born infants for baptism, a need he 
accepted on the Church's authority, and on the basis of his own 
consciousness of sin as a child, and the observation of sin in 
babies.(29) This recalls the change in Origen's thought which 
was at least linked to his confrontation with the practice of 
paedo-baptism. The need for baptism obviously implied the 
presence of something needing remitting, even though individual, 
responsible sin was obviously not present. Secondly, the idea 
of carnal generation is necessary, particularly against the 
Pelagians, to stress the universality of guilt, and to explain 
why the children of even regenerate parents are still guilty and 
in need of baptism. Even though baptism removes the guilt of 
concupiscence, concupiscence itself is still present, leaving 
the believer with a constant battle in which he or she never has 
the victory to the extent of propagating without pleasure. So 
propagation is always due to the old nature not the new.(30) In 
interpreting the guilt as itself merited on account of the 
punishment, Augustine seems to be tracing a circular argument. 
It is an argument which also leads to a very harsh view of God, 
which Augustine tries to mitigate in the case of infants, by 
allowing the "mildest condemnation of all" to infants who die 
without being baptized.(3l) He is concerned to guard against any 
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suggestion of God being the origin of sin and does so by 
reference to his view of evil. God is the author of human 
nature, which is still itself good, but not of the corruption of 
that nature. At times he refers to the devil as the author of 
this evil, and also to his understanding of will, maintaining 
that the evil volition itself is not from God, as a defection, 
but the ability to perform the evil volition is from God.(32) 
The above means that his argument does seem to tend towards 
attributing everything to God - or else towards giving nihil, 
and its adherents, more reality and force than he really wants 
to. Ricoeur notes that although Augustine includes the 
opposition of will and freedom at some level, this opposition is 
not thematized because this would need the idea of evil as a 
qualitative leap, a philosophy of action and a philosophy of 
contingence, and so the movement towards nothingness becomes 
difficult to distinguish from the total character of creation, 
and the resulting concept of defectus does not take account of 
the positive power of evil.(33) So Augustine talks frequently 
about God's purpose in creation, giving various explanations 
such as that God gives the ability to sin for human beings' 
condemnation(34), and prescribes impossible sinlessness in order 
that he may both justly condemn and rightly cleanse.(35) 
Creation and the fall are thus reduced to a demonstration of 
God's justice and mercy, justice being foremost. They are 
ordained to show what human free will was capable of and to show 
humanity the goodness of obedience. Above all the whole process 
of creation, fall and redemption are seen as part of the order 
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of cause and effect, themselves relationships of ius Within the 
finite order.(36) Ius is basically an expression of God's 
controlling will. Augustine is not actually saying that God 
ordained the fall, as Calvin was to do, but that he created 
human beings with the capability for sin, foreknew the outcome 
and works it into his good purposes. 
Following on from this is the second real tension in 
Augustine's thought. This is the dichotomy between his deep 
sense of suffering and sin, their depth and weight even in 
children a concern with the subjective side of sin - and his 
insistence that all this is a part of God's ordered harmony. 
Ricoeur notes that while the doctrinal stiffness and false logic 
of Augustine's concept of original sin is attributable to the 
Pelagian controversy, his profound motivation was his own 
experience of conversion and the inward struggle of the 
will.(37) From his own experience and from his philosophy he 
describes those who need redemption as " ... involved in the 
death, infirmities, servitude, captivity and darkness of sin, 
under the dominion of the devil, the author of sin", yet he also 
strangely devalues evil. Burnaby considers that Augustine 
failed to reach a truly Christian solution of the problem of 
suffering, and to maintain consistently a theory of the true 
nature of punishment. This is seen in two ways. Firstly, 
••natural" evils are seen as part of nature, which is good. It 
only seems evil because it is discordant to our ears which are 
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imperfectly tuned to hear. So he says that " ... without the 
justice of God no one is slow in mind or crippled in body."(38) 
Secondly he can allow no possibility of anything totally evil 
existing (even Satan) as this would be impossible, evil being a 
defection from good, nor can he allow cosmic or objective evil 
because of God's omnipotence and providence. Lacey argues that 
what he is omitting to account for is that things can change in 
the course of evil not just from being to non-being, but from 
one kind of thing to something different.(39) So human sin is 
described as" ... rebellion against our own selves, proceeding 
from ourselves."(40) Evil and sin are thus subsumed within God's 
good being, and his good purposes(4l), which involve his control 
of evil as well as of good wills.(42) 
The third main tension, implied above, is the question of 
fate which TeSelle particularly raises (in his 
conclusion,p.419ff). It cannot be denied that Augustine's 
teaching sounds fatalistic, especially taking into account his 
teaching on grace, the final doctrine to tie in. It accords 
with what has been said already about free will. In the process 
of redemption the human being is allowed the exercise of free 
will understood as action motivated by desire. So, once 
presented with the truth, it is the human being's individual 
responsibility to accept willingly, once the will has been 
prepared by God. This is consistent with the rest of 
Augustine's thought, and leads to a situation in which human 
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beings can do nothing other than sin because of their sinful 
conception and solidarity with Adam, and nothing other than 
believe once acted on to so believe.(43) It may be that 
Augustine was led to over-emphasise his view on grace in the 
Pelagian debate, but these views are reiterated in the 
~etractions, and are in line with his view of choice as part of 
the human sinful state. As TeSelle notes, Augustine would not 
accept the charge of fatalism on several counts. He allows a 
place for free action in Adam, the human state is related to 
God's justice and grace which leads to true freedom: and God's 
foreknowledge is not the same thing as his ordination. He also 
sees the change as really coming in Augustine's views on 
election, not on free-will or grace, and relates the devaluation 
of suffering specifically to his later views on predestination. 
Assessments of the debate between Augustine and Pelagius 
obviously vary. However it does seem fairly clear that, as 
Rondet points out, Augustine was making explicit a tradition 
which was already slowly coming to the surface. Even 
N.P.Williams admits some element of truth in this. Rondet is 
particularly concerned to refute the common Protestant 
assumption which is axiomatic to Williams that "original sin'' is 
essentially original to Augustine. This assumption is based on 
Williams' distinction between the dogmatic and the 
psychological. As a "formal dogmatic scheme'' he acknowledges 
that original sin purports to be based upon scriptural texts 
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expounded by previous theologians. It is as a "psychological 
document" that it proclaims itself to be a product of 
Augustine's own personality and of the unique circumstances of 
his life. J.P.Burns also claims an element of the radically new 
in Augustine's anthropology in the fusing of the Christian 
Platonic and the Ascetic traditions in terms of which he 
classifies the tradition before Augustine. However, in relation 
to Burns' own designation of these categories Augustine seems 
closer to the Platonic than the Ascetic.(44) Despite its 
problems, Augustine's thought was undeniably vastly influential, 
and this influence has been evident right up to this century. 
B. Augustinian and Reformed Pessimism - Calvin and Calvinism. 
Although there was an immediate and widespread reaction against 
Augustine's thought, at least in its most rigid or stringent 
form, in the work of Anselm and Abelard in particular, Aquinas 
accepted his anthropology at many points(45), and the reformers 
relied on Augustine's understanding of humanity to a great 
extent.(46) The reformation pessimism about humanity was part of 
the assertion of salvation by faith alone and the denial of 
salvation by works or by humanity's own efforts, which the 
Catholic Church was seen to at least allow, if not to teach. In 
Calvin we find Augustinianism pushed to what Moxon calls its 
"logical and fatal conclusion" (see Appendx A pp.335f). As for 
Augustine, for Calvin the doctrines of God and of revelation are 
of central importance. Knowledge of God and of self are derived 
from the knowledge of revelation, the motion of knowledge, as 
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that of grace, being from God down to humanity(47). Calvin is 
concerned to stress God's omnipotence and sovereignty, his 
ultimate causality of all things. This causality means that 
there can be no distinction between God's willing and his 
permission, or between the divine foreknowledge and 
ordination.(48) The corollary of the above is that sin, although 
a given reality, is to be seen from the standpoint of grace. 
So, as redemption is the total renovation of humanity, so that 
state from which humanity is redeemed must be total.(49) 
Calvin's view of humanity before the fall is close to the 
catholic view, as he sees humanity as perfect, from creation, 
with original righteousness as a supernatural gift in addition 
to the ''natural" endowments. The human being was not originally 
sinful in any sense, but was given freedom to "incline his will 
to evil".(50) The fall is therefore crucial for Calvin as the 
point at which the immediate responsibility for sin devolves 
onto humanity due to Adam's pride, faithlessness and free choice 
to rebel.(51) He also maintains the existence of Satan, 
similarly ascribing his fall to rebellion. However, Calvin has 
to go further back because of the necessary nature of God's 
will, which means that the ultimate origin of sin cannot be left 
with Adam, either by his choice or his constitution. At this 
more fundamental level Calvin is concerned to assert that Deus 
non causa peccati emphasized throughout tradition, and in the 
reformed confessions.(52) He wants to avoid the dualism this 
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formulation points to however, denying sin a real, independent, 
substantial existence or an origin outside of God's will. 
Calvin resolves the conflict in God, rather than in the 
character of sin itself, asserting God's ordination of the fall 
and of sin.(53) Schleiermacher picks up the inconsistency of 
still allowing the possibility of rebellion, and Berkouwer notes 
that it is "remarkable" that Calvin will speak of "ordinatio" 
whereas Roman Catholic theology prefers to speak of a "positive 
permissio."(54) The confessions generally do not go as far as 
Calvin( 55) despite their explicit statements about God's 
sovereignty and providence. To bring the two together they talk 
of God making good use of sin and evil, a kind of theodicy to 
which Calvin comes close to. However, Calvin takes another step 
further back in explanation, resorting ultimately to the 
distinction between God's revealed and his hidden will, the 
"cause" of God's will itself being a mystery.(56) He also 
asserts that God is not responsible for sin because he is the 
Creator, and sin is the perversion of creation.(57) This last 
point is important in Calvin's understanding of sin as 
''insanity", against reason, disorder, in contrast with the order 
of God's creation. 
Calvin takes up Augustine's understanding of original sin 
in his view of original sin as itself sin and as punishable, 
although it is also the "seed" of sin. This means that we are 
"conceived and born" in sin.(58) Although he also refers to the 
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idea of wrath as "human affection after the manner of Scripture 
for the revengement of God", he still maintains the severe 
reality of that revengement.(59) So for Calvin original sin is a 
disease, "a hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature 
which first makes us liable to God's wrath, then also 
brings forth in us those works which Scripture calls 'works of 
the flesh'". He also specifically denies that sin per se arises 
from habit.(60) At this point, the antithesis of sin is external 
to the human being, it is the antithesis between fallen 
humanity, the flesh, and the Holy Spirit. We have no 
righteousness at all, nor even any ability or potential for 
righteousness, prior to God's grace. There are ''remnants" of 
God's image, but what is left is itself polluted, part of the 
flesh, and cannot be counted as righteous.(61) Having said this, 
Calvin wants to insist that humanity is responsible. Although 
sin is necessary or inevitable, it is also voluntary. Human 
beings are free not from necessity, but from compulsion and they 
are therefore responsible. 
Calvin's understanding of the Law is important for his 
understanding of sin. 
objective depth to 
In Torrance's words, the Law "gives 
(man's) perversity".(62) It is also 
significant for salvation for, as Christ's death is 
substitutionary, it is the fulfilment of God's law of judgment. 
As such it achieves salvation, the state of justification before 
God as the absolute antithesis to the prior human state of 
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condemnation before God. Redemption is thus re-creation or 
re-birth, there is an absolute discontinuity between human 
beings in their £allen state, where they are no longer 
recognisable as God's creation, and in their redeemed state. 
However, despite the antithetical character of this view of 
salvation, the believer cannot move from one sphere to the other 
so long as he or she is in the sinful world, the effects of sin 
are not so easily dealt with. The world is evil because it is 
fallen, and the body is the "prison house."(63) The process of 
repentance is thus a process of mortification of the flesh and 
vivification by the spirit. 
changed, but the outworking 
flesh-spirit distinction is 
Human status before God has 
of this is gradual. 
soteriological, it is 
The 
the 
distinction between the sinful nature of humanity and the image 
of God to which it is being restored in practice, as in reality 
in Christ it has been restored. The real conflict of sin for 
Calvin is therefore post- not pre-conversion.(64) Repentance is 
thus necessary throughout the life of the believer: "the whole 
man is naturally flesh, until by the grace of regeneration, he 
begins to be spiritual."(65) 
The reformed perspective seen in Calvin and Calvinism will 
be particularly relevant to my later analysis of Barth (Chapter 
3 pp.79ff) and also for our brief analysis of Schleiermacher 
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below. In particular, Calvin's description of sin as "insanity" 
prefigures Barth's idea of sin as the impossible possibility. 
c. The Protestant and Catholic Options. 
As we have seen with Calvin, the Protestant "option" involves 
varying degrees of an Augustinian pessimism about the extent and 
depth of sin. The depth of depravity was seen as corresponding 
to the scope of redemption. Karl Aner describes the reformation 
as the "Restoration of a Religious and Personal Content to the 
Doctrine of Sin",(66) and indeed the reformers were concerned to 
stress the positive nature of sin in precise and ethical terms. 
This, combined with the denial of any distinction between human 
nature and any donum superadditum to be lost at the fall, 
tended, as in Calvin, to result in the ascription of positive 
and personal power and guilt to hereditary sin, as the result of 
the fall and as its punishment. Zwingli was an exception, 
denying the guilt of original sin because of the denial of 
individual responsibility which this entailed. Early 
Protestantism denied the validity Of the distinction between the 
obligation to be perfect and the obligation to try to be, 
asserting that every human act which does not embody moral 
perfection is sin, and that human beings can obey God only 
through his special grace. Their concern was to deny the 
possibility of any human fulfilment of the law, and this was the 
basis of their insistence about sin, the state of sin and 
original sin, the latter being the real battleground. 
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The Catholic reaction to this teaching and Catholic unease 
about some of Augustine's teaching came to expression at the 
Council of Trent, which holds preeminent authority as the 
orthodox Catholic statement about sin(67), although some 
expositions refer back to the council of Carthage which Trent 
was restating to a great extent. Although Trent has been 
described as generally semi-Pelagian(68), its first four decrees 
on sin, originating largely from the anti-Pelagian Council of 
Carthage, and being directed against the semi- or neo- Pelagian 
positions of Erasmus (on Romans 5), Pighius and Zwingli, are in 
fact anti-Pelagian. These decrees insist on the effect of 
Adam's sin as the source of original sin, its transmission to 
all by physical propagation, not Qy imitation, and the 
necessity, therefore, of baptism for all, including infants. So 
Jedin states that the final decree of Trent was as far removed 
from Pelagianism as from Protestantism. It is not therefore 
sufficient simply to' describe the Catholic view as 
semi-Pelagian, or privative. Sin has a positive element as well 
as a negative, a turning to something created as well as a 
turning away from God, the former being emphasised by Thomist 
thought, the latter by Scotist.(69) 
However Trent was also a refutation of Luther's teaching 
about sin and particularly about justification, the decrees 
about sin being, to some extent, a preamble for the crucial 
discussion on justification.(70) It is this element of Trent's 
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teaching which gives some weight to its designation as 
semi-Pelagian. In the fifth decree the Council insisted on the 
removal of original sin and guilt in baptism and that 
concupiscence, which remains after baptism, is not sin "in the 
true and proper sense", although it does come from and incline 
to sin. After baptism the human being is "innocent, unstained, 
pure and guiltless ... so that nothing henceforth holds them 
back from entering into heaven."(71) This teaching was directed 
against Luther's view that concupiscence, remaining after 
baptism, is sinful, although its sin and guilt are not imputed 
to us because of the imputation, instead, of Christ's 
righteousness. Trent was to go on, in the decrees on 
justification, to affirm justification as a real state of 
holiness, not an imputed status or a ''fiction". The original 
sin which is removed by baptism is the absence of original 
righteousness and holiness, this deficiency being made up by the 
grace of justification which is interior and habitual. In this 
justified state human beings are liable to sin and have no 
certainty about their predestination to eternal life (this also 
was directed against the reformer's views on assurance): they 
must therefore work out their salvation and trust God for the 
grace of perseverance. Trent's teaching puts an emphasis on 
human co-operation with grace which Luther and Calvin could not 
have accepted because of their belief in the persistence, after 
baptism, of the moral deterioration involved in sin. For Trent 
the justified human being is really just; the remaining, 
post-baptismal concupiscence is not sin as such, and so the area 
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of practical importance becomes that of actual sins. 
Lying behind this teaching is the distinction between the 
human being's essential character, the pura naturalis, and 
original righteousness, the donum superadditum. It is because 
the fall involved the loss of original righteousness not the 
corruption of humanity's essential nature that the remission of 
sin and justification result in the human being essential 
goodness. The human being's inclination to virtue may be 
weakened but the integrity and the essential capacity of the 
natural human powers are not lost. Humanity can therefore play 
a significant role in salvation. The adequate fulfilment of the 
law by human effort (with grace) is possible and the gift of 
eternal life is reward as well as grace. 
This Catholic anthropology is thus basically optimistic, 
seeing sin chiefly as a privation which leaves humanity with 
their powers of decision and seeing redemption and justification 
as enabling real holiness, and at least partial restoration of 
the individual to the original state of righteousness.(72) 
Janelle considers this optimism in more detail in his analysis 
of the Catholic reformation as not only a response to the 
Protestant reformation and to the need for practical and 
administrative reforms, but also the expression of a spirit of 
piety which had been spreading throughout the previous century, 
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particularly in the forms of mystical writings and the Christian 
humanism of Erasmus and More. This piety he describes as first 
and foremost optimistic, with its trust in human nature and the 
beauty of the human soul, its search for methods to enhance the 
gradual ascent of the human soul towards union with God, and its 
stress not on the decayed nature of humanity, but on its bright 
prospects. 
The divergence between the Protestant and Catholic 
anthropologies can thus be described most simply as that between 
a pessimistic and an optimistic view of humanity and sin. 
However, as in any such heated debate, both sides are likely to 
be pushed to extremes by the very fact of the conflict, as were 
Augustine and Pelagius. This outline should be seen as a fairly 
general one, for this reason; also because of the differences 
which existed in either camp.(73) Melanchthon, like Zwingli, 
tended towards a more privative view of sin and towards a 
Thomistic understanding of post-baptismal concupiscence as the 
materia of sin, its guilt being removed. He succeeded in 
getting a less pessimistic doctrine than that of Luther accepted 
in the Augsburg Confession. The Arminians reacted more 
violently to the Protestant teachings on human degradation. 
Similar differences and reactions existed within the Catholic 
Church, notably in the Jansenists' argument for a pessimistic, 
Augustinian anthropology. This outline will serve, however, as 
a general indication of the dominant emphases of Catholic and 
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Protestant theology as they emerged from the Reformation period. 
·:!2. Liberal Optimism and the Subject 
Schleiermacher. 
It is tempting to apply the anachronistic labels "evolutionary" 
and "existentialist" to Schleiermacher's theological 
anthropology. He adumbrates ideas which have developed in our 
century under the influence of evolutionary and existential 
thought, and has himself been directly influential on Christian 
theology. His perspective on sin in The Christian Faith is 
significant because of his role in the growth of liberalism and 
it is his legacy which is greatly reflected and reacted against 
in contemporary theology, particularly in that of Barth. (74) 
one of Schleiermacher's central ideas, developed in interaction 
with the philosophical psychology of his day, is that of the 
religious self-consciousness, the highest level of 
consciousness, whose content is the feeling of absolute 
dependence - i.e. awareness of being posited by something other 
than oneself. This is the true realm of piety, in which 
Schleiermacher was concerned to identify the essence of 
Christianity and to use as a hermeneutic for the whole of 
Christian theology. Piety or God-consciousness is the content 
of redemption and constitutes humanity's link with God. However 
we should first note a significant point which has relevance to 
sin; the realm of God-consciousness is the spirit as opposed to 
the flesh. This is not, strictly speaking, a classical 
spirit-flesh dualism, as the flesh has no innate evil power, its 
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dominance being more a matter of temporal priority, but it is 
seen as the lower nature, the abode, or realm in some sense, of 
sin.(75) 
A second determinative idea is that of redemption. It is 
in a sense a false distinction to talk of God-consciousness, 
consciousness of sin and of redemption separately, for the three 
belong very much together. The God-consciousness, itself 
dependent on Christ as Redeemer to bring it into real existence, 
involves consciousness of sin. Indeed, Schleiermacher's concern 
is not so much with the universal God-consciousness but with the 
Christian redeemed consciousness. Thus the idea of redemption 
is as central as that of consciousness. Sin, related to 
redemption, is defined as "that which evokes redemption". It is 
also with a view to his idea on sin that Schleiermacher 
considers that the term Redemption may in some cases need 
redefining.(76) Also, it is only through redemption that the 
divine attributes can be related to sin(77) - which brings us to 
the next point. Thirdly, the Christian self-consciousness 
shapes our idea of God who, strictly speaking, can be posited 
only as the "Whence'' of our feeling of dependence. We cannot 
really go further than this in our description of God himself: 
any description of his attributes is really a description of the 
way our feeling of dependence is related to him. In practice 
Schleiermacher relates most of the divine attributes to the 
divine causality, although he does come to say at the end of The 
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Christian Faith that the essence of God is love and wisdom, 
derived from our awareness of redemption. This sits rather 
uncomfortably with his otherwise very Platonic concept of God as 
the indivisible, impassible unmoved mover - an inconsistency 
which Richard Niebuhr notes - although this more approachable 
conception of God brings us closer to Schleiermacher's aim to 
centre dogmatics and theological discussion once more on true 
piety. Schleiermacher was also particularly concerned with the 
relationship between individuality and community,to which I will 
refer again in Chapter Six (p.303 and note 17). 
In a sense, the fact of sin is a given for Schleiermacher 
as part of the consciousness of God and of redemption - there is 
a distinction to be noted, however, in that God-consciousness is 
taken as given, whereas sin is a necessary presupposition of the 
consciousness of redemption, and so could be said to be derived 
from it. 
It is solely on that inward experience (i.e. the 
inward and immediate consciousness of universal 
sinfulness) that our consciousness of the need of 
redemption depends.(78) 
so he denies the possibility of seeing the consciousness of sin 
as a consciousness of good still lacking in us, on the grounds 
that this would nullify the reality of sin and the need for a 
redeemer, and would thereby make it scarcely a Christian view at 
all.(79) However, this is not to conclude that sin is important 
to Schleiermacher merely as the prerequisite for redemption 
(although this is the way it sometimes seems) - but rather to 
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point out the centrality of redemption. 
We should also note, in relation to the fact of sin, that 
Schleiermacher deals with sin in isolation from other doctrines 
-e.~., redemption or Christology- as an expedient for the 
purpose of his exposition, while insisting, as we have noted, 
that consciousness of sin and of grace always belong together, 
the one relating to consciousness of alienation from God, the 
other to communion with God. This recalls the focus of the 
majority of earlier writers on the centrality of salvation for 
all theology, including the doctrine of sin. With 
Schleiermacher, as with other theologians we will consider, this 
centrality of redemption is narrowed down further to the person 
of Christ. 
There are two implications for Schleiermacher of the fact 
of the consciousness of sin. Firstly, it implies knowledge of 
some better state from which sin represents a deviation. 
Rejecting the idea of deviation from the law, as either being 
synonymous with deviation from God's will, or smuggling in a 
non-Christian distinction between God and his law, he says that 
the knowledge of a better state is original perfection. This 
original perfection, which exists in us as in Adam before, 
during and after our (and his) first sin, is our predisposition 
towards God-consciousness. This includes the consciousness of a 
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faculty of attaining this consciousness of God (80), and also 
includes the impulse to express the God-consciousness which is 
part of the corporate nature of redemption. It is in comparison 
with this original perfection that we recognise sin as a 
derangement of our nature. Secondly, in connection with the 
sin-grace antithesis, the consciousness of sin must always 
eventually arise out of the "vision of Christ's perfection". 
Sin and grace are therefore linked as consciousness of sin is 
the beginning of regeneration, due to Christ's redeeming 
activity. This second point also relates to the spirit-flesh 
theme, in that the designation of the activity of the flesh as 
sin is dependent on the state of the spirit, i.e., sin is seen 
as such if the God-consciousness is sufficiently developed for 
there to be a conflict between the two. 
Going on from the fact of sin to the nature of sin, 
original sin is the focal point arising from Schleiermacher's 
consideration of Protestant Confessional Statements. 
Schleiermacher rejects the idea of a historical fall as the 
origin of sin firstly as irrelevant because unverifiable in 
terms of our self-consciousness, and secondly as irrelevant 
because it has no effect on our own consciousness of sin and of 
the need for redemption. Schleiermacher, also rejecting the 
idea of Satan, finds it inexplicable how the first sin could 
have happened had some sinfulness - even potential - not existed 
already. He admits that to allow for the activity of Satan 
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makes an explanation more possible without such sinfulness, but 
even so insists that for Satan's suggestions to take effect 
there must have been some kind of readiness to sin present in 
the soul. This is because Schleiermacher cannot accept more 
than a relative freedom for humanity (i.e. relative to the 
finite world only): more importantly, it would reduce the 
validity of the consciousness of absolute dependence. This 
interpretation also has to do with the fact "that Schleiermacher 
Will accept no real distinction between potentiality and 
actuality, such as is used in explanations of the origins of sin 
in terms of the potentiality inherent in human free will: if 
human beings had the potential to sin before they first did so, 
that is, for Schleiermacher, tantamount to saying that they had 
prior sinfulness. So it is that Schleiermacher explicates the 
idea of a 
timeless original sinfulness always and everywhere 
inhering in human nature and co-existent with the 
original perfection given along with it(Bl), 
the relationship between the two tendencies being one of 
vacillation. This original sinfulness is a received condition 
of guilt: it is complete incapacity for good (i.e. for that 
which is determined for the God-consciousness), and has its 
grounds in our own being. For the idea of imputed guilt 
Schleiermacher substitutes the idea of an absolutely identical 
common guilt for all. The sin of all generations is original, 
in the sense of being universal and prior to individual action, 
it is also originated with regard to the previous generation and 
originating with regard to that following. That is, 
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Schleiermacher is claiming that all sin is due to the original 
sinfulness in humanity which, as it existed before the first 
actual sin was committed, cannot be traced to any one human 
being or action - yet it has corporate implications. This 
original sinfulness is only truly original before the individual 
±s ~pontaneously active, although it can grow in itself due to 
individual action, much as a tendency is strengthened by habit. 
So it is both original and originating. This is one point at 
which the relation of the individual to the corporate is 
important. Due to the above, guilt may be said to be 
individual; also because original sin, being grounded in the 
individual, is sufficient grounds for all actual sins, which are 
themselves individual, being determined by individual 
temperament and voluntary action. However, the corporate nature 
of sin and particularly of guilt is the aspect which 
Schleiermacher stresses. Original sin is a corporate matter, 
transmitted by the individual to others, and implanted within 
them(82), and therefore 
.. whether ... we regard it as guilt and deed or rather 
as a spirit and a state, it is in either case common 
to all .. (is) in each the work of all and in all the 
work of each.(83) 
The link between th~ universality of guilt and corporate 
responsibility seems somewhat weak, but it is important for 
Schleiermacher because it is linked to consciousness of the 
universal need of redemption: 
... the denial of the corporate character of original 
sin and a lower estimate of the redemption wrought by 
Christ usually go hand in hand.(84) 
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The question of the punishment of original sin is also 
linked to the nature of redemption and Schleiermacher denies 
that original sin should be punished. This is explained further 
in connection with his idea of God, but here he simply gives as 
a reason that the prospect of punishment would be a danger to 
Christian piety, our need of redemption being mediated solely, 
so he claims, by a consciousness of penal desert, which would 
make it less pure. The flesh-spirit dualism is also relevant 
here: he adds that in this case, the sensuous is being made the 
standard for the spiritual. 
Schleiermacher, of course, offers an account not merely of 
original sin but also of actual sin. Again denying a real 
distinction between potentiality and actuality, Schleiermacher 
denies the possibility of any isolation in practice of original 
sin from actual sin; only that whereas original sin has grounds 
within the individual prior to action, generation of actual sin 
requires outside factors of some kind. However original sin is 
the "unfailing seed" of actual sin. So as original sin is the 
incapacity for God-consciousness, actual sin is the arrestment 
of the power of the spirit, it is that which obstructs and 
opposes the development of the God-consciousness. It is here 
that the conflict between the flesh and the spirit really comes 
into focus. The idea is dependent on Schleiermacher's 
contention early in The Christian Faith(85) that the realm of 
the God-consciousness is the highest grade of self-consciousness 
60 
in which the subject-object antithesis is overcome. Development 
of this level requires the development also of the second level 
(self-consciousness itself) to the extent where the lowest grade 
(animal consciousness appropriate to young children) has 
disappeared. Due to the time this takes, and to the corporate 
nature of guilt which makes sin a community matter, the flesh 
gets a foothold before the spirit comes to be a reality, gains 
strength through practice and habit, and by the time the spirit 
is conscious the flesh is entrenched enough to rebel. 
It is here that the spheres of sin and of 
God-consciousness, as the flesh and the spirit, are clearly 
explicated. The flesh, "the totality of the so-called lower 
powers of the soul", is designated as the "source of everything 
in human action which is incompatible with the 
God-consciousness."(86) Again, does this also reflect the 
influence on Schleiermacher of his reading of Plato? The 
parallels are obvious, as with the gnostic myths of sin and the 
beginning, but we should note the important distinction that the 
flesh in itself is not evil.(87) To say that sin is the victory 
of flesh over spirit is to say that because the flesh is 
predominant over the spirit, the moment is sin: "what gives a 
moment the character of sin is the self-centred activity of the 
flesh."(BB) This also recalls Augustine's understanding of 
concupiscence. Similarly, 
... all activities of 
subservient to the 
the 
spirit 
flesh 
and 
are 
all are 
good when 
evil when 
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severed from it. 
This does not mean, however, that the actions of the regenerate 
are invariably good - there is still some conception of actions 
as good or bad in themselves - but his sins are such as do not 
obstruct the spiritual life of the agent himself or of the 
community.(89) They are no longer originating in themselves, and 
are merely "the shadow of sin". This parallels the description 
of actions which precede the development of the 
God-consciousness as only the "germ" of sin, which "cannot at 
this stage be regarded as sin in the proper sense." This 
reference to sin "in the proper sense", like the patristic 
understanding of "sin properly so called" emphasises the 
importance of the discussion about the language being used here, 
which is to be considered in more detail in the conclusion, 
Chapter Six (pp.304f). So what we have here is a radical 
definition of sin as resistance to the God-consciousness, upon 
which attitude depends the classification of specific actions as 
either sins or merely shadowing sin. In this we see again the 
contrast of Schleiermacher's pietism with the negative and arid 
theologising against which he reacted. The nearest 
Schleiermacher gets to any kind of practical ethic is to say 
that "sin consists in our desiring what Christ condemns and vice 
versa."(90) 
From the above it can be seen that the dualism of original 
righteousness and original sin is seen by Schleiermacher as part 
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of human nature as originally created, and as thus having a 
divine causality. However, he implicitly deals with the problem 
of an imperfect creation by relating the creation of humanity 
with inherent sinfulness specifically to redemption. So sin is 
part of the divine economy, wrought by God with a view to 
redemption, not as something contrary to his will. This is why 
the link between sin and grace is so important - indeed, sin 
only exists as "attached to grace."(91) 
This appears to be a notable deviation from the orthodox 
view of sin and its insistence that God is in no way the author 
of sin. For Schleiermacher it is the solution to the problem of 
the existence of sin and evil in view of divine omnipotence and 
causality, which is the most important question sin raises for 
him. I have already referred to Schleiermacher's attitude to 
the doctrine of the fall and the idea of free will involving 
sin. He cannot give sin or evil any existence prior to or 
independent of the creation of humanity because he rules out as 
inadmissible any distinction in the divine causality between 
causing and permitting and he is aware that the danger is 
therefore Manichaeism. His solution, not unlike Calvin's, is 
that sin is ordained by God as part of redemption, but this is 
the extent of its existence for Schleiermacher. 
We have no choice ..• than to assert that sin, in so 
far as it cannot be grounded in the divine causality, 
cannot exist for God, but that, in so far as the 
consciousness of our sin is a true element of our 
being, and sin therefore a reality, it is ordained by 
God as that which makes redemption necessary.(92) 
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This in turn is why sin cannot be said to be rebellion against 
God - it is related to human beings and their needs, and only 
via this function to God. Neither is it related to God in terms 
of punishment as orthodox doctrine and tradition would largely 
see it.(93) Schleiermacher dismisses as primitive and derisory 
the idea of God's wrath or offence at sin. He also denies the 
real existence of evil, as this also would necessitate that God 
was its ultimate cause. However, he does see the interpretation 
we give of natural "imperfections" (concreated) as being evil, 
as connected in some way with sin: a connection ordained by God 
as a form of punishment, which is not reformative or 
retributive, but preventative, and thus this too is linked to 
redemption. This is the real crux of the problem of 
Schleiermacher's understanding of sin. At the centre of his 
methodology and epistemology is the reality of sin as the 
presupposition on which rests our consciousness of the need for 
redemption: yet he maintains that it is not really real because 
not divinely caused in itself. Yet to draw too great a 
distinction between finite and infinite causality and reality is 
surely against his own principle that divine preservation and 
natural causation are essentially the same thing. It is a 
tortuous argument to which Schleiermacher is forced by his 
conception of God - which in turn is due to his emphasis on the 
self-consciousness, and by which he hopes to solve the problem 
of reconciling sin with the divine omnipotence as he sees it: he 
claims that 
The more 
of sin for 
closely these two things (the non-existence 
God and sin as ordained by God for 
redemption) are capable of being unified in the sphere 
of actual fact ..• and the more definitely we can 
keep them apart in our thinking, so that neither will 
seem to involve the contrary of the other, the more 
completely shall we find all difficulties 
disappear .... (94) 
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The implications of Schleiermacher's idea of sin lie 
chiefly in the area of Christ's work, and the myth of the 
beginning which it assumes. The human predicament being seen as 
the conflict of flesh and spirit (i.e. God-consciousness), 
rather than truly as bondage, slavery to sin, redemption becomes 
not delivery as such, but the decisive aid in resolving the 
conflict absorption into the power of Christ's perfect 
God-consciousness which gives power to our own spirit. 
Schleiermacher acknowledges that the term redemption is no 
longer the most appropriate term for Christ's achievement in 
comparison with such a description as "completion of human 
nature".(95) As we noted earlier, there is a symmetry between 
the doctrines of sin and salvation, and serious alteration in 
the one will inevitably involve similar alteration in the other 
if the symmetry is retained at all. However, we should note 
that Schleiermacher does give place to the pain and misery of 
sin on the human level, from which Christ can also be said to 
redeem. His sufferings, however, are no longer central to 
redemption. They have an important sympathetic role but no 
special reconciling value. Reconciliation becomes the 
assumption of believers into the fellowship of Christ's 
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"unclouded blessedness" and so consciousness of forgiveness 
replaces the consciousness of sin, which is in itself 
so little an essential part of the being of man 
that we can never regard it as anything else than a 
disturbance of nature. 
To sum up, the chief determining factors in Schleiermacher•s 
doctrine of sin are his concept of God's omnipotence- in common 
with Christian theologians down the ages - and what would today 
be called an evolutionary and existential anthropology. This 
latter leads him to an idea of sin which seems to be defined so 
thoroughly in anthropological terms that it fails to connect 
adequately with God, despite his omnipotence. This, in turn, 
means that although sin is methodologically important for 
Schleiermacher, it seems to lack the doctrinal weight which 
would allow it to inform his ideas of God and of salvation. In 
Chapter Three we will note the parallels with Barth's ideas 
about sin.(96) This analysis of Schleiermacher also serves to 
highlight themes which have continued to be influential 
throughout the history of the understanding of sin, and which 
have persisted into the twentieth century: in particular the 
conception of sin as negative and the understanding of 
anthropology from the perspective of Christology. 
From these brief outlines we can see the agenda which has 
been set for discussion about sin. We might well expect the 
same issues to be important in twentieth century theology. If 
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they are no longer the same significance then this change could 
itself be significant. This traditional agenda focuses on the 
issue of free-will and divine determination as a debate which is 
crucial for our understanding of sin: does the fact of human sin 
mean that human beings are self-determining? Do the effects of 
sin include human inability to take an active role in accepting 
salvation? If human beings have no ultimate control over their 
lives can they be held responsible for sin? Do certain views of 
the determination of human existence by sin lead to unacceptable 
fatalism? The question of responsibility for sin and the 
relation of sin to God's will, power and ordination of reality 
is also crucial, with particular emphasis on the declaration 
that God is not responsible for sin, and on the need to avoid 
dualism. The potential of sin to affect God's plans is another 
key issue. 
Discussion about the nature of sin has centred around the 
idea of negativity, sin as a defection rather than a positive 
force; something which has a different kind of reality to that 
of God's good creation. Linked with this idea is the question 
of sin's status as something which is potent, dangerous and 
destructive, and yet something which is overcome and which 
cannot ultimately assail God's goodness. We have also begun to 
see clearly the interconnections between sin and salvation so 
that increased pessimism about human sin often accompanies 
increased optimism about salvation. 
67 
Particularly significant in twentieth century theology, 
where the tendency has become more dominant, is the emphasis on 
sin's "secondary'' nature as a doctrine which is to be derived 
from salvation in Christ, it is a presupposition of this more 
important fact. With Schleiermacher we also begin to see some 
of the implications of the rejection of a historical fall.(97) 
These, then, are the perspectives and issues traditionally 
associated with the doctrine of sin. It is clear from the 
analyses above, and from the issues associated with the 
doctrine, that a doctrine of sin is inextricably linked with 
other doctrines, presuppositions and definitions. To understand 
particular views of sin it is essential to understand the 
corresponding views of the relationship between God and 
humanity, and of creation and salvation. We see that sin is an 
essentially systematic doctrine, i.e. it cannot be understood 
without consideration of these interrelationships. The 
functions of the doctrine may include a significant 
determination of human nature or of relationship with God as 
well as its role as the presupposition of salvation. Its 
contents and significance may in turn be determined by the 
doctrines of creation and salvation which also have important 
implications for humanity in relation to God. It is all the 
more important to see sin within the context of these systematic 
relationships because of the ever-present paradox of freedom and 
necessity. 
In short, 
... we cannot speak properly of sin without speaking, 
at the same time, of God, his will, grace, salvation, 
reconciliation with God, repentance, forgiveness of 
sin etc. Sin is integral to a complex network of 
theological and doctrinal discourse and we cannot 
abstract it from that context without distorting or 
dissolving its meaning.(98) 
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We will therefore go on to a more thorough examination of sin in 
this systematic context, taking a number of key figures as 
examples of different contemporary perspectives and paying 
particular attention to the inevitable relationships which we 
have seen in this chapter between sin and God's creation, sin 
and Christology, and sin and salvation. This analysis will 
concentrate on these interrelationships and ramifications of sin 
as much as on definitions of the content and specific meaning of 
sin, hoping that the real significance and "shape" of the 
doctrine will thus emerge. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KARL BARTH AND EMIL BRUNNER 
As an exploration of the doctrine of sin and as an experiment in 
its connections with other doctrines, my analysis in the next 
three chapters will necessarily involve a panoramic view. This 
means that I will spend time understanding each particular 
theology as a whole, outlining the basic motivations and 
concerns, the determinative presuppositions and the key 
doctrines so that the place and function of the doctrine of sin 
will be seen in its context, so that the doctrine per se can be 
properly understood. This perspective will include some 
consideration of the role of anthropology within the theology in 
question, an issue which is inextricably tied up with the 
definition and the functioning of the doctrine of sin. The aim 
of this broad, but necessarily brief outline, as noted in 
Chapter One, is not a study of the theologians as such, nor of 
their own specific doctrines of sin for their own sakes but it 
is to give us a correct and systematic understanding of "options 
they illuminate" to use Kelsey's phrase.(l) 
The options illuminated by Barth and Brunner arise from 
their dogmatic view of theology. For both Barth and Brunner the 
task of theology as dogmatics is the believing exposition and 
mirroring of the Word of God which functions, in various ways, 
as source and norm. 
In dogmatics our question is: What are we to think and 
say? Of course, that comes after we have learned from 
Scripture where we have to draw this 'what' from, and 
keeping in view the fact that we have to say something 
not just theoretically, but have to call something out 
to the world.(2) 
It is the believing Church itself which, in dogmatics, 
makes its own teaching the object of reflection; 
essentially, dogmatics claims to be an academic study 
controlled by the Church.(3) 
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The theologies which their respective understandings of the Word 
of God have led Barth and Brunner to expound have been variously 
characterised as "theology of the Word', "crisis theology", 
"dialectic theology", "neo-orthodoxy". Each of these titles 
applies to both Barth and Brunner in some respects and at some 
stage in the development of their thought. Both were reacting 
against theological liberalism with its supposed optimism and 
its anthropocentricity, represented first of all by 
Schleiermacher. Points of comparison are to be expected between 
Barth and Brunner, given their common starting point in outlook 
and motivation. However the rift between them proclaimed in 
Natural Theologv and Nein! in 1934 is of particular 
significance for this thesis, centering around the role of 
anthropology within theology and the doctrines of humanity and 
sin. It is the differences between Barth and Brunner which will 
particularly highlight the implications of the perspectives of a 
dogmatic and "neo-orthodox" theology for our area and the 
tensions involved. Critique and a consideration of this 
comparison will come at the end of the chapter, after general 
outlines of both Barth and Brunner. 
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Revelation and knowledge of God 
While not wishing to enter the debate about the possibility of 
isolating one key doctrine or principle in Barth's theology in 
terms of which everything else should be understood(4), a 
central factor is Barth's view of God's revelation of grace in 
Christ.(5) This revelation, the Word of God, is the task and the 
possibility as well as the object of theology as such. It is 
the revelation of God by himself to humanity, it is his 
"coming'', which is totally dependent on his own will and action. 
Behind this emphasis on the sole efficiency of God's action, at 
least in Barth's earlier work, is his insistence on God's 
irrevocable otherness.(6) There is no unity between humanity and 
God as there is underlying other perceptions. Barth therefore 
rejects vehemently the notion of the analogia entis, which 
presupposes some such unity, preferring the analogia gratia or 
analogia fidei, by which any correspondence between human 
theologising and talk about God and the truth of God is due to 
God's grace, not to any innate or inevitable coherence . 
... our whole inquiry as to the knowability of God can 
consist only in a conscious and therefore finally a 
confident return to the decision which has been taken 
in the being of God the decision that God is 
knowable.(7) 
by the capacity of the object, it is a true 
viewing and conceiving.(B) 
In The Christian Life, which includes Barth's latest writings, 
Barth still maintains this unlikeness between God and humanity: 
What is common to him and them is neither a nature 
that embraces and determines him and them, nor an act 
common to him and them, but simply the free will and 
the free work of his grace, goodness and mercy, a 
participation in his being and life which is freely 
granted to them, but which, even as it is granted to 
them, remains his and is never theirs.(9) 
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So knowledge of God is dependent on God's giving himself to be 
known. The stance of the human being as the subject dealing 
with the object in theology is determined by that object: "Only 
because God posits Himself as the object is man posited as the 
knower of God''(lO); knowledge of God is "an event utterly 
undetermined by man but utterly determined by God as its 
object."(ll) This understanding lies behind Barth's rejection of 
Schleiermacher's anthropology and his emphatic Nein! to Brunner 
and to any suggestion of "natural theology" because of their 
attribution to humanity of some inherent and material 
potentiality for knowledge of God. For Barth such a capacity 
presupposes unacceptable continuity between the human being and 
God. It is unacceptable because God's being cannot be on the 
same plane as ours due to his nature as the origin and boundary 
of all being. It would also allow for the possibility of human 
beings somehow having control over revelation, and having God 
"at (their) disposal" - even the possibility of a human being 
choosing for or against knowledge of God, which would mean a 
diminution in God. Despite the impression which a first reading 
of Nein! might give, Barth does accept an objective basis for 
knowledge of God and of the virtutes Dei revealed in creation 
but this is totally hidden from the "natural human being" as a 
result of the fall.(l2) 
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In The Christian Life Barth goes even further in saying 
that the concealment of what God does objectively, as Creator in 
the world, is itself broken and becomes transparent at least in 
places. 
In spite of all the worldliness and unfaithfulness and 
ignorance of people does not God in fact see to it 
that the knowledge of God is not ineffective, that 
people must know about God and therefore know 
what they do not want to know or in fact seem to know? 
Must they not simply because the objective knowledge 
of God seems to be stronger than all their 
unfaithfulness and ignorance, because his openness for 
the world seems to be stronger than its being closed 
against him? Will not this objective knowledge be at 
least as strong in places as that mediated to the 
world through the witness of Christianity?(l3) 
However Barth does not really accept the implications of this, 
and while accepting the "serious force" of these impressions, 
says that they should not be systematised along the lines of 
natural theology. Natural theology means for him the 
transformation of revelation from a question put to humanity 
into an answer given by human beings.(l4) Barth's insistence on 
the human role in theology as that of a recipient is the 
theological basis for what Sykes calls Barth's "romantic 
aversion to abstract clarity", which denies the theologian the 
right to clarify his meaning through fear that he may thus find 
himself controlling· it.(l5) This train of thought reflects 
Barth's reaction to theological liberalism and to Feuerbach's 
critique of religion as man's projection of himself. It also 
ties up with his view of anthropology. 
Theological Anthropology 
Humanity's status as the subject determined by the self-giving 
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of the "object'', God, means that theological anthropology is for 
Barth the inquiry into the creatureliness presupposed in this 
relationship and made known by it.(l6) A human being's position 
as the object of theological anthropology depends on his or her 
relationship to and being addressed by God. 
We do not understand man in his own light. In all 
these determinations we understand man as the man who 
is set before God by God himself.(l7) 
In direct opposition to a view such as Rahner's (see Chapter 
Four) Barth maintains that "theology can never be anthropology 
because it is the interpretation of the Word of God spoken to 
the actuality and truth of man."(l8) In short, anthropology has 
a fairly subsidiary role, derived exclusively from the primary 
task of theology, which is "a response to election''.(l9) There 
is no theological anthropology in its own right.(20) 
As the primary source of knowledge about humanity the Word 
of God and God's determination of human beings have priority 
over any other kind of knowledge about humanity. Empirical 
observation has only a subsidiary and supplementary place and 
cannot lead to any knowledge of true, i.e. redeemed, human 
beings. The data of science can be recognised as part of the 
symptoms of and related to true humanity once we have this 
knowledge. In the light of God's word the true nature of 
humanity can be seen even in its degenerate nature.(2l) Barth 
emphasises at least in his later work - the status given to 
humanity as the object of God's revelation and thus of 
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theological anthropology, and says that more precisely, the 
Christian science and doctrine of God should be termed 
"The-anthropology".(22) However "speculative" anthropology is 
the enemy of Christianity, positing an independent viewpoint, 
beginning ultimately with self-confidence.(23) Barth asserts 
that we must not allow our opponents to determine the form of 
the question about humanity. Human self-understanding is not to 
be taken seriously, it is to be reversed, refounded.(24) This 
determination of "real humanity" as "redeemed humanity" has 
serious implications, as Brunner noted, and as we Will consider 
in the critique. 
However Barth does, again in The Humanity of God, allow a 
place for "legitimate Christian thinking from below and moving 
up, from man who is taken hold of by God to God who takes hold 
of man'', for "the attempt of Christian anthropocentrism". 
Theology is in reality not only the doctrine of God, 
but the doctrine of God and man ... Starting from 
below, as it were, with Christian man, it (nineteenth 
century theology) could and should have struggled its 
way upward to an authentic explication of the 
Christian faith. It could and should have sought 
increasingly to validate the Christian message as 
God's act and word, the ground, object and content of 
faith. ( 25) 
Barth, however, does not himself start "from below" in this way. 
I will say more about his doctrine of humanity in due course. 
An important corollary of the above is that Christian 
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revelation and theology as such are not, for Barth, open to 
independent or external assessment or validation. 
'From outside' means from the point of view of a human 
position where truth, dignity and competence are so 
ascribed to human seeing, understanding and judging as 
to be judge over the reality and possibility of what 
happens here. But this is the very thing which is 
excluded by the inner understanding of what 
happens •.. (26) 
It is against this kind of position that Pannenberg insists on 
anthropology as precisely the area where theology must do battle 
with enlightenment atheism in order to be heard and to have 
value for the modern world. (27) Although Barth criticises 
nineteenth century theology for making confrontation with the 
world into the guiding principle of theology, he sees its 
exposing of theology to the world as its strength: 
Obviously theology has always been to some extent open 
towards and related to the world, consciously or 
unconsciously. It should be so. Retreats behind 
Chinese Walls never served theology well. It must be 
engaged in conversation with the contemporary world, 
whatever the means of dialogue.(28) 
However the position from which this conversation takes place 
must for Barth be the position of the knowledge of God, a 
position from which we can understand all positions, a 
"neutrality", "full of superiority and unassailability".(29) 
God, Creation and Election 
What is the character of the Christian God who reveals himself 
to humanity? For Barth in his earlier work, God is 
characterised chiefly by otherness; he is incomprehensible, 
inconceivable, unsearchable, he has might, ability and 
possibility. All reality rests on God as its possibility.(30) 
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God's power is not power in itself, but is legitimate power 
based on law, potestas not potentia.(3l) In The Humanity of God 
Barth analyses this early tendency as a reaction against the 
nineteenth century reduction of God to a symbol or an expressipn 
of human experience, which led Barth himself to view God as the 
wholly other, isolated, abstracted and absolutised: 
We... set it over against man, this miserable wretch 
- not to say boxed his ears with it in such a 
fashion that it continually showed greater similarity 
to the deity of the God of the philosophers than to 
the deity of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.(32) 
He goes on to set out the new task of deriving from this new 
knowledge of God's deity from knowledge of his humanity: deity 
is to be understood in dialogue with human beings, only here 
does it find its meaning and power.(33) So also in The Gift of 
Freedom he says that God's freedom is not unlimited possibility 
or naked sovereignty but it exists in the will and determination 
to be humanity's God. 
This will and freedom of God is expressed in creation and 
at the centre of creation is Christ. The Incarnation represents 
the overlapping of God and humanity, eternity and time, and 
Christ is therefore the security for the reality of creature and 
Creator.(35) our humanity, derived from Christ's, is also 
between the two worlds of heaven and earth. (36) So it is in 
Christ that it is possible that "God does not grudge the world 
distinct from Himself, its own reality, nature and 
freedom."(37), and that while the terminus£ guo of creation is 
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the good pleasure of the free omnipotence of the divine love, 
its terminus ad guem is the reality elected, posited and limited 
by the divine love, of something not divine, something 
absolutely independent.(38) Another way Barth expresses this is 
in the coterminous nature of creation and covenant: "Creation is 
the outward basis of the covenant (Gen.l) and the covenant is 
the inward basis of creation (Gen.2)."(39) Creation is grace, it 
is a temporal analogue of the event by which God is the Father 
of the son(40), and it is God's election, in Christ, of 
humanity. This thought is decisive for Barth's theology. 
Dogmatics has no concern with providing a cosmology or world 
view because its concern is this electing word of God. This 
means that for Barth the doctrine of creation in practice means 
anthropology: its real concern is the relationship of God and 
humanity.(41) Creation is not just the beginning of the created 
order and thus of God's relationship with it, but it is the 
determination of that order. 
The determination for God, for brotherhood with his 
Son, which is granted to human nature in and with its 
creation, is the unlost and unlosable determination of 
his (the Christian's) existence, too, no matter 
whether it be fulfilled or not in his life.(42) 
God's election in creation has two particular corollaries. 
Firstly it means that human beings are important because they 
are the ones whom God has chosen. Election is the basis of the 
distinction of human beings as such in creation. 
Man is not elected to intercourse with God because, by 
virtue of his humanity, he deserved such preference. 
He is elected through God's grace alone. He is 
elected, however, as the being especially endowed by 
God's grace. This is manifest in his special bodily 
nature ... (43) 
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Human beings are the theological centre of creation, despite 
their insignificance as creatures among creatures.(44) Human 
beings, as elected in Christ, also are involved in this 
overlapping of heaven and earth, "equally bound and committed to 
both."(45) This position of being "in-between" is founded on 
humanity's election in Christ who was first "in-between" in the 
Incarnation. Any talk of capacity in humanity is again ruled 
out. The fact of election transcends the being of all God 
created. It happens to and not in human nature and its 
possibilities, and not human history and its 
development.(46) This is to say that anthropology must be 
derived from Christology. Our truth is our being - as created 
and elected - in Christ. The "special task" of theological 
anthropology is to see what the "creaturely nature of man 
unbroken by sin is."(47) This raises an obvious problem because 
human beings are sinful and Christ is God. Barth outlines 
certain minimal requirements and criteria for a definition of or 
knowledge of humanity which can be derived from Christ: 
- humanity must be seen as in relationship with God. 
humanity is conditioned by the fact that revelation is for 
human beings. 
- human beings are under God's Lordship. 
-human being and action consist in being for God.(48) 
There is no abstract humanity and therefore no 
correspondingly abstract human self-understanding. 
Man is no more, no less, no other than what he is 
through and with and for Jesus Christ Without 
Christ he would not be man at all. 
Thus the Christian view of man in all its 
particularity is basic and normative for the view of 
man in general and as such. What the Christian knows 
about himself he has to attest to the non-Christian as 
valid also for him .... (49) 
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Secondly, as a corollary of God's election in creation, sin is a 
possibility excluded by creation and covenant.(50) Evil has no 
place in the creation of God or the creatureliness of human 
beings(51), it "can be explained neither from the side of the 
Creator nor from that of the creature, neither as the action of 
the Creator nor as the life-act of the creature ... "(52). As we 
shall see however Barth does try to explain sin's existence in 
his problematic work on Nothingness. Although Barth does also 
want to insist on the reality of sin the being of a human being 
is not changed by sin(53), but the human spirit is "naturally 
Christian".(54) "There is no man but the man of the 
covenant.''(55) We will come back to Barth's view of sin later. 
Redemption and the Incarnation 
Pursuing the nature of anthropology as deriving from 
Christology, we find that this is part and parcel of Barth's 
understanding of redemption as centering around the Incarnation. 
The nature of human being is the nature of being redeemed by 
Christ, a redemption achieved through the identification of 
Christ with us and his substitution for us in the fact of the 
Incarnation. Everything is done for us in Jesus Christ. The 
Incarnation was God's will from eternity(56): God's creative 
election and his redemptive election are one and the same. 
Barth was critical of Brunner for distinguishing between 
election or salvation and creation, but his own identification 
of the two raises problems which I will consider later. Jesus 
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is the maintaining and fulfilling of the divine judgment and 
thus of the covenant.(57) The work of atonement is fulfilment of 
the communion between God and humanity as the one who overcomes 
sin.(58) This takes place in the exercising of God's wrath upon 
Jesus so that we are no longer subject to it, there is no 
"second order" of creation, i.e. an order of wrath.(59) Christ 
is the model of both the elect and the rejected so that in their 
rejection the Godless are bearing witness to Christ.(60) In the 
Incarnation Jesus thus reveals human rebellion and God's wrath. 
He is the figure of the human being smitten by God(61), and his 
death is the death of the covenant breaker.(62) His death is 
also the taking away of the power of death, "real death, death 
as the condemnation and destruction of the creature, death as 
the offender against God and the last enemy."(63) In his burial 
the covenant-breaker is buried and destroyed and in his 
resurrection God proclaims his sentence that human beings are 
suitable to be his own partners, in Christ.(64) This is why and 
how the Incarnation is a decision about humanity: 
... a decision ... concerning the being and nature of 
every man. By the mere fact that with him and among 
all other men He too has been made a man.(65) 
... the existence of Jesus Christ is the sovereign 
decision upon the existence of every man.(66) 
Christ's death and resurrection are God's No and Yes to sinful 
and to redeemed humanity. This is why anthropology is 
Christology, because all humanity is to be seen in Christ, in 
whom the decision has been made: 
And we may and should understand ourselves as men seen 
by God in Him, in this man, as men made known to Him 
in this way. Before His eyes from eternity God keeps 
men, each man, in Him, in this One; and not only 
before His eyes but loved and elect and called and 
made His possession ... Everything is decided about 
us in Him, in this one man.(67) 
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In the light of this, godlessness is ontologically impossible. 
"Man is not without, but with God"(68), the world is objectively 
overcome by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ(69), the 
"rent tearing human existence to its depths is healed and closed 
in virtue of a historical relation to genuine 
transcendence."(70) It is because Jesus is sinful humanity that 
"real" humanity is redeemed humanity; in this line of thought 
sinful humanity, I will argue, as humanity living today in 
alienation from God, is lost completely. Barth talks about 
judgment in terms of emancipation(7l), aid and acquittal(72): 
its purpose is that God wills to have humanity for himself(73), 
and he Will not have a negative answer.( 7 4) In short, redemption 
is unopposable it is achieved on humanity's behalf and human 
beings are thus accepted by God, t ·.Jey have no eternal 
choice.(75) God sees human beings in spite of sin, finding them 
blameless in Jesus(76): their ''evil past is not merely crossed 
out because of its irrelevancy. Rathec, it is in the good care 
of God."(77) Again this is linked in with the covenant, which 
Barth describes as "a more or less one-sided decree."(78) Grace 
and covenant is primary, sin is secondary(79) and the choice of 
the godless human against God is void because "he belongs 
eternally to Jesus Christ and therefore is not rejected but 
elected by God in Jesus Christ.''(SO) This is how election occurs 
to and not in human nature and history (cf.p.87f above). So sin 
is secondary to grace, an episode; it belongs within the context 
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of reconciliation(Bl) where it is "overshadowed and crowded into 
the margins by grace."(82) This thought takes the form of a 
broad supralapsarianism within which there is no chance of human 
beings overturning God's purpose which is not only ordained but 
aready achieved before the fall.(83) So God no longer takes 
human beings seriously as sinners.(84) 
If salvation is thus achieved for human beings and they are 
accepted by God then the function of redemption which still 
remains incomplete is the unveiling of this fact. This is an 
area where Barth is much criticised, I believe with reason, and 
it is linked to the charge, also levelled at Barth, of 
universalism, to which I will return. Barth says that all sin 
consists in unbelief, in ignoring our origins in what God has 
done for us: he describes human being in responsibility as 
response to God and thus as a matter of knowledge, and talks of 
human beings fulfilling their being (i.e. the being achieved in 
Christ) in knowledge.(86) Our future as Christians "consists in 
our being shown that all was right and goad irt our existence and 
in this evil; world- history and mirdc.e ~n miracle! - in the 
still more evil Church history .... because Christ was in the 
centre."(87) 
Humanity 
What, then is the role of humanity? The human role is a 
response of faith, gratitude and obedience. In Dogmatics in 
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Outline Barth stresses the nature of faith as the meeting of God 
and humanity(SS), a meeting which involves the gift of freedom 
to human beings enabling them to trust and to choose life with 
God. "Their only choice can be to live this new life, which 
here and now is already theirs, by seeking it where it is, 
namely in Christ." ( 89) In The Christian Barth is 
particularly concerned with the responsive life of the Christian 
which he characterises above all as invocation. This invocation 
of God and his kingdom by the Christian expresses gratitude, 
praise and petition, it is the normal action which corresponds 
to the fulfilment of the covenant in Christ.(90) In these later 
writings Barth is particularly concerned to allow a place for 
the human being as God's partner, co-determining his 
actions.(9l) The Christian's choice may be described as a 
repetition of God's choice(92), but Barth wants here to stress 
human significance in this response and human responsibility in 
knowledge will and act. His work on the Christian life is 
certainly far from unhelpful, but it relates to redeemed 
humanity, as real humanity: we will question whether this is 
sufficient content for a doctrine of humanity per se. The 
content which Barth gives the idea of freedom here, as freedom 
to choose the good, is like that of Augustine. The human being 
does not have choice between good and evil, "sin as an 
alternative is not anticipated or included in the freedom given 
to man by God", but freedom as a gift of God is the unambiguous 
willing of the human being to be God's creature: this is real 
freedom, though an imperfect mirroring of God's own freedom.(93) 
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Barth also characterises the Christian life as one of 
conflict, and here we come back to his thought about sin. We 
exist "between the times and therefore in the sphere of the 
great ambivalence of light and darkness that desecrates the name 
of God."(94) We experience continual war between faith and 
unbelief(95), and the tension of the "fatal contradiction of 
righteousness and sin by which the world and the church are 
ruled ... takes on the scandalous form that I and you are at one 
and the same time both righteous and sinners."(96). We should 
note that if we question the reality of sin for Barth then the 
reality of this tension will also be thrown into doubt. Over 
against this tension is the kingdom of God, which is God Himself 
in the act of "normalizing" human existence, overcoming the 
disorder which still rules humanity.(97) Caught between the 
''contradiction" and the kingdom of God, the Christian's task is 
one of protest against disorder, it is a rising and revolting 
against the actualization of the bad possibility, as a 
complement to the struggle for the actualization of the good 
possibility of the kingdom of God. Does this mean that Barth 
does allow for revolt against God, or rP.jection of him? He 
says, in The Christian Life, that the human world exists in an 
unordered and undetermined relationship to God and is guilty 
because of the ambivalence in which it lives.(98) People have 
themselves appealed to an alien dominion and this is their 
guilt.(99) Again, Barth talks of the fact of ignorance of God in 
the world and the possibility of ignorance of him in the 
Church.(lOO) The relationship of this to what we have said above 
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about the unassailable nature of salvation can be seen partly in 
the declaration that: 
In (Christ's) knowledge of God a decision is made 
concerning theirs. Their knowledge of God is enclosed 
in his ... In relation to Jesus Christ, ignorance of 
God can be recorded and defined only as an exclusive 
and absurd possibility.(lOl) 
Knowledge is thus also achieved on humanity's behalf, in Christ, 
and the very concession that sin and ignorance of God exist is 
blasphemy. However this is also to be seen in terms of Barth's 
doctrine of sin as Nothingness. 
Sin for Barth is essentially the concrete and active form of 
"Nothingness", in which the human being becomes victim and 
servant, sharing the nature of Nothingness, producing and 
extending it.(l02) Knowledge of sin, like knowledge of humanity 
and of God, is derived from Christ. We learn what sin is by 
seeing what it was that Christ overcame. However what we can 
know from ourselves - weakness, decay etc. - is not really sin 
but rather is the negative aspect of crealio~ which belongs to 
the essence of creaturely existence: its ''nG-" which stands in 
antithesis tL .ts "yes", both of which toaether constitute the 
goodness of God's creation.(l03) This antithesis is relative and 
provisional, "merely within creation and therefore dialectical". 
It is the goodness of creation (although continually confronted 
by the menace of Nothingness) because God suffered both its yes 
and its no in Christ and because it is God's work and therefore 
cannot in its nature share in chaos, and thus in opposition to 
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God.(l04) Indeed to treat it as such is to slander creation and 
to overlook the seriousness of real Nothingness. 
Genesis l 
Although Nothingness is Barth's own explanation of sin, he does 
not disregard the Genesis narrative which he designates as 
"saga".(l05) Its status as saga is still the status of biblical 
witness, and it can still have the status of "history" as an 
event between God and humanity, although it is not "historical'' 
in terms of the general conception of historical truth: it is 
truly historical reality, Geschichtliche, but not historical 
history, historische Geschichte, and it reflects purely divine 
events.(l06) Barth rejects the category of myth as throwing 
doubt upon the substance of the Bible witness, and as seeing the 
events of myth not as historical but as "so-called non-spatial 
timeless truth, in other words, a human creation."(l07) 
Barth sees Adam as summing up all humanity, not in terms of 
heredity but because he was reached first by the Word of God in 
a way which is typical for all humanity. The garden of Eden 
prefigures the entire situation and history of humanity: all 
history is Adamic history, although not by succession or even by 
imitation: "No one has to be Adam". We are so, however, freely 
and responsibly. Although Adam is not really significant in 
himself, except as the first, primus inter pares, the fall is 
highly significant in setting a definite ''circumference" to 
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history. It is the event which constitutes the plane of 
historical being. Barth is opposed to any emphasis or 
speculation on the pre-fall, golden age, and sees the fall saga 
as functioning to begin the history of the covenant of grace 
with a description of the conflict.(l08) The fall is thus the 
presupposition of our history, not within that history. Adam's 
fall is determinative for humanity therefore not as fate, but as 
the truth of humanity's relationship with God. It is God who 
establishes this relationship.(l09) Given the choice between 
good and evil, a human being will "always" and ''necessarily" 
fail. 
He will not achieve that which is right but that which 
is not right. Unlike God's, man's decision will be a 
decision for evil, destruction and death: not because 
he is man, but because he is only man and not God; 
because the willing of good and salvation and life as 
such is a concern of God which cannot be transferred 
to any other being.(llO) 
However the human decision for evil, for existence without and 
apart from God is an impossible decision, a choice of an 
impossibility. God has already chosen fur human beings in their 
election in Christ and only in ignorance of this fact can a 
human being mistakenly imagine that he or she has the power to 
make eternal choices, "as if he were a second God". 
Genesis is also illuminating with regard to the nature of 
sin which is essentially the refusal to be the creature of God. 
However the real significance of Adam is related to Christ, the 
first and true Adam, of which the other is only a type. The 
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determination of the fall is always to be seen within the 
greater determination of election in Christ. 
Genesis is thus for Barth an "intuitive and poetic picture 
of a prehistorical reality of history", which is, however, to be 
seen within the context of Christology. Barth, like Brunner and 
Ricoeur, sees the serpent as indicating prior evil, but he does 
not stress the anthropological nature of the saga in attributing 
sin to human free choice and such an anthropological exposition 
would not be consistent with other aspects of his thought. 
Nothingness 
The closest Barth comes to an explanation of the origin of sin 
is in his conception of Nothingness. The real and absolute 
antithesis is that between God and Nothingness, and this is also 
the nearest Barth comes to explaining the origin of sin and 
evil. The antic context of Nothingness, as of all that is, is 
God's election. Just as willing implies non-willing, election 
implies rejection. Nothingness is that whict God rejected in 
the act of creating and its existence is thus as inherent 
contradiction, impossible possibi 1 lty.(ll2) It can be ascribed 
no existence at all except ir ronfro~tation with God's 
non-willing. Barth talks about creation as the separation of 
creatureliness and Nothingness(ll3), which, as part of God's 
electing will, is why Nothingness is not to be seen as part of 
human nature. 
That which God renounces and abandons in virtue of his 
decision is not merely nothing. It is nothingness, 
and has as such its own being, albeit malignant and 
perverse. A real dimension is disclosed, and 
existence and form are given to a reality sui generis, 
in the fact that God is wholly and utterly not the 
Creator in this respect. Nothingness is that which 
God does not will. It lives only by the fact that it 
is that which God does not will. But it does live by 
this fact. For not only what God wills, but what He 
does not will, is potent, and must have a real 
correspondence.(ll4) 
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This existence of sin is a third type of existence, distinct 
from the existence of that which exists and the non-existence of 
that which does not exist, and it therefore cannot be the object 
of natural knowledge because it is inexplicable and 
unsystematizable. At this point in his thought Barth 
acknowledges the influence of Schleiermacher from whom we learn 
that the existence of nothingness is in its negation by God's 
grace and that it exists only in relation to God's grace, and we 
will find him also subject to some of the criticisms we made of 
Schleiermacher in Chapter Two. Without God's negation sin would 
be incapable of either reality or being. It "owes its existence 
to God in the sense that He has not elected and willed, but 
ignored, rejected, excluded and judged, or as Schleiermacher 
would say 'negated' it."(llSJ Evil, sin and death, as that to 
which God said no, thus have a "reality behind God's back. But 
if being is to be ascribed to it (evil) at all, and we would 
rather not say that it is non-existent, then it is only the 
power of the being which arises out of the weight of the divine 
'No' .''(116) It is, however, necessary as the presupposition of 
salvation, it must exist because God takes account of it and 
this is why it is not simply that which is not. It is 
the reality on whose account God Himself willed to 
become a creature ... yielding and subjecting Himself to 
it ... in order to overcome it ... , 
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it is "that which brought Jesus to the cross and which he 
defeated and only here can be see its reality."(ll7) Barth 
foresees the question as to why something can have reality when 
God has negated it, but rules the question out of bounds.(llS) 
We should be concerned rather with God's action in the 
Incarnation. 
This existence of impossibility carries over into human 
actions as concrete sin. Choice against God is choice of 
Nothingness, it is null and impotent, as we have seen because of 
election, yet we do sin. This sin is negation, and as such it 
is a reality but is not autonomous.(ll9) It has its basis in 
humanity's fall from God, but this is only an attempted fall and 
alienation, a ''dreadful 'as if'."(l20) This is why ignorance of 
God is a fact, but it is an excluded and absurd 
possibility.(l2l) Thus the reality of sinful humanity is a 
pseudo-reality: yet as such, this existence still has 
catastrophic consequences. ( 122) The conf l, :·t of the Christian 
also can only be that between what is abso~utely and exclusively 
possible and what is absolutely and utterly impossible.(l23) For 
Barth the very existence of sin i~ view of God's good creation 
and his will to elect and save is a paradox, but he has to 
accept the paradox at some level, he does not want merely to 
conclude that sin does not really exist. The extent to which he 
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can avoid this conclusion is a key issue in my critique. Barth 
also talks of the human being as a prisoner of Nothingness - not 
having the capacity to sin.(l24) Nothingness is the "larger" 
reality, it is more than human sin, having also the form of real 
evil and death, and yet it is not a fate inevitably bound up 
with human nature.(l25) 
The "contradiction'' of sin also includes the fact that it 
is always that which is past, it is always defeated and under 
God, and can only fulfil its destiny as such. It "has its 
reality and character, plays its role as the adversary God has 
routed."(l26) It is God who deals with Nothingness, not human 
beings. Although God is taking up humanity's cause and 
struggle, as the one overcome by Nothingness, the struggle is 
God's affair, his cause and contention, in which he "allows" 
human beings a share. It is a struggle and a paradox which is 
external to humanity and this is the nub of Barth's 
understanding of sin and its inadequacy. In sin human beings 
are lost to themselves, not to their Creator, because as far as 
God is concerned, sin is already dealt with. It is human beings 
who need reconciling, not God. His kingdom of divine order 
stands as an unbreachable dam against the kingdom of disorder. 
so we come back finally to the role of the Christian 
Church, that of invocation, which means the Church's recognition 
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and proclamation of God's victory and kingdom, and her 
resistance against the appalling and impossible possibility of 
disorder and godlessness. Her invocation in itself is 
a sign that neither man's breaking away from God, nor 
the unrighteousness and disorder of his existence, nor 
the manifestation of this in the lordship of the 
powers which he has unleashed and which oppress and 
afflict him, can establish a definitive situation or 
represent an ineluctable fate. 
Jesus Christ is the new thing ... He is the total and 
definitive limitation of human unrighteousness and 
disorder.(l27) 
EMIL BRUNNER 
Following an outline of Barth's thought by an outline of Brunner 
it will be impossible to avoid comparisons between them. At 
this stage however comparison will be used as a means of 
elucidating Brunner's thought and critical comment will be left 
until the end of the chapter. 
Revelation and Knowledge of God 
For Brunner also, God's revelation of grace in Christ is central 
to the theological task and to human being. Brunner puts more 
stress on Scripture as the norm of theology, functioning as a 
relative authority because it is the primary witness to 
revelation.(l28) Scripture deals with relatio~s and events, not 
"doctrines'': it is a history of revealing and knowing.(l29) The 
real and absolute norm of theology is Christ himself, he is the 
''real" content of revelation, the Logos, the event in which the 
102 
Word of God, as absolute demand, is given, in which indeed God 
himself is present personally. "To be determined by this event, 
this fact of the Word, this Word incarnate is faith." For 
Brunner it is particularly significant that the event of 
revelation is the event of being addressed by another: as such, 
as a real relation to a real "Thou" it makes us 
responsible.(l30) 
The act of revelation rests on God's will, his will to 
Lordship and fellowship, and consequently "participates in the 
unconditioned character of the divine will."(l3l) However it 
also rests for Brunner on personal correspondence, "the 
fundamental category of the Biblical revelation."(l32) In this 
correspondence God is always and inconvertibly first, the human 
always and inconvertibly second; God's relation to humanity has 
no sort of presupposition in a relation of humanity to God, but 
the human being is a counterpart for God, created by God as a 
human being over against him. This correspondence becomes clear 
in the correlation between the Word of God and "Faith". So it 
is vital for Brunner that, in the indirectness of the divine 
self-communication (i.e. in the Incarnation), 
God does not force Himself upon man, that He does not 
overwhelm him with His creative power, but that He 
summons him to make his own decision.(l33) 
Although the world created by God is fundamentally different 
from God's being, for Brunner t.he analogia entis is essential. 
It cannot be severed from the doctrine of creation, and it is 
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presupposed when we talk of God speaking to us.(l34) The 
analogia entis, which is presupposed by the analogia fidei(l35), 
can be seen to be fundamental in the centrality of the Word and 
the Person to theology and to talk about God. so Christian 
theology 
is a positive theology which rests upon the truth that 
there is a relation of similarity between God's being 
as Person and the being of man as human, thus between 
the Being of God and the being of His creatures, which 
makes the use of such human, parabolic 
lan9uage l9itimate. (13G) 
Brunner does refute the use of analogy along Nee-Platonic lines 
which makes it into a principle of natural theology. Such a use 
presupposes the inviolable character of human knowledge because 
of humanity's creation in the image of God. Brunner points out 
that God's revelation in creation alone is not sufficient to 
lead to true knowledge of God and that human beings inevitably 
misinterpret what glimpses of God there are in creation because 
they are sinful. However he insists on the importance of 
natural theology. It is not a "negligible quantity", but "a 
very important part of Christian Theology, especially in the 
doctrine of man."(l37) Correct understanding of the analogia 
and true knowledge of God from creation require 
enlightenment through God's Word, but for Brunner human beings 
can have some kind of knowledge of God, albeit always a mixture 
of true knowledge and deification of the creature, that is 
through creation and through his or her God-given abilities as a 
human being. The question is, for Brunner, one of the doctrine 
of humanity not the doctrine of God. (He sees it as undeniable 
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that God, as Creator, leaves some imprint of the mark of his 
Spirit on creation). What is at issue for Brunner is the effect 
of sin and human responsibility. While he maintains, with 
Barth, that the "God'' or "gods" human beings postulate in their 
sin are false, they are lying pictures of idols(l38), and while 
he may not seem to be asserting much more than Barth in terms of 
what human beings can actually know apart from revelation in 
Christ, the points he really wants to defend and the points of 
real difference from Barth are important. 
Theological Anthropology 
At the centre of the issue is the nature of humanity. For 
Brunner, creation is the beginning of God's kenosis. "He limits 
Himself by the fact that the world over against Himself is a 
real existence." The human being, the purpose of God's 
creation, is a being who stands "over against" God.(l39) As 
such, the human being is responsible. For Brunner this 
responsibility means that human beings have the ability to 
accept or refuse revelation which is the idea Barth wants to 
guard against in his denial of natural theology; it means that 
human beings are responsible for their perversion of the 
glimpses of God which are in creation: they are guilty, and 
therefore subject to judgment. It also means that human 
self-understanding is to be taker. seriously. The sphere of 
revelation is the reality of human sin, divine wrath and divine 
necessity of punishment.(l40) The status of humanity, for 
Brunner, must start with God's revelation in Christ. However 
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this does not mean that anthropology is to be derived from 
Christology, for "To look at man in the light of Jesus Christ is 
not the same -thing as knowing Jesus Christ." ( 141) This coheres 
with Brunner's three-fold anthropology in Man in Revolt(l42), in 
which his doctrine of humanity takes into account its origin, 
i.e. human creation in the image of God; contradiction, i.e. 
sin, as well as the actual state of humanity living in conflict 
between these two. So human beings are to be seen before God, 
but they are before God in a state of contradiction. "Real man 
is the unity of creation, disintegrated by sin. He is dissolved 
unity.(l42) There "is no such thing as a neutral secular humanum 
which as such would have nothing to do with God"(l44), because 
human beings live always in relation to God though the 
relationship is perverted. The reality of the human being as 
sinner is vital, and is revealed in Christ, but it is not lost 
in Christ as it seems to be for Barth. 
This means that apologetics is an important task, "as 
urgent and as inevitable as the Christian study of doctrine 
proper, or dogmatics."(l45) Anthropology is important as the 
subject which Christian thought has in common in discussion with 
the non-believing world, and such discussion is necessary.(l46) 
The "Christian doctrine of man must be beaten out on the anvil 
of continual argument with man's own view of himself."(l47) 
However for Brunner as well as for Barth it is conversation from 
a position of knowledge of the truth, which is due to grace and 
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not to human achievement, and this is why the "outsider's'' 
questions can never be answered unless he or she ceases to be an 
outsider: "Every theoretical understanding is in its very 
inception a misunderstanding"(l48) and so science, for example, 
may assault faith but can never really refute it.(l49) 
God, Creation and Election 
Brunner's doctrine of God is not unlike that of Barth's later 
works. God's nature, in Scripture, is not described only in 
itself, but is in relation to the created world.(l50) God is the 
God who approaches humanity, as the human being is the one who 
comes from God.(l5l) Like Barth, Brunner is concerned to deny 
the ''philosophical" conception of God which confuses his 
omnipotence with potestas absoluta, so that God becomes the sole 
reality which swallows up everything.(l52) God's omnipotence is 
rooted in his nature as free and sovereign. Out of his 
unlimited freedom and sovereignty God creates, and as Creator he 
has absolute authority. His self-revelation is motivated by his 
wish to rule, though he communicates with us as if he needed 
us.(l53) Sod's will and thought, the origin of all that exists, 
is revealed to us as love.(l54) An emphasis which is, however, 
quite different from Barth is Brunner's emphasis on the 
dialectic within God between his holiness and his mercy, his 
wrath and his love. This dialectic is the decisive point of the 
Christian doctrine of God for Brunner. He describes God's wrath 
as "the inevitable necessary reaction of the will of God to all 
that opposes him". This reaction from God is necessary in order 
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for there to be order and seriousness in the world. Brunner 
sees rejection of the wrath of God as the beginning of the 
pantheistic disintegration of the idea of God. So Brunner says 
that "human guilt gains its infinity from God''.(l55) So within 
God there is a two-fold and at first sight contradictory -
movement of inclusion and expansion and exclusion and 
withdrawal.(l56) This dialectic is one of asymmetry however. 
God is love, but it is never said that he is wrath. Wrath is 
his "strange" work, not his "own" work. This incongruity is the 
possibility of human decision. Another indication of the 
seriousness with which God treats human sin is his 
long-suffering, which is nothing less than the basis of history, 
as a breathing space or last chance for humanity(l57): it is 
God's preservation.(l58) For Barth God is wrathful, but this 
wrath is directed at Nothingness and at Christ as rejected, and 
it is not part of his attitude to humanity which is now 
redeemed. 
Although Brunner makes a point of saying that creation ex 
nihilo means that God determines all, he is determined by none 
and is therefore not even determined by a "Nothing"(l59), he 
does maintain that in creation God limits himself because of the 
independence granted to creation, and particularly to humanity 
as we noted above. 
He limits Himself by the fact that the world over 
against Himself is a real existence. Hence the 
maximum of the divine self-limitation is equally the 
maximum of actual 'over-againstness' the free 
position of that being who is 'over-against' God, and 
is therefore able to answer the Word of the Creator in 
freedom.(l50) 
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This self-limitation which God is also of course free to 
remove, having first created it by his own will - is related to 
revelation. "He limits Himself, in order that a creature may 
have room alongside of Himself, in whom and to whom he can 
reveal and impart Himself."(l5l) This self-limitation is seen in 
the fact that though God's creation was good, it is no longer 
good, the existing order is not God's order, and in its 
distorted form, spoiled by sin, he does not will it.(l52) 
Creation is the beginning of time, not a consequence of the 
fall.(l63) That is, creation is not the solution, it is the 
beginning. Brunner sees the movement of the Christian "myth" as 
indispensable and as taking time absolutely seriously, unlike 
alternative myths, in its sequence of creation, fall, 
reconciliation and redemption.(l64) As a narrative, Brunner 
suggests that the Adam myth should be abandoned, being the main 
source of determinism(l65), but he consistently insists on its 
importance and meaning as essential to the Christian faith. It 
is necessary to maintain the distinction between human existence 
as created by God and that of the sinful human being, while 
retaining the reality of both. 
The admittedly mythological, and therefore inadequate, 
conception of a fall is the only possibility of so 
bringing creation and sin into connexion without 
weakening either, and in some way making the 
contradiction in men innocuous. In this double 
qualification, 'created 
and corrupted through 
anthropological and 
Christian faith.(l66) 
in God's image' and 'fallen 
sin' is included the whole 
psychological knowledge of 
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The fall is thus the clearest expression of the inexplicable 
character of sin, in the light of God's creation.(l67) It can 
also be seen when God is revealed through the cross, i.e. when 
humanity's true origin becomes visible.(l68) Brunner also 
interprets the serpent in the myth as meaning the prior 
existence of a force of temptation outside humanity. This means 
that human beings did not invent evil and that human sin always 
contains an element of frailty. 
The significance of the above is enormous, and this is part 
of the real difference between Barth and Brunner. It means that 
for Brunner sin must be treated in every way as real. This in 
turn means that it is not possible or appropriate to speak of 
creation and election as one decree, they are not coterminous. 
Creation is subordinate to election so is neither co-ordinated 
with it nor super-ordinated above it.(l69) The ideas of eternal 
decree are not applied to creation in the New Testament, Brunner 
argues. Both election and creation are mediated by Christ and 
in both cases Christ is not the subject. This means that 
election is in and through Christ, but not Qy_ Christ. (170) 
Brunner is once again concerned to safeguard the freedom of 
humanity, the possibility of an "Either-Or". If Jesus is the 
Elect, then there can be no rejection, then the decision for 
every human being is anticipated in Christ. 
In Himself the Son signifies Election: where the Son 
is, there is Election; but where the Son is not, there 
is no election. But the Son is only present where 
there is faith... For this cause alone faith is 
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decisive in 
ruin ... (l7l) 
which the stakes are salvation or 
Brunner's understanding of the New Testament is that 
fore-ordination and freedom, predestination and responsibility 
are seen as truths necessarily and inseparably connected, and 
freedom is based on the fact of election.(l72) Through the 
encounter of faith the word of historical calling becomes 
encounter with the eternal will of God, but this is not the same 
as the predestination of all, which "makes human history a mere 
game of chess."(l73) Brunner sees this kind of predestination, 
in which the possibility of being lost is finally eliminated, as 
due to a mistaken emphasis on "Christ alone" and upon a 
misunderstanding of the theological passivity of sola gratia as 
involving psychological passivity. This criticism, although not 
specifically applied by Brunner, can be applied to Barth. 
Although eternal election- God's word of love from eternity 
through Christ - goes "before" human existence and decision as 
that which makes it possible this does not make that existence 
and decision futile. In the human being's free personal 
decision eternal destiny is realised as a temporal act. This is 
consistent with the nature of God who "always, while calling to 
faith, furthers the power of decision."(l74) Human 
responsibility and thus humanness is therefore grounded in 
election, and when human beings turn away from God, his call to 
them is distorted but still exists and so they are still 
human.(l75) Brunner also expresses this election as God allowing 
humanity to participate in his Being, his love and so as God 
giving us our human existence.(l76) 
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This is Brunner's anthropology in more detail. Humanness 
and the human being's distinction within creation depend on 
God's call to humanity, no matter what the response to that call 
is. This call is part of the same divine will which created 
humanity in God's image which, although lost as content, remains 
as structure(l77), so that human abilities are conditions for 
the realization of real human existence.(l78) Because of 
humanity's calling human nature is identified with one's 
attitude to God, whether positive or negative.(l79) Humanity 
must be seen in the light of both creation and sin(l80), being 
as a sinner is still "being-in-the-Word-of-God."(l81) 
Redemption and the Incarnation 
As with Barth, we gain complete knowledge of sin only from 
Christ. 
To have a complete knowledge of the gulf would mean 
the knowledge that God has placed a bridge across the 
gulf. Perception of sin is not serious until we know 
that we can only be helped by the mediation which God 
Himself has provided. This, however, we only know 
when it happens. That this must happen first of all 
shows us where we are. Complete knowledge of sin is 
attained only in the Mediator.(l82) 
For Brunner the Incarnation is determined by sin, it is a new 
event not a pre-existent state, although Christ's sending and 
willingness to be sent are eternal.(l83) 
The purpose of the Incarnation refers rather to sinful 
fallen humanity and the creature than to the creature 
as such. The coming of the son into the world is not 
a coming into God's Creation, but into sinful 
creation. It is not the perfecting, but the 
restoration of creation. It is connected with closing 
the gulf which yawns not between the creature and the 
Creator, but between man who is sinful and a wrathful 
God.(l84) 
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Thus the Incarnation means the contingency and uniqueness of 
revelation. The incomprehensible co-existence of the predicates 
God and humanity means the incomprehensible coming to us of the 
eternal God. "In this monstrosity of a God-man we know our own 
deformity, in this contradiction we see our contradiction, in 
this problem we see our own problem, the problem of humanity, 
evil, sin."(l85) Whereas for Barth God contradicts our 
"contradiction" by his election in Christ and his rejection in 
Christ, for Brunner the paradox is dealt with by God's taking 
the "contradiction'' into himself, and this also reveals that 
human sin is real. 
Through him the antagonism has not only been overcome, 
but through him alone knowledge of the contradiction 
of sin itself is made possible and real. 
This approach of God to man, this divine 
condescension, this entering into a world of sin and 
sinners burdened with their sense of contradiction to 
him, just this constitutes the mystery of divine 
revelation and reconciliation in the incarnate and 
crucified Christ. That God removes the contradiction 
by bearing it himself, this is the cross- Agnus Dei 
qui tollit peccata mundi.(l86) 
The cross is sacrifice and it achieves atonement and 
reconciliation. It is necessary because of God's wrath and the 
necessity of punishment. God's self-revelation, his coming and 
the atonement he achieves are one. The Mediator is in his 
person the bridge across the gulf between God and humanity. He 
is God's ''assault" on the hostile world(l87), and the cross and 
the resurrection are indispensable to his work and person, they 
are his highest revelation. 
There, where Jesus went down into the depths for our 
sake, the revelation reaches its highest point, 
because God can only really meet man in the depths of 
humanity, because this depth of man is reality ... At 
the point where Jesus completes His 
these three things: the Reality 
Merciful, the reality of man as 
genuine reality of man in God.(l88) 
life He reveals 
of God as Holy and 
sinner, and the 
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Through the cross we know the divine love as that which enters 
the world in order to "tear'' it out of its present accursed 
existence.(l89) As such, the event of the cross means that 
suffering becomes a positive principle, and with the Incarnation 
we have the possibility of becoming human. The resurrection is 
the proof of the reality of redemption over wrath.(l90) 
Humanity and Sin 
However the call of God which we hear at the cross does have a 
condition: "that we should hear it as the unconditional call 
that it is, that is, that we should believe."(l91) We come back 
again to the reality of sin as a gulf between humanity and God, 
and to the significance of human decision. Sin is dealt with at 
one level in that Christ's work and person mean that humanity 
has the possibility of being truly human. However just as sin 
is on one level a free act, human repentance and belief are 
necessary for us to realise this possibility. Sin is 
essentially a paradoxical state, and this "contradiction" is the 
presupposition of the Christian message.(l92) Its possibility 
lies in human freedom in self-determination, determining oneself 
against the determination of God.(l93) Its most original form is 
therefore arrogance.(l94) In sin human beings are tearing 
themselves away from their origins and this is one aspect of the 
paradox because human existence is always dependent on God even 
in alienation. So sin is "being human in an inhuman way."(l95) 
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Sin therefore has the nature of a cleavage or rent through 
all existence(l96), it results in a divided existence.(l97) This 
paradox is characteristic of humanity's essen~e because the 
relation to God is determinative(l98), and it is also 
self-chosen.(l99) For Brunner it is part of humanity's created 
humanness that human beings can choose to sin and sin is always 
an act. "To be a sinner means: to be engaged in rebellion 
against God. Sin never becomes a quality or even a substance. 
Sin is and remains an act."(200) So human beings are fully 
responsible for sin.(20l) 
In the Bible sin is never anything other than a total 
act of the person namely, self-determination which is 
opposed to man's real destiny, disobedience to the 
will of God.(202) 
However sin involves further paradox in that humanity becomes 
enslaved in its own emancipation from God(203), and this 
enslavement is corporate as well as individual. Sin is 
therefore fully personal but also unavoidable.(204) Again this 
is very like Ricoeur's "enslaved will" (see Chapter Five). It 
is this that leads Brunner to see sin as a fate, as well as a 
conscious decision and choice. 
Thus the Biblical revelation recognises the fatal 
sense of the inevitable, the sense of Fate in evil; it 
calls us 'slaves of sin,' who have no free choice not 
to commit sin or not to be sinners; but it also 
recognises man's absolute responsibility, and does not 
attempt to ascribe it to some impersonal force in the 
form of a destiny ... 
Because sin is always concerned with God, it is an 
act ... But at the same time, because it concerns God, 
the fact that this act takes place means that we 'can 
do nothing about' it is this inevitable 
combination of an 'act' and a 'state' which 
constitutes the depth of sin.(205) 
A further aspect of paradox is that sin is negative and 
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positive. Brunner is concerned with the avoidance of evil by 
the modern mind which he characterises as Pelagian(206), and 
with the definition of sin as negative as a means of denying its 
reality. 
sin is that concept which finds a place in no 
system of thought. Every system thanks to its 
monistic tendency, must try to eliminate this sharpest 
of all contradictions ... The usual procedure, if the 
problem is not ignored, ... is the transformation of 
sin as evil into a negative magnitude.(207) 
Sin is a negation, but it is a positive negation. "Man never 
sins purely out of weakness ... Even in the dullest sinner there 
is still a spark of decision, of active positive negation which 
is not merely 'negative'."(208) However paradoxical its 
existence, sin is real, and therefore knowledge of God, to 
become actual, must be a real act of the human being just as it 
is a real act of God.(209) The decision is forced by the 
Incarnation, wherein Christ reveals the seriousness of the 
Divine Royal Will(210), but the decision is incontrovertibly 
humanity's and it is given weight by the fact of judgment.(2ll) 
"To take the past seriously as guilt, for which I am now 
responsible ... which irrevocably determines my present 
existence, shows the seriousness of the decision, and thus shows 
the seriousness of irrevocable history."(212) A decision has 
been taken in Christ, the decision of forgiveness and acquittal, 
but the new beginning based on this decision is itself a 
decision: for Christ and the will of God.(213) The turning point 
is the human being, faith is always action, the existence of the 
decision(214), and because sin is real, rebirth is necessary, 
not only knowledge of the truth.(215) Yet again, there is 
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paradox here, because human freedom is affected by sin, and 
freedom of decision and inability to decide are both sides of 
human reality(216): human freedom is freedom for death.(217) 
Knowledge of sin and guilt is the ''antechamber" of faith, its 
implied presupposition, "the act of standing before that gulf 
knowing quite well that it is utterly impossible for me to cross 
over; to be brought to the point where I despair of ever healing 
the wound of my existence in my own strength, or to bridge this 
gulf in my own power ... ".(218) Brunner has an understanding of 
freedom as Augustinian as Barth's, in that genuine freedom is 
freedom from the compulsion of sin and is thus based on 
faith(219); freedom is thus complete in dependence, and it is 
never to be understood as the human "leap" of faith, but as gift 
of God.(220) Indeed, faith is God's work and this is why it is 
successful, it is not our own act but is the act of the Holy 
Spirit. (221) 
Faith only exists where a •word' is 
soul, or rather, where this 'word' 
because it comes from God, and its 
self-evident.(222) 
accepted by the 
captures the soul 
truth is thus 
Nevertheless the human decision is determinative. Human being 
as such is constituted by the fact of decision(223): human being 
is always a being-in-decision(224): "Man must stop on the way he 
is going and must turn around. Everything depends upon whether 
or not this happens."(225) The fact of human decision is thus a 
paradox because it is both the work of God and a personal act, 
"the only fully personal act", taking place within the 
personality as a whole. It is "self-knowledge, 
self-determination which springs from the deliberate acceptance 
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of one's life from the Hand of God. We have no right to attempt 
to remove this final paradox."(226) 
This aspect of conflict is carried over into the life of 
the Christian which is the continual wrestling for and winning 
of faith from unbelief, because the believer is always also a 
sinner.(227) The ruin of sin still takes its course where the 
guilt is forgiven.(228) So although the Word of God is fulfilled 
in the Church, the fellowship of the called, - and particularly 
so in the corporate life of the Christian community(229) -
although the redeemed human being has peace with God and freedom 
to serve him, which is the service of humanity, the real hope of 
the Christian is the future hope of the removal of death from 
life. 
For if this were all the creation of God would remain 
rent, and the sovereignty of God limited ... The 
restoration, the divine fulfilment, cannot be other 
than the removal of this disturbance (death) which has 
intruded into the created world and has set its seal 
wholly upon it.(230) 
Tnis is the redemption which is the final stage in the movement 
of the Christian "myth", "the conclusion of the possibility of 
decision by means of the actual removal of the 
contradiction".(231) 
CRITIQUE 
The overwhelming and unavoidable emphasis of both Barth's and 
Brunner's theology from the point of view of this thesis is 
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their emphasis on sin as "contradiction". This seems not 
unnatural given the concern of both Barth and Brunner with the 
transcendence of God and his revelation, in the light of which 
sin is a paradoxical possibility, and their antagonism to the 
damaging "optimism" of the liberals, in the light of which sin 
must be allowed to affect one's view of humanity. As "dogmatic" 
theologians, both Barth and Brunner spend considerable time on 
the doctrines of sin and humanity and both take some account of 
Genesis in this respect. However both are concerned with the 
guiding of theology by revelation not by metaphysics or by 
"speculative" philosophy and they are not concerned with 
explanations of the origins of sin as such, but rather with its 
relationship to God's will for redemption in Christ and to the 
nature of humanity. Brunner is specifically concerned with sin 
rather than with evil, the latter being a more philosophical 
term. For Brunner this relates particularly to sin as human 
action, as personal and active.(232) Barth is concerned with 
sin, "the real sin of man'', a personal act and guilt, but this 
is the most important form of Nothingness which is the larger 
category, the "fundamental phenomenon", and which also takes the 
form of real evil.(233) Barth and Brunner are happy to allow 
paradox, even contradiction, a place in their thought, because 
their aim is the elucidation cf revelation which is 
transcendent, which is therefore inevitably at some point beyond 
human understanding(234), and which is authoritative whether we 
understand it fully or not; this is one of the characteristics 
indicated by the term "nee-orthodox". Both Barth and Brunner 
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reject the idea of a theological "system", which smacked of the 
liberal rationalism they opposed, and neither would be 
intimidated into the defence of orthodoxy or the need to explain 
paradox to the non-believer by means of human reason. However, 
within their broad mutual emphasis on sin as "contradiction" 
there is significant divergence between Barth and Brunner in the 
systematic location of the paradox and this has radical 
consequences for their respective doctrines of humanity, sin and 
redemption. 
Barth analysed his differences with Brunner as coming back 
ultimately to the fact that Brunner distinguished, in a way he 
would not accept, between the Word of the Creator and the Lord 
of the Covenant.(235) This is the basis of their very different 
views of humanity. Whereas Brunner follows the sequence of 
creation, fall, reconciliation and redemption as events which 
are historically or temporally separate, Barth links creation so 
closely with election - which is in and by Christ and thus part 
of redemption that the significance of creation is quite 
dJfferent. This has led to the criticism that Barth negates the 
Christlan doctrine of creation to the point of omitting it 
entirely: a criticism which also relates to the limited extent 
of the discontinuity he allows between humanity and God.(236) 
This has again been linked with Barth's lack of concern with 
human growth, diversity and freedom of response of the 
individual. Barth's view seems to be that characterised by 
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Brunner (although not by name) as due to a mistaken emphasis on 
"Christ-alone'', whereby God and Christ are absolutely equated 
and are together the subject of the actions of creation and 
election.(237) Creation is understood Christologically.(238) 
The above means that Barth and Brunner give quite different 
place to the narrative of Genesis. Brunner's understanding of 
the Genesis "myth'' is very close, as we shall see, to that of 
Ricoeur,(239) though he does not emphasise the anthropological 
nature of the myth as strongly as does Ricoeur, in terms of the 
reponsibility of humanity for sin, this responsibility being 
founded for Brunner more on humanity's creation in God's image 
and its calling by God. He does however insist on the 
distinction between God's creation and the present sinful 
creation, a distinction which Ricoeur highlights as integral to 
the Christian myth and an important point of difference between 
the Christian and the non-Christian myths. Brunner also insists 
on the fall as the explanation of this distinction. He sees the 
serpent as significant in indicating that humanity is not the 
original source of evil; in Ricoeur's terms it points to the 
sense in which sin is fate as well as being personal. Brunner 
satisfies the requirements which Ricoeur understands as being 
necessary for a Christian doctrine of sin, encapsulated in "the 
enslaved will" and he does so by a very similar treatment of 
Genesis. 
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Brunner, then, emerges from our analysis as a dogmatic 
paradigm of the way in which we might apply Ricoeur's work 
theologically. His stance on the points which Ricoeur isolates 
as crucial accompany a theology which gives due weight to the 
doctrine of sin and its tensions, and which concomitantly gives 
human beings a genuine role. As such a paradigm Brunner 
indicates the potential of Ricoeur's work, and he becomes a foil 
in the following critique of Barth. 
Barth's view of creation and the fall is very interesting 
in view of Ricoeur's analysis. As we noted (cf. p.95f) Barth 
takes significant account of Genesis l-3 and sees Adam as 
typical of all humanity. However Genesis is not seen as an 
anthropological account of sin, as a fall due to humanity's free 
decision. The emphasis is on the fact, not the event of the 
fall. That is, Adam's fall represents not some disastrous event 
which changed or perverted the order of creation, but the state 
of fallennesss of historical being. It is the fall which sets 
the stage for God's gracious dealings with human beings. It is 
thus, in a sense, the necessary presupposition of grace and 
redemption, rather than a contingent action of humanity; 
although Barth says that a human being is only "Adam" freely and 
responsibly, there is an unavoidable element of the tragic in 
that it is the fall which constitutes historical being, so that 
we will always and necessarily fail. 
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All this is, however, to be seen in the greater context of 
God's election in Christ and this dominant perspective causes 
ambiguity over whether or not humanity's state is the fallenness 
of all historical being or the elect and saved status of 
humanity in Christ, the second and true Adam. It is Barth's 
explanation of Nothingness which explores this ambiguity, and 
the link between this explanation and Genesis is in the 
overcoming of chaos(240): the formula as far as Nothingness is 
concerned is creation and chaos, rather than creation and fall 
or creation and evil, evil having more to do with the 
Incarnation, which is the prior factor.(241) The chaos myth is 
one of the types Ricoeur analyses as being destructive of the 
Christian myth. This chaos type, or the ''theogonic" myth, is 
the myth Ricoeur sees as closest to the tragic myth where fault 
is indistinguishable from existence. In the chaos myth there is 
no place for the fall because the problem of evil is already 
resolved in the primordial conflict. There is no history of 
salvation as distinct from creation because creation is the 
overcoming of chaos, and thus it is salvation. The seduction of 
evil is thus the resurgence of this chaos.(242) While Barth 
obviously does not see chaos as anterior to order or the 
principle of evil as primordial and coextensive with divinity as 
does the Babylonian chaos myth, his language is reminiscent of 
this myth as he talks of creation as God confirming and 
upholding the separation between His creature and 
nothingness(243), and of chaos as the antithesis which claims 
humanity as its victim.(244) This resembles the language of the 
123 
Babylonian chaos myth more than the Christian doctrine of 
creation. Ricoeur explains the attraction for Christian 
theology of a "learned theogony'' (for which evil is an original 
element of being) as a way of coping with the tragic which is 
invincible at the level of humanity and unthinkable at the level 
of God. A learned theogony makes tragedy both invincible and 
intelligible by locating it, as Barth does, at the origin of 
things, and by making it coincide with a logic of being, by 
means of negativity.(245) This seems to me to be the trap in 
which Barth finds himself. There is no question that Barth sees 
sin as effective at the level of human beings' ordinary lives, 
and his analysis of the sinner's concealment of sin is very 
astute. He talks about the reality-forming power of sin and 
wants to deny that sin is merely nothing(246): it is a "yawning 
abyss" between humanity and God.(247) However there is still 
ambiguity in Barth's thought about the reality of sin because of 
its unthinkable nature at the level of God. With this 
precarious status of sin, wavering between the poles of reality 
at the level of human beings and unreality at the level of God, 
Barth does indeed seek intelligibility in his myth of the 
beginning, a search such as that for which he censured Muller 
(cf. Appendix A p.333f) and with similarly unsatisfactory 
results. 
Barth's explanation of the existence and nature of sin in 
terms of Nothingness fails on various grounds. Firstly, a 
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beginning-myth which speaks of God overcoming chaos is 
unChristian. We have noted the similarities between what Batth 
says and the Babylonian chaos myth (as Ricoeur describes the 
latter). Any such explanation by a Christian theologian must be 
justified, which Barth does not undertake to do, and must be 
seen in relation to the biblical myth, which should be 
normative. Ricoeur for his part insists that the 
interrelationships between the myths are necessary, but they are 
also fundamentally iconoclastic of one another. 
Secondly, Barth's explanation of Nothingness has 
unacceptable concomitants in his theology. It makes existence 
tragic in that the human being has no choice in relation to 
Nothingness, but is subject to it.(248) This is similar to 
Brunner's understanding of enslavement, but without the 
counterbalance of responsibility which Brunner maintains. 
Barth, as Ricoeur says, makes the tragic coincide with a logic 
of being. Barth is here open to his own criticism of Leibnitz's 
concept of Nothingness.(249) This thought also has strange 
implications for redemption, which thus becomes the repetition, 
albeit in a louder voice, of God's initial "No" to Nothingness 
declared in creation, this second "No" actually routing 
Nothingness. Barth's reaction to the obvious question as to how 
Nothingness can assail God if he has already negated it, is that 
"we must not pursue this thought to its logical end."(250) It is 
not clear why the possibility of Nothingness resisting God's 
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rejection is any more acceptable, or at least more intelligible, 
to Barth than human resistance to God's creation. 
Thirdly, Barth's explanation Of the existence of 
Nothingness only leads to confusion and further ambiguity.(25l) 
Whereas the determinate nature of God and of creation is 
"straightforward determinacy" which implies nothing about 
Nothingness, and the determinacy of God and of the creature as 
distinct beings is good and legitimate, the determinate nature 
of God's creative act per se, as an act of election, gives 
reality to that which is thereby rejected: chaos and Nothingness 
thus have evil and powerful reality. So at certain points the 
determinacy of creation is not good, but has dire consequences. 
This explanation is not justified by Barth, and it is not 
clarified by his explanation that Nothingness occupies some 
third plane of reality, the other two planes being the existence 
of that which exists and the non-existence of that which does 
not exist. By removing Nothingness to this strange third realm 
Barth makes this explanation unfalsifiable: it has roots neither 
in the realm of human knowledge and experience nor in Christian 
theology. Barth also gives no explanation of how something 
existing in such a plane can have effect on the ''ordinary" plane 
of existence. The inexplicable nature of sin is neither 
explained nor resolved by this explanation of Nothingness. 
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Barth's work on Nothingness thus seems to be a cul-de-sac 
as far as the problem of sin is concerned, leaving us with the 
question of whether or not sin is real for Barth. This problem 
is, however, given further resolution by the wider context of 
Barth's thought. The human being, as we saw, although he or she 
does sin, cannot sin. Sin is an ontological impossibility, its 
very existence is as something already defeated. For Barth the 
paradox of sin is something external to humanity: this is 
crucial. Sin is God's problem, rather than humanity's, and God 
has dealt with the problem. For Brunner, on the other hand, the 
paradox is essentially internal. Human existence (not sin's) is 
as "contradiction". The paradoxical nature of sin is thus given 
broader scope within Brunner's theology which gives, I believe, 
a more satisfactory view of humanity. This is another focus of 
the issue between Barth and Brunner. Brunner criticises Barth's 
understanding of "real man" the "leading idea of Barthian 
anthropology" as irreconcilable with the Christian doctrine of 
sin. "Real" humanity is, for Barth, "true" humanity, i.e., the 
humanity of the covenant, redeemed humanity, and the sinner 
seems to be shunted into the same strange third sphere of being 
as Nothingness.(252) Those features incompatible with Barth's 
view of "real" humanity, Christologically determined, can be 
excised as ipso facto non-human(253), and Barth's view of 
humanity also thus becomes unfalsifiab~e in relation to the 
empirical sciences, which may offer knowledge of the symptoms of 
"real" humanity, recognisable as such only £ posteriori, but 
which can do no more than this. This issue is seen also in 
127 
Barth's criticism of Brunner for his concern only with the 
phenomena of the human being rather than with "real humanity". 
Barth demands the specific content of "freedom", i.e., reception 
of God's revelation, and not the mere form of potentiality for 
revelation.(254) 
Barth emphasises humanity's inability and its role as 
determined from above to such an extent that real humanity in 
Brunner's sense, human beings as they are and experience 
themselves to be, sinful human beings, are lost. They no longer 
exist as such, they have no "truth" of their own but are lost in 
God's truth.(255) It is this view of humanity which leads to the 
criticism that salvation is noetic for Barth, that is, because a 
human being is saved, he or she merely needs to know this 
fact. ( 256) As Wingren says, for Baru, "the decisive factor is 
that the man into whose world God enters through a birth and 
through the written word is a man without knowledge of God, a 
man without contact with God."(257) 
The other implication of all the above is that of 
universalism. Barth's thought seems, unavoidably, to mean that 
all people are utimately saved, because all are incorporated in 
Christ's rejection by God as sinful and in his acceptance by God 
as elect. Barth himself is not afraid of this charge, although 
he states neither acceptance nor rejection of it, but he asserts 
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that the question of universalism is not the right question: 
rather we should be concerned with the loving kindness of 
God.(258) 
So it seems that Barth's non-inclusion of the 
anthropological implications of the Genesis myth and his 
effective abandonment of the real historical or temporal 
movement of creation, fall, reconciliation and redemption leads 
to an unsatisfactory view of sin itself, and a view of humanity 
which is not adequate in the light of human beings' experience 
of themselves as guilty and responsible, and in the light of the 
emphasis of Scripture on the human being as a sinner in real 
rebellion against and alienation from God. The question is 
ultimately removed from humanity's sphere of operation. 
In his efforts to locate and explain the paradox which sin 
is, Barth uses contradictory language. God's non-willing gives 
Nothingness "the truth of falsehood, the power of impotence, the 
sense of non-sense and the possibility of the impossible", and 
these "attributes'' are accorded it on the left hand of God and 
withdrawn from it in God's victory on his right hand.(259) In 
ordinary conversation such use of language would be seen as 
nonsense, and yet it does express an important insight into the 
paradoxical nature of sin as a reality in the light of God's 
goodness and his power in creation and redemption. However, as 
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we have seen, Barth's locating of sin wholly outside of 
humanity, and its determination by his emphasis on God's 
electing salvation in Christ make the reality of sin finally 
dubious. The real import of this contradictory language is thus 
ambiguous. It is sin's very existence, not its nature which is 
seen as paradoxical by Barth. For Brunner the conflict is 
allowed greater range and significance and is centred largely in 
human nature affecting human nature and existence as well as 
affecting God's attitude to human beings and their actions. 
Both Barth and Brunner deny that sin can be systematised 
i.e. given a consistent and coherent place within theology as a 
whole which is hardly surprising after their description of 
sin as "contradiction".(260) However Barth does seem to attempt, 
in practice, to systematise sin because of his presuppositions 
about the effectiveness of God's will in Christ, and these 
fences limit the meaning of sin in an unacceptable way. A 
development of Ricoeur•s understanding of the symbolism of sin 
could provide safeguards against the dangers we have seen 
illustrated in Barth's thought. Understanding sin as a 
"tensive" symbol(26l) involving the essential paradox of 
inevitability and freedom means that, like Brunner, we can 
accept the presence of the paradox not as something to be 
explained but as part of the inexplicable meaning of sin. 
Incorporating an understanding of the 
distinctive,anthropological nature of the Adamic myth into our 
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exposition of sin would, furthermore, ensure that this paradox 
is seen as internal to, constitutive of, humanity. That is, it 
-is not a paradox which lies only between God and sin or God and 
humanity but it also lies within humanity. This means that 
human existence cannot be seen as fateful because freedom is 
affirmed. Exploration of the breadth of the meaning of sin as 
symbol - its polysemic, tensive nature and its incorporation of 
a complex group of ideas - would also guard against overemphasis 
on only one aspect, such as the inexplicability of sin, which 
should be balanced by similar emphasis on its reality. 
This kind of application of Ricoeur will be considered 
further in Chapter Six(pp.282f) but we can see already what such 
an application might involve in Brunner's work. Brunner is 
prepared to accept the real paradox and tension of sin. He sees 
no need to explain the existence of the paradox as such and is 
more concerned to insist on the reality of those factors which 
constitute the tension - human freedom and God's determination -
and on the existential implications for humanity; factors which 
he derives from creation and the fall narrative, from salvation 
and from human nature. The result is a theology which not only 
gives greater significance to sin, and thus has more chance of 
relating to the experience of human beings who are sinners, but 
also relates to a more satisfying doctrine of redemption which 
is the powerful response and solution to a powerful threat. 
To conclude in Brunner's words, 
We must absolutely resist the inclination to draw 
'logical conclusions', since they only lead to one of 
two errors: either to the doctrine of the double 
decree or to the doctrine of universal salvation, each 
of which removes the reality of the decision of faith. 
Only the renunciation of the logically satisfying 
theory creates room for true decision; but the Gospel 
is the Word which confronts us with the summons to 
d~cision.(262) 
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252. "'Real' here seems thus not to have its usual meaning but 
rather what we would express by the word 'true man' ... it 
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is said that the sinner - and according to our usage that 
would be real man- is man who has 'missed his reality'. 
But surely it is the sinner that God is 'for', for the 
man we actually are as sinners. In this case real man 
cannot be man of God's good creation ... At one moment real 
man is man who fulfils the purpose of God in creation. At 
another moment real man is man as he in fact exists, i.e., 
sinful man ... ", "The New Barth", p.l26. 
253. S. MacLean, Humanity in the Thought of Karl Barth, makes 
this criticism, p.33, 96f. 
254. CD III/2, p.l28ff. 
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longer exists as such; that in his self-understanding he 
now exists only in one monstrous misunderstanding ... 
According to God's revelation, their source and end, he has 
already lost his own truth, his own being in the good 
pleasure of God. Therefore they point to his truth as in 
and with this same revelation of God... It has already 
broken in upon him and mastered him as his original and 
future truth, alien, transcendent, and irresistible." CD 
I I /1, p.lllff. 
It is this strand of Barth's thought which has led 
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him the Kierkegaardian existentialist framework of absolute 
discontinuity between God and humanity. MacLean, op.cit., 
p.lff. 
256. cf. p.9lf above. 
257. Theology in Conflict, p.ll5. R. Roberts makes the 
criticism that "the result of the surpassing completeness 
of the redemptive activity of God in Christ means that the 
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realization", "Barth and:Time", in Karl Barth, ed. S.W. 
Sykes. R.D. Williams claims that this means Barth's 
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"Barth on the Triune God", in Karl Barth, ed. s.w. Sykes, 
p.l73ff. 
258. " ... we have no theological right to set any sort of limits 
to the loving-kindness of God which has appeared in Jesus 
Christ. Our theological duty is to see and understand it 
as being still greater than we had seen before." HG, 
p.6lf. Cf. c. Brown, op.cit., p.l36, and J. Macquarrie, 
"The Anthropological Approach to Theology", who concludes 
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that both Barth and Rahner see all humanity as saved, 
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elsewhere Barth does reject universalism, CD II/2, p.417-8. 
Cf. Chapter6 p.300ff. 
259. CD III/3, p.363. "If they (human abilities apart from God 
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260. CD III/3, p.354, God and Man, p.63. 
261. Cf. Chapter 5, p.273ff and Chapter 6, p.282ff below. 
262. Dg.I, p.353. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
KARL RAHNER AND WOLFHART PANNENBERG 
In our examination of the doctrine of sin in the theologies of 
Karl Rahner and Wolfhart Pannenberg - and so broadly of their 
theologies as such - the question of the role of theological 
anthropology has a significance and centrality which both men 
emphasised. In both cases this emphasis is partly a reaction 
against a theology such as Barth's which, in stressing God's 
transcendence in a particular way, reduces humanity's role and 
significance to a level which is seen as unacceptably low. This 
emphasis alone could well be enough to justify my combination of 
Rahner and Pannenberg in this chapter. However they also have 
in common a metaphysical approach to theology characterised by 
concern with the nature of reality and particularly transcendent 
reality, in opposition to the Kant ian embargo on the 
consideration of reality other than the empirical and 
phenomenal, and in opposition to subjectivism in theology; and a 
concern with humanity's knowledge of this reality, the 
possibility of this knowledge and the method by which it is 
attained. Because of this metaphysical stance, the significance 
of sin within this 'type' of theology may be related to these 
epistemological and methodological concerns. 
However, Rahner and Pannenberg come to quite different 
answers to these questions about reality and knowledge and 
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although they come to some similar conclusions and share some 
tendencies there are as many, arguably greater, differences in 
their thought; they cannot be incorporated under one "label" or 
title to the same extent as Barth and Brunner. 
KARL RAHNER 
Rahner, like Barth and Brunner, designates himself from the 
start as a "Christian" theologian, whose task is "ecclesial" 
theology; i.e., a theology which remains "within the Church's 
reflection on the Word of God", which questions and reflects on 
the "whole truth of man" which is already always given, and 
which is present in the Church's confession.(!) However this 
"old basic substance of the faith" must be expressed in new ways 
in order adequately to confront the modern, non-Christian milieu 
and this "transposition" of faith will require a pluralism of 
theologies because of the pluralism of present and future 
horizons of understanding: this pluralism of theology being 
related still and necessarily to Roman Catholic teaching which 
is the principle of continuity.(2) 
Revelation and Knowledge of God 
The necessity for transposition of theology into the world 
follows from Rahner's understanding of revelation as God's 
self-communication with humanity and thus as humanity's 
fulfilment(3), which takes place in and through humanity itself. 
Essential to this is the presupposition of God's relationship to 
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the world as being one of both transcendence and immanence.(4) 
This relationship, like revelation, is perpetual because God is 
the living, perpetual ground of the world's movement and of 
humanity's being, and "revelation'' is the highest degree of this 
principle.(5) Revelation thus has two aspects corresponding to 
the world's movement and to humanity's being: it is a 
"historical mediation and conceptual objectification" of an 
existential and transcendent determination and experience, 
taking place in history and constituting in its totality the 
whole of history: it is the permanently operative and gracious 
existential itself which constitutes humanity's transcendence. 
As we shall see Rahner's idea of revelation is determinative not 
only for humanity but also for sin. History is thus the history 
of God's self-communication both in specific historical 
occurrences, ultimately and absolutely in Christ's history, as 
also in God's Word - created utterance concerning God, and in 
humanity's transcendental determination: it is thus God's 
history as well as - indeed in the fact of being humanity's 
history. This is why theology is the explication of a truth 
which is already present, "for the whole truth of man as opposed 
to partial questions and answers must always already be given if 
it is always to be questioned and found."(6) 
Theological Anthropology 
Humanity is the locus of revelation, for the human being finds 
knowledge of God only in and through knowledge of him or herself 
as a transcendent being.(7) So, Rahner argues, theology must be 
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anthropology. He gives three reasons why theology must be 
anthropology and these illuminate his view of humanity and of 
theology as such.(S) 
1. Theology must be anthropology from the case itself, because 
of the very process of knowing. 
2. Theology must be anthropology because of the contemporary 
situation. 
3. Theology must be anthropology because this is necessary for 
basic theological formulations and for apologetics. 
Firstly Rahner is claiming that a theological anthropology 
is unavoidable because of the nature of theology which, as an 
intellectual enterprise always raises the question of the 
subject. The ''transcendent and limitless horizon" presupposed 
in humanity by its quest for knowledge - even on the most 
mundane level is not only the only possible basis for 
understanding such a concept as "God'' but itself points beyond 
to God as its absolute reference point. Theology must always be 
interested in the question of the knowing subject because: a. 
as a philosophical discipline it is concerned with the whole of 
reality. b. as a theological discipline it is concerned by 
definition with God who, as the fundamental ground of all 
reality, can only be understood as the absolute point of 
humanity's transcendent orientation, i.e., as what "makes" the 
human being subject. The human knower as the questioner is at 
the centre of the process of knowing. In self-knowledge the 
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subject possesses both its knowledge and itself - Aquinas ' 
reditio completa the return to self of the subject in a 
"co-known unthematic self-presence". This is because being and 
knowing constitute an original unity: 
The original meaning of knowing is self-possession, 
and being possesses itself to the extent that it is 
being... the essence of being is to know and to be 
known in an original unity which we call the (knowing) 
self-presence of being.(9) 
This unity of self and knowledge is vital for Rahner's thought. 
It is the ultimate presupposition of the communication of the 
ultimate being - God - "pure being in its divinity" to humanity: 
this is in essence Rahner's understanding of the analogy of 
being. Analogy, in talk about God, is valid because 
transcendence is the more original term, it is the ground of the 
categorical and the categorical can therefore be used, 
analogically, to designate the transcendent Mystery. Such use 
is an indication of humanity's link with Mystery, not of 
distance from it, and it signifies what is most basic and 
original in our knowledge, and what is thus most basic and 
original to humanity. Analogy is "the tension between a 
categorical starting point and the incomprehensibility of the 
holy mystery, namely God".(lO) The tension exists because being 
is ''somewhat discontinuous": that to which humanity is related 
is also "other".(ll) 
In this self-consciousness of the knowing subject - also in 
the subject's openness to reality -which is a transcendent 
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experience there is an unthematic and anonymous knowledge of 
God, an experience "in which he whom we call 'God' encounters 
humanity in silence as the absolute and the incomprehensible, as 
the term of its transcendence which cannot be incorporated into 
any system of co-ordinates."(l2) This original, unthematic, 
unreflexive knowledge of God is pointed to by our reflective 
talk of God which is thus £ posteriori and analogous. This 
train of thought is a clear example of Rahner's transcendental 
method whereby his reflection on the performance of questioning 
and knowledge leads him to assertions about the conditions of 
possibility of such knowledge. Further to this, the unthematic 
knowledge of being present in the act of knowledge is itself the 
possibility of metaphysics for the human intellect, which thus 
starts in the very performance of the question of the 
possibility.(l3) 
The transcendent orientation of human existence is also 
revealed by the possibility of human judgments which posit an 
object over against the subject and which affirm universal 
quiddity of such sensible, particular objects.(l4) 
And this grasping of the single subject under the 
concept (the knowledge of the object as possessing the 
universal quiddity mentioned by the statement's 
predicate) is but the other side of what we have 
called the self-subsistence in knowledge of the 
knowing human subject.(l5) 
The condition of possibility of such knowledge, of the universal 
concept or abstraction, is the Vorgriff, the anticipation, the 
"reaching for more" which accompanies humanity's awareness or 
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suspicion of the limitation of the particular object, making the 
human being "conscious by opening up the horizon within which 
the single object of human knowledge is known."(l6) The Vorgriff 
is a denial of the finite as it reveals its own finiteness, by 
reaching beyond all the finite towards being as such, in its 
essential infinity: the Vorgriff aims at God. This is 
humanity's fundamental openness to being, its constitution as 
spirit, and it is the condition of possibility of all knowledge. 
In less philosophical terms this involves humanity's awareness 
of its finiteness in its continual questioning and in the 
ever-receding horizon of that questioning. This sort Of 
transcendent subjectivity is severely criticised by Barth and 
Pannenberg, among others. We will see later that it has serious 
and questionable implications for sin. 
Such, then, is the basis of Rahner's metaphysical 
anthropology: 
Man is spirit and, as such, he always already stands 
before the infinite God who, as infinite, is always 
more than only the ideal unity of the essentially 
finite powers of human existence and of the world. He 
does not only acknowledge God in fact, but in the 
daily drift of his existence he is man, 
self-subsistent, capable of judgments and of free 
activity only because he continually reaches out into 
a domain that only the fulness of God's absolute being 
can fill.(l7) 
However the fact that this unobjective knowledge of God is an 9 
priori condition of human knowledge means that objective 
knowledge of God is impossible; knowledge of God must always be 
indirect, analogous and inadequate. Knowledge of God is found 
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through knowledge of oneself, and so the theologian invites the 
Christian and the non-Christian to listen to this "process of 
self-questioning" in the hope that both will be able to make it 
their own.(l8) We should note here however that this process is 
an anthropologia negativa because the ground of being which 
humanity encounters within itself and its knowledge is 
incomprehensible. 
Arguments 2 and 3 in Rahner's case for theological 
anthropology are so closely linked that I will look at them 
together. Rahner's overriding concern is that theology should 
be related to humanity in theological and anthropological germs. 
The human being is the point of reference for the illumination 
of theology, there must be continuity between dogma and 
experience, for theological ~d apologetic reasons. 
Theologically the human being is central as the beneficiary of 
salvation and as the questionlng subject in the theological 
task. Rahner points out that if theology is "salvation" 
theology it must be to do with the human being who needs saving. 
"Everything of significance for salvation is to be illuminated 
by referring it back to this transcendent being." Theology is 
to be "investigated by enquiring at the same time as to man's 
saving receptivity for the object."(l9) Rahner explicates what 
this means in practice with reference to such doctrines as 
Trinity, Grace and Incarnation, each fundamentally requiring a 
"transcendental" approach, i.e. needing to be seen from the 
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point of view of the subject's relationship to God. Without 
such understanding these doctrines are for Rahner at the 
"pre-theological" 
"mythology". 
stage of proclamation, picture-language", 
The theological necessity for humanity's centrality is also 
tied up with analogy. If the very possibility of understanding 
Mystery is grounded in humanity's transcendence, in its relation 
to Mystery and continuity with it, then theological statements 
should be comprehensible to human beings as they experience 
themselves to be. 
Apologetically the need for a link between dogma and 
experience is inescapable, particularly because of the 
contemporary situation of "hominisation" in the world.(20) 
Rahner shares Pannenberg's concern with the anthropocentrism of 
modern society, science, philosophy etc., which he claims sprang 
originally out of the Christian view of humanity and is still 
profoundly Christian in seeing humanity as the subject of 
freedom, the centre in whom the world becomes God's own history. 
However, humanity has become almost its own creator and God, and 
is thus profoundly anti-Christian. Again Rahner is close to 
Pannenberg in seeing this as the challenge for theology because 
humanity's ultimate dependence (openness, for Pannenberg) is the 
point where God enters the system. Rahner wants to combat this 
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secular, anti-Christian anthropocentrism by a true theological 
anthropology. The difficulties which modern humanity has with 
theology are all related to the fact that 
theological statements are not formulated in such a 
way that man can see how what is meant by them is 
connected with his understanding of himself, as 
witnessed to in his own experience. 
Doctrines are credible precisely because they are seen 
as coherent responses to the question we are and as 
articulations of convictions and longings already 
possessed.(2l) 
For Rahner salvation is "Validation of a person's true 
self-understanding." The only sense in which for Rahner the 
theologian or apologist needs to do battle with a human being's 
own self-understanding is in combating the tendency to 
self-deification. Despite this avowal we shall have reasons to 
question whether his anthropology does actually relate to human 
beings' experience of themselves. Rahner sees the necessity for 
theology to be intelligible to modern humanity reflected in the 
serious concern of contemporary theologians with 
demythologisation. It is only by ensuring these links between 
dogma and experience that theology will "enter into the correct 
relationship with the constantly valid kerygma. What is 
essential remains."(22) 
As we noted above, the human capacity for knowledge is 
evidence of innate, unobjective awareness of God so that God is 
co-willed and co-affirmed in every objective judgment and human 
commitment to a finite object. The task of the apologist is 
therefore to bring to consciousness the innate awareness of God 
which is already present and already implicitly affirmed. 
The unlimited transcendence of man, itself directed of 
necessity towards God, is raised up consciously by 
grace, although possible without explicit thematic 
reflection, in such a way that the possibility of 
faith in revelation is thereby made available.(23) 
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The evidence of human experience is thus used, by demonstration 
of the unity between it and Christian doctrine to prove this 
underlying transcendent awareness. All of this means that 
Rahner could be said to hold a theory of "natural theology" or 
''natural revelation" although he does not use this terminology 
because for him the human being does not exist as "natural", in 
opposition to the supernatural. In his awareness of God human 
reason is already supernatural, it is "elevated'' and orientated 
to the explicit, conscious knowledge of faith. This ''natural" 
revelation presents God's presence as question and the human 
being's historical, categorical self-interpretation, which takes 
place in his or her whole history, is often depraved or 
distorted. "Real" or "ultimate" revelation, with the character 
of event, is answer, the forgiving closeness of God in 
sanctifying and justifying grace. Where a human 
self-interpretation is pure and correct it is because it is 
willed and directed by God.(24) 
Theology and apologetics are thus inseparable for Rahner 
and both look from humanity to God, not vice versa. The 
discovery of connections between the content of dogma and a 
human being's experience of himself or herself constitutes the 
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required change to a transcendent anthropological method in 
theology.(25) 
There are however two important points to emphasise when 
talking about Rahner's transcendent anthropology. The first is 
that Rahner does not want to bring the whole of dogmatic 
theology into theological anthropology because of the 
"inescapable dualism" in spiritual creatures between what 
belongs to their "essence" and what belongs to their ''concrete 
existence". The areas he excepts include the history of 
salvation (or perdition), moral theology, the eschata and the 
doctrine of God(26) - although the last at least is very closely 
bound up with his anthropology. 
God and Creation 
The second point is that this anthropology is negative, in the 
sense that it ends in God's incomprehensibility. This 
incomprehensibility results, as Aquinas understood, from the 
disproportion between the self-communication of the infinite God 
and the finite character of the beholder, and it is this 
incomprehensibility which is experienced as the reality offering 
itself directly to human vision.(27) This is the aspect of 
Rahner's theology which is closest to that of Barth. God is 
the whole in its incomprehensible and ineffable origin 
and ground which transcends that whole to which we and 
our experimental knowledge belong ... the ground which 
is not the sum of individual realities but which 
confronts them freely and creatively without forming a 
'higher whole' with them. God is the silent mystery, 
absolutely unconditioned and incomprehensible. God is 
the infinitely distant horizon to which the 
understanding of the individual realities, their 
interrelations and their manipulation must always 
point ... God is the unconditioned, but conditioning 
ground, the sacred mystery, because of this 
everlasting incomprehensibility •... he is the silent 
abyss .... (28). 
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This mystery is the content of humanity's experience of "being", 
and it is the basic and original way of knowing God. Rahner has 
to define God in this way in order for him to be seen as the 
ultimate reality which cannot be overreached or incorporated 
within a broader horizon.(29) In this sense God is known only as 
the term for transcendence(30), present only in his otherness 
and distance, not admitting of definition because known only by 
transcendent experience and because there is nothing beyond in 
terms of which it could be defined. This incomprehensibility is 
not an attribute of God, it is rather the attribute of his 
attributes.(31) 
However it is possible to say more about God than this 
because God wished not to be the eternally distant one but to be 
the innermost centre of our existence, in free grace. Thus 
God's self-communication ~s rooted in his freedom, again as in 
Barth. Indeed it is necessay for the term "holy mystery" to be 
understood, deepened and gradually shown to be identical with 
God and this is done by understanding God's self-communcation as 
"God making himself the innermost constituent element of 
man."(32) once seen as the ground of humanity's transcendence 
and thus of its knowledge, the mystery can be understood 
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analogously as love. The human being is the event of God's free 
and forgiving self-communication; this is the supernatural 
constitution of humanity's transcendence. God's 
incomprehensibility is thus definitive for humanity. Reason is 
to be understood as the capacity of the incomprehensible and 
being exposed to transcendence as the condition Of the 
possibility of knowledge which is not a matter of grasping 
mystery but of being grasped by it. 
All man knows of himself in grasping this 
bein-in-reference is that he loses himself in God 
because God is Mystery, our origin and future, our 
Whence? and Whither?(33) 
God's purpose of self-communication is, in effect, Rahner's 
doctrine of election and it is the heart of his understanding of 
creation indeed the heart of the Christian conception of 
reality: 
The true and complete relation of the Absolute and of 
what we experience as ourselves and our world and know 
to be finite and contingent is not a relation of 
identity or of necessary connection ... or the simple 
relation of an absolute effective cause to its effect. 
It is rather the free relation of the Absolute 
communicating himself.(34) 
God's free decision for self-communication can be seen as the 
reason for creation and humanity's spiritual essence as 
established at creation in order for God's self-communication to 
be possible.(35) This is the essential definition of humanity: 
By reason of its unlimited transcendence in knowledge 
and freedom, this nature can be potentiality for the 
self-communication of God, since it is thus capable of 
receiving this self-communication without being 
eliminated thereby ... (36): 
what is most intrinsic to humanity is God's self-communication 
at least as offer, because of God's freedom.(37) In more 
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metaphysical language Rahner talks of the possibility of 
creation as grounded in the radical possibility of God's 
self-exteriorization, so that the ultimate definition of 
humanity is as a possible mode of the existence of God, a 
"potential brother" of Christ.(38) Elsewhere Rahner denies that 
this makes the human being a pantheistic or gnostic emanation, 
because humanity is free(39); his awareness of the need for such 
a defence is significant and indicates a real problem, to which 
we will come in due course. 
Humanity 
This constitution of the human being as recipient of God's 
self-revelation is the potentia obedientialis for the hypostatic 
union between God and humanity. This potentia is not a 
particular faculty of humanity but must be identified with the 
spiritual and personal nature of the human being as such - it is 
human nature. It is the human being's dignity and value as a 
person. This "essence" of the human being is mediated by the 
objective. Humanity is in a state of ''constant osmosis" between 
the two spheres of its spiritual personal nucleus, i.e., the 
intentional transcendent relation to Being, and its corporeality 
and situation in the concrete world. This union provides the 
means for the human being's cognitive access to himself or 
herself, which is through knowledge of the objective.(40) 
Although the intention to explain humanity in terms of its 
empirical roots may be legitimate, no such anthropology can 
explain the human being's consciousness of its self as personal 
160 
and a subject, as the subjectivity of these multiple, empirical 
objectivies, in a conscious and free relationship to the 
totality of itself.(41) 
The non-particular, non-empirical data- the human being's 
openness - can be further elucidated as responsibility and 
freedom. In the context of Rahner's anthropology as such 
freedom is almost a function of human being: it varies in 
accordance with one's degree of being. Its source and goal is 
in God and is truly freedom only where "the degree of being 
proper to the spiritual person is reached'" i.e. where the 
human being is dependent on God and is thus endowed with free 
self-mastery in dialogue with God. This creaturely freedom is a 
vehicle of God's self-communication; its content is Love.(42) 
Freedom is the possibility, through and beyond the finite, of 
taking a position before God: it is also the act or process of 
self-achievement before God.(43) This freedom means that 
humanity is responsible before God for its self-understanding 
and self-positing. However this freedom exists in synthesis 
with the necessity involved in living within an objective world: 
The free subject is present to himself in his origins 
and freedom and distant from himself because of the 
objective factors through which he is mediated to 
himself.(44) 
The final actualisation of a human being's freedom is not 
reached until death which is the "concretisation of freedom come 
to its maturity".(45) Rahner is saying that a human being is not 
really free until he or she is free before God (an Augustinian 
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understanding of freedom) although this act is itself an act of 
freedom. It is dependent on God's being and self-communication, 
it is mystery, as the primordial dialogue, as freedom 
liberated from bondage and called into absolute 
mystery, in whom alone freedom is fully achieved.(46) 
The freedom the human being possesses as a spiritual creature is 
the capacity for something absolutely final, the capacity for 
the eternal although as such it is still "supported and 
authorized" by its absolute horizon, i.e. God. Indeed this 
"natural" freedom is only a presupposition created by God for 
his self-communication.(47) Freedom is thus an act, something to 
be realized, a demand not a fact. 
Rahner's anthropology is thus defined in terms of God's 
will for self-communication. However this self-communication is 
not an automatic process following creation, because of finitude 
and sin. Humanity's freedom is enslaved because of sin, death 
and law, it is a guilty and imprisoned egoism which refuses to 
accept God's self-communication and to let God be God. The 
human being is therefore incapable as a sinner and as finite of 
fulfilling the potentia obedientialis, and anthropology is thus 
also defined by Christ, as saviour. God's will for 
self-communication is universal: it is also salvific, and it is 
achieved in Christ. The human being cannot affirm God's 
salvific will and the goodness therefore of creation on a 
theoretical plane because of finitude and sin, because of the 
impenetrability of God's will and of human freedom. However 
162 
this salvific will becomes a manifest principle in Christ and 
the individual can therefore experience it in hope and 
faith. ( 48) 
Redemption and the Incarnation 
The incarnation and creation - as for Barth - are one act of 
grace, of the communication by God to humanity of himself. 
Incarnation is moreover the more original act of self-emptying 
and as such it is the possibility of creation.(49) It is also 
the unique culmination of revelation, revealing the absolute 
unity of God's transcendent self-communication and its 
historical mediation.(50) As the perfect hypostatic union 
between God and humanity, Christ is "the supreme fulfilment of 
what man expresses"(5l), Christ's humanity appears in the 
assumption of creation by God, as achieving the highest possible 
human perfection. As such "the incarnation is the first step 
and the lasting guarantee of ultimate self-transcendence," the 
"necessary start of the divinization of the world as a 
whole".(52) 
Properly understood Christology and soteriology are 
therefore one, and Christology is the beginning and end of 
anthropology, because in Christ God has assumed the world 
ontologically.(53) 
If God himself is man and remains so for all eternity 
all theology is eternally anthropology. Man is for 
all eternity the expression of the mystery of God 
which participates in the mystery of its ground.(54) 
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God's purpose of self-communication by means of the incarnation 
was a purpose of creation, and history as a whole is therefore 
the process of divinization, moving towards the immediate 
presence of God. The incarnation is the event in which this 
essence of history becomes irreversible and is made 
manifest.(55) It was essential that this event, this act of God 
should be historical in order for it to be definitive, and also 
presumably in order for it to be accessible to humanity as 
historical beings. However Rahner cautions that this absolute 
event is not absolute so as to be identified with humanity's 
perfect fulfilment; history must be a movement towards 
consummation such that the individual's future as such is left 
open.(56) God's self-giving in Christ is eschatological.(57) 
Christ is the perfect unity between humanity and God 
because he accepts God's offer of himself,the offer which is 
constitutive of human nature, and the God who communicates and 
the human being who accepts thus become irrevocably one. As 
promise and acceptance, the history of God's self-communication 
achieves self-presence in history and is present to human beings 
in a historical and comunicable way. He is thus the offer and 
the reality becoming effective of itself(58), his fate is the 
promise of salvation, permitting concrete hope. By the 
incarnation the freedom of human freedom is established and 
present in the world(59), so that human beings can decide for or 
against God. 
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Because he sees Christology and soteriology as so closely 
linked (the incarnation is salvation), Rahner does not stress 
the usual soteriological problems.(60) However redemption is not 
accomplished for Rahner only in the fact of the incarnation. 
Christ's death is also necessary. Rahner's understanding of 
death is important throughout his theology but particularly in 
his idea of Christ's death as the definitive realisation of his 
freedom, his self-disposal - i.e. his acceptance of God. It 
was the event of gaining the finality of his human reality in 
the life of God himself, a passing into the silent 
incomprehensibility and unavailability of God.(6l) As well as 
achieving definitively his acceptance of God's call, Christ's 
death was also an act of faith because of the 
incomprehensibility of the God to whom he was committing 
himself; as such it is an example and encouragement to all 
people to do the same. In his death Christ was surrendering 
himself to the absolute mystery, the dark abyss which, in faith, 
he called Abba. In achieving this surrender Jesus was 
definitively accepted by the one who enabled him to achieve it, 
in the resurrection which is also the perceptibility of his 
achievement for us. Christ's suffering is significant as the 
experience by God of what it means to be a human being who is 
not God, the misery of the creature suffered as God's own 
misery. Christ's passion was "the unique acceptance of the 
passion of mankind, in which it is accepted, suffered, redeemed 
and freed into the mystery of God."(62) 
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The human response should be in acceptance of the "scandal 
and absurdity of our inescapable situation", the "prison-van of 
finite existence" in faith, hope and love to our salvation, 
accepting it as the power and wisdom of God.(63) We must be able 
to experience the abyss as the holy mystery of God so that we 
may then call it God. In order for such acceptance and 
experience not to be acceptance of the absurd, it must imply or 
affirm a death which has already taken place in which the 
dialectic of activity and powerless suffering is reconciled by 
being identified with him who is the ultimate ground of its 
duality - Jesus Christ. This, then, is the means of God's 
divinization, his ontological assumption of the world, from 
which union in Christ, sanctifying grace, follows 
necessarily.(64) Prevenient grace is necessary because 
humanity's freedom is injured, and it accomplishes the "freeing 
of man's freedom into the immediacy of God's own freedom of 
being".(65) This is objective salvation which is achieved for 
all humanity. Jesus is the "definitive, unsurpassable and 
victorious utterance of God to man."(66) 
The 
God by his own sovereign efficacious grace has already 
decided the totality of the history of freedom (which 
forms the domain within which the individual's free 
choice is made) in favour of the salvation of the 
world in Christ, and in Christ has already promulgated 
this event. Without detriment to its freedom the 
world as a whole is 'conquered' and delivered by the 
love of God. That is the saving will of God with 
which Christian hope is primarily and fundamentally 
concerned.(67) 
subjective aspect of redemption is humanity's free 
acceptance of salvation, itself a gift from God, and a work of 
his grace because God's self-communication also effects its 
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acceptance, otherwise it would be reduced to an event remaining 
in the domain of the purely finite.(68) So 
Christianity is the proclamation of the victory of 
God's grace and not actually merely the ambivalent 
offer to man's freedom of two possibilities, salvation 
or eternal perdition. But this very message of God's 
gracious freedom is more powerful than man's freedom, 
and always ahead of the latter without destroying 
it ... (69) 
This grace persists despite the possibility of a human being 
protesting against it.(70) 
Talking about the human being's acceptance of God's offer 
as coming from and empowered by God himself Rahner sounds very 
like Barth in such statements as: 
we must say of man here and now that he participates 
in God's being... has been given the Spirit, is 
already God's son here and now, and what he already is 
must only become manifest.(7l) 
Salvation is thus a structural feature characterising personal 
life even prior to justification.(72) There is thus a continuity 
between God and humanity which, I will argue, leads to 
difficulties in Rahner's doctrine of sin. 
Grace and salvation are therefore existential 
determinations of human existence not just as offer but also as 
acceptance. This is the basis of Rahner's notorious "anonymous 
Christian" thesis which claims the ''the expression of acceptance 
is always already given even before there is any personal 
acceptance of grace."(73) However this is not just an objective 
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state of affairs quite separate from subjective reality, but it 
is true to the way human beings experience themselves to be: 
grace is not a "thing" but a conditioning of the subject for 
relationship with God. The most objective reality of salvation 
is the most subjective.(74) 
Every human being even previous to the explicit 
preaching of the Christian message, is always 
potentially a believer and already in possession, in 
the grace that is prior to his freedom, of what he is 
to believe.(75) 
Rahner explains something of what this means in practice: 
God and Christ's grace are in everything as the secret 
essence of all reality that is an object of choice. 
As a consequence it is not very easy to seek anything 
without having to do with God and Jesus Christ in one 
way or another. Even if someone who is still far away 
from any explicit... revelation accepts his human 
reality, his humanity in silent patience ... as a 
mystery which loses itself in the mystery of eternal 
love and bears life in the very midst of death, he is 
saying Yes to Jesus Christ even if he does not realize 
it ... If someone lets go and jumps, he falls into the 
depths which is actually there, not merely the depth 
he has measured. Anyone who accepts his human reality 
wholly and without reserve (and it remains uncertain 
who really does so) has accepted the Son of Man, 
because in him God accepts man.(76) 
Despite all these positive statements of the efficacy of 
salvation however Rahner does want to safeguard the human 
being's role, although the degree of his success here is 
questionable. There is a choice because the grace of salvation 
in Christ is not the only supernatural existential determining 
human existence; it is one of two existentials, the other being 
Adam's choice against God. Human beings can therefore ratify 
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the element of original sin and exist in the status peccati. 
Rahner insists that rejection of God is a possibility and it is 
a permanent possibility for humanity because a decision is not 
fully actualised until death, so that even the decision for 
acceptance of salvation and of God's grace may later be changed. 
If a human being tries to remain free without grace, to achieve 
freedom in the finite, he or she becomes a slave to the finite, 
which is objectively slavery to diabolic powers.(77) Indeed the 
Christian doctrine of freedom is constituted, Rahner says, by 
the possibility of a Yes or No to its own horizon. However, 
this possibility is an absolute contradiction and ultimate 
absurdity(78), and the two possibilities of Yes and No, of 
salvation and perdition are not two possibilities on an equal 
level for the creature to choose autonomously. Existentially 
and ontologically the morally evil decision is not even formally 
on the same plane as the good decision because God has already 
decided the outcome of history which is moving towards 
definitive salvation.(79) The fear (not knowledge) that there 
are those who are lost confronts a genuine, and for us 
undeniable, possibility, but not one which is demonstrated by 
its fulfilment: it is a fear which commands us to hope.(SO) This 
is consistent with Rahner's understanding of freedom as freedom 
for God, not freedom of choice as such. The human being's role 
is in the choice of self, it is acceptance and recognition of 
what is already the case,i.e., of the supernatural existential 
of grace which has already overcome and included the existential 
of Adam's decision. Freedom's consent is co-operation with 
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God's work but not synergism, that is, not working with God's 
work as one of two efficients, as Arminius maintained. So there 
is a dialectic of freedom and necessity, but God's freedom is 
greater than humanity's. The message of God's gracious freedom 
is "more powerful than man's freedom and always ahead of it 
without destroying it."(Sl) A human being's role is also to hope 
for salvation in the future, which should result in an attitude 
of openness to the world and to other people and above all in an 
attitude of trusting surrender to death following Christ's 
example. This attitude of openness and trust is our subjective 
redemption.(82) 
What then is humanity's need for redemption- sin? Rahner 
says that the ''states of man" as expounded in traditional 
theology cannot be combined into a single system which would be 
clear and logical. They are not successive stages of the 
history of salvation, but two aspects of the one and the same 
situation. Just as there never was a time in which humanity was 
"objectively redeemed", there is no period or situation not 
affected by the "sin of the world''.(83) As with Barth, this 
rejection of any idea of sequence is very significant for 
Rahner's thought about sin, and for my critique. 
we have already noted that for Rahner humanity exists under 
two "existentials": Adam's sin and Christ's redemption between 
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which the human being must choose.(84) The essence of sin is an 
actualization of transcendent freedom in rejection of God(85) 
and as such must be personal, inevitably involving the human 
being as a whole. Also as we have seen, Rahner is concerned to 
insist that such a rejection is possible although it is a 
possibility which is "transcended" in some way by God's 
acceptance of humanity in Christ. However there is also a 
co-determination of our actions by the guilt of others, sin as a 
"situation" (and only analogously called "sin"). This 
"structural" sin includes the consequences of Adam's sin as well 
as of the sinful actions of those around us. Adam is, in 
Scripture, an aetiological inference from our experience of 
human reality as guilty, and indeed, original sin is implied, in 
anthropological terms, by the universal and ineradicable nature 
of the human situation as bearing the stamp of guilt.(86) Its 
most original starting point is a human being's awareness of 
himself or herself as a sinner who receives salvation through 
Christ. A theology of the beginning is necessary for a doctrine 
of original sin because the human being is an historical being: 
Rahner sees a theology of the beginning as necessary for any 
existential and ontological anthropology. Because human beings 
are historical beings, beginning must be seen as the basis. The 
absence of grace or holiness, the "holy Pneuma", which we should 
receive prior to our own personal existence as an existential 
modality is original sin. Such an absence must be due to 
someone's fault at the beginning, because it militates against 
God's will that human beings should have this grace, but 
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original sin is not a projection of the personal state of the 
guilt of Adam, but "merely" the absence of this grace. Rahner's 
understanding of the fall is in line with Catholic teaching in 
general (cf. Chapter Two, pp.47ff). However there is some 
ambiguity in his thought about what original sin is. It is 
called sin only analogously and it is not personal guilt, yet it 
is the objectification of guilt. It is a 
This 
certain sinfulness which 
decision of the individual 
personal decision this 
made manifest by a process 
is prior to the personal 
as such, so that in this 
prior state of sinfulness is 
of ratification.(87) 
prior sinfulness is necessary in order for sin's 
universality to be absolutely radical. 
Rahner says that the existence of "real sin" at the 
beginning of human history is "no myth", although it is 
important for us not to see this sin as an actual event. It 
must be a "real" sin because the human being is "really" free. 
Rahner actually changed his mind about monogenism, about whether 
or not the individual person of Adam as the origin of the human 
race, is a necessary presupposition for the Catholic doctrine of 
original sin.(88) In 1954 (Theological Investigations I, E.T. 
1961) Rahner was concerned to show an objective connection 
between monogenism and the Church's teaching on original sin, so 
that to contest the former is implicitly to deny the latter: 
Adam was the first man; and where for the first time a 
man is to be found in the metaphysical and theological 
sense, that is where we must look for Adam.(89) 
He argues here for monogenism on the basis of the Church's 
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teaching, Scripture, and metaphysics, although much of his 
argument is seen as demonstrating that monogenism is possible or 
consistent, rather than that it is necessary. However, in 1970 
(T.I. II, E.T. 1974(90) ) he asserts that monogenism is not 
necessary and that the Church's doctrine leaves room for 
polygenism, so that the magisterium need not intervene in the 
discussion: 
it makes no difference whether humanity itself is 
conceived of in terms of monogenism or polygenism, 
provided only that it is recognised as a real unity, 
something which is possible in any case and 
independently of the question of polygenism.(9l) 
What is most important for Rahner is to see Adam (whatever Adam 
means) and original sin in the light of Christ: 
Original sin and grace, therefore, to the extent that 
both these realities are prior to the personal 
decision of man do not, properly speaking, follow one 
upon another in a temporal succession, but rather both 
together imply a single, dialectic 'situation' of man 
(as a being endowed with freedom) to the extent that a 
specification is imparted to him both by the 
'beginning' (that which provides the origins of 
mankind) and by Christ as the 'end' and 'goal'.(92) 
So humanity has to choose whether its basis will be the absence 
of grace imparted from Adam or grace through Christ. There is 
always the "temptation of ratifying his Adamite lack of grace by 
personal sin and of making it the real meaning of his 
existence."(93) 
The justified are still in the situation of concupiscence 
and death, though by grace and its acceptance original sin is no 
longer guilt for them.(94) Concupiscence, for Rahner, has two 
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elements, one of which is essential to human nature and one of 
which is the consequence of the loss of grace in Adam: the 
former element includes various weaknesses etc., which would 
have been present before the fall.(95) Concupiscence, which must 
be distinguished from personal sin but which is still part of 
the need for salvation, is theologically understood as the 
dualism in the human being between essence and existence, 
expressed in but not the same as the dualism between 
spirituality and sensibility. It 
consists essentially in the fact that man in this 
regime does not overcome even by his free decision the 
dualism between what he is as nature prior to his 
existential decision and what he becomes as person by 
this decision, ... Man never becomes wholly absorbed 
either in good or in evil.(96) 
This dualism can also be experienced as the dualism between 
"person" and "nature". This dualism, Rahner says, is the ground 
of the distinction between objective and subjective redemption, 
i.e. between salvation as achieved and as not yet achieved and 
writes of "that created finitude even in working out its 
salvation which is not identical with the necessary essence of 
man and his freedom", resulting in "a concrete, temporal 
situation which goes to constitute the real nature of freedom as 
it is in fact exercised.(97) It is this view of human 
creatureliness which leads Rahner to talk about the "prison-van 
of our finite being", the "cross of existence".(98) This is why 
he couples finitude with personal guilt as being the joint need 
of redemption(99), which subjectively involves the acceptance of 
one's concrete existence as within God's grace, an acceptance 
finallY actualized in one's death in hope. So the human being, 
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as nature of itself, "must reckon with the possibility of 
remaining without absolute fulfilment."(lOO) 
However Rahner is not happy with the "extrinsicism" which 
opposes what humanity is by "nature" to what it iS 
supernaturally. These are not two clear categories so that we 
can never tell exactly what humanity would be if it were not 
determined by God's call.(lOl) What God decrees for humanity 
must be "eo ipso an interior ontological constituent of his 
concrete quiddity, •terminative', even if it is not constituent 
of his nature."(l02) Grace penetrates both essence and 
existence, the supernatural act is not different from the 
natural: 
Actual human nature is never 'pure' nature, but nature 
in a supernatural order, which man (even the 
unbeliever and the sinner) can never escape from; 
nature superformed (which does not mean justified) by 
the supernatural grace offered to it.(l03) 
This is a correlative with what Rahner says about Christ as the 
beginning of the divinization of man in fact. 
Because of this dualism between essence and existence a 
human being can never really be sure whether he or she has 
accepted God's call. God's will is impenetrable and the human 
being's freedom is impenetrable and he or she is thus ultimately 
uncertain about how God will deal with them and whether or not 
they will decide for God. We can never know whether our action 
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is the objectification of a real decision or the result of 
manipulation and nec€ssity.(l04) 
Alongside this, however, stand Rahner's statements about 
the universally victorious nature of God's universal salvific 
will, within which the sin of the world is permitted by God only 
within the framework of a divine decree absolutely predestining 
the world as a whole to salvation. Theology has a 
"supralapsarian subject-matter", the infralapsarian economy must 
not be seen as a second enterprise of God to make good the 
failure of his first plan because of the fall, but must be seen 
within a wider supralapsarian context making God's "permission" 
of sin, as part of his pre-fall plan, "intelligible as far as 
possible."(l05) 
In conclusion then Rahner's theological anthropology as 
such is paradoxical. It cannot be a ''system" in a true sense 
because of the "definitive dialectic'' of the individual 
statements of theological anthropology, "even to the point of 
seeming contradiction."(l06) These statements include the human 
being as historical, yet not determined by space and time; as 
free and yet determined, particularly as incorporated within 
history, and yet already endowed with grace to be realised in 
that history; as sinner yet surrounded by God's love and thus 
beyond death. These dialectic statements point ultimately to 
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the mystery of God. 
However beyond this dialectic Rahner's statement of the 
core of the Christian faith stresses the determinative nature of 
God's saving call, and (again as with Barth) it seems that this 
dialectic is more or less resolved by this emphasis: 
we who believe know that we are ineluctably 
engaged by the incomprehensible mystery of our lives 
whom we call God and who ceaselessly and silently 
grasps us and challenges our hope and love even when 
we show little concern for him in the practice of our 
lives or even actually deny him in theory; we who 
believe are convinced that this incomprehensible 
mystery whom we call God has definitively and 
forgivingly promised himself to us in the life, death 
and eternal living presence of Jesus of Nazareth, as 
the content and eternal validity of our own lives, 
which do not perish. we who believe constitute ... 
the community of believers, the Church ... (107) 
WOLFHART PANNENBERG 
AS R.J. Neuhaus notes in his introduction to Theology and the 
Kingdom of God Pannenberg sees himself as a "Church Theologian", 
holding himself responsible, like Barth, Brunner and Rahner, to 
the continuing tradition of Christian reflection.(l08) He notes 
the decisive difference from Barth in Pannenberg's placing of 
this tradition within the wider community of humanity as such, 
with its canons of rationality. This relates to Pannenberg's 
view of the professional theologian as a teacher of the 
community, carrying out a "reformulation" of 
... the substantial truth of the Christian faith •.. in 
the context of contemporary experience and 
understanding of reality in all dimensions of human 
existence.(l09) 
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Its touch-stone, the "substantial truth'' is the Christ event 
which can function as such because it has its meaning in itself, 
rather than merely in interpretations of it. The theologian 
thus presupposes this historically unique event and person and 
seeks to formulate its universal meaning for reality and for 
humanity's consciousness of truth.(llO) Pannenberg's concern for 
interaction between the theologian and modern humanity's 
understanding of truth and of itself brings him into common 
ground with Rahner. 
Revelation and Knowledge of God 
The most radical difference between Pannenberg's theology and 
that of Rahner is in their understandings of revelation with 
which the theologian is concerned. Rahner's means of opposing 
the subjective concern in theology with the individual's being 
is by broadening that subjectivity in its relation to 
transcendence. Pannenberg however opposes the prevalent 
pre-occupation with God's direct self-communication as such, 
which is at the root of Rahner's theology as well as that of 
Barth.(lll) He opposes it because he sees Scripture as concerned 
with God's indirect revelation in history and because of the 
subjective mode of such revelation which makes it inaccessible 
to verification. 
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Dealing with the first of these points, Pannenberg and his 
associates analyse the understanding of revelation in Scripture 
and within the Christian tradition and conclude that this 
understanding does not see God's revelation of himself as an 
actual disclosure of beinq.(ll2) Pannenberg traces the origins 
of this emphasis to Hegel's strict definition of revelation as 
the self-revelation of the absolute which, as such, can only be 
unique and which, resting on the full disclosure of the absolute 
as spirit, can have no medium which is distinct from 
itself.(ll3) He sees this understanding as exemplified in Barth. 
Not only does such an understanding not appear in Scripture, 
except where there is gnostic influence; such a revelation 
cannot maintain God's hiddenness within revelation and must 
have, in an immediate way, that content which it wishes to 
communicate. It also presupposes continuity, a direct link, 
between sender and receiver. 
The second point Pannenberg also sees typified in Barth's 
thought: a view of revelation as a direct "vertical" 
self-disclosure of God's being, resulting in a revelation which 
is inaccessible to the usual human methods of investigation and 
validation. It can only be experienced and verified 
subjectively. Whereas Barth claims that to make God objectively 
accessible is to subject him to the human's control Pannenberg 
claims that this is the very result of making God accessible 
only subjectively. He draws on Hegel's critique of the 
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withdrawal of theology into the subjective in response to the 
Enlightenment: 
'What has its root only in my feelings is only for me; 
it is mine but not its own; it has no independent 
existence in and for itself.' Thus one must show 
'that God is not rooted in feeling merely, is not 
merely my God.'(ll4) 
This relates not only to the verifiability of revelation, but to 
humanity's constitution as historical being: 
It is this that first makes intelligible the fact that 
the divine mystery is not merely an unconscious 
presupposition of the structure of man's existence, 
but rather something man finds himself confronted by 
and is always associating with.(ll5) 
In this context Pannenberg deals specifically with Rahner. He 
accepts that an anthropology such as Rahner's may raise the 
question about God, but the truth of such an anthropology, as 
well as the truth of revelation, must be related to "the whole 
current experience of existence": "The gods of religion confront 
men as realities distinct from themselves because they are 
experienced as powers over the whole of man's existence 
including the world."(ll6) Such verification is thus related to 
the history of religions. 
Revelation and History 
Pannenberg sees this analysis of theology as leaving two 
options: 
a. the totality of reality should be seen as an indirect 
communication of God : natural theology. 
b. the totality of reality in its temporal development should 
be seen as history and as the self-communication of God. 
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Pannenberg takes the second of these two options, building to a 
great extent on Hegel's work. 
Revelation is no longer understood in terms of a 
supernatural disclosure, or of a particularly 
religious experience and religious subjectivity, but 
in terms of the comprehensive whole of reality which, 
however, is not simply given, but is a temporal 
process of a history that is not yet completed, but 
open to a future, which is anticipated in the teaching 
and personal history of Jesus.(ll7) 
A major emphasis throughout Pannenberg•s theology is the idea of 
unity and in relation to revelation this is the unity of 
history. It is as a whole that history reveals God: anything 
including history can only be known as a whole when it is 
complete and inasmuch as we receive revelation now within the 
process of history, it must therefore be as an anticipation of 
that end. This understanding of the priority of the future 
underlies and determines all Pannenberg's specific theological 
doctrines. The future is powerful because it is the unity of 
all things, of all history and thus determines the nature of any 
particular event which can only be known in relation to the 
whole. Finite events are thus described as ''springing" from the 
future, which has an imperative claim on such events.(ll8) What 
this means must be seen in relation to each particular idea in 
Pannenberg's theology and will thus be worked out in this way. 
It is as the proleptic appearance of the end that Christ is the 
absolute revelation of God, and through him the end of history 
is the basis for understanding world history. In this way 
Pannenberg believes theology can answer the need for 
universality in theology, it can deal with the hermeneutical 
problems of Scripture and bridge the gulf between the situation 
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of Scripture and the situation of the contemporary 
interpreter.(ll9) 
This is not to say that modern history is God's revelation 
as such, but theology must no longer oppose revelation and 
history: history is God acting in his creation.(l20) This 
history must be "real" history, not metahistory or suprahistory. 
It is therefore open to critical historical research. This is a 
refutation of distinction between Historie and 
Geschichte, between the facts of history and their 
interpretation or meaning, and thus between the Jesus of history 
and the Christ of faith.(l21) A clear implication of this is 
that the human being has "natural" knowledge of God such as 
Barth rejects: indeed this is the mode of knowledge of God. 
such knowledge exists not only because his revelation is in 
history but also because of humanity's inherent relationship 
with God of which human beings must always be conscious, in some 
form. Pannenberg, like Rahner, is asserting a basic continuity 
between humanity and God, the implications of which, for sin, 
must be questioned. 
In his Theological Anthropology Pannenberg expounds the 
imago Dei in terms of humanity's destiny for self-realization 
and says, in language very like that of Rahner, that in the 
process of realizing this destiny 
.. as they thematize a divine reality that grounds the 
unity of the world, they already have, at every point, 
a knowledge of a mystery which transcends the world in 
its entirety and with which their own existence, 
itself transcending and therefore encompassing the 
world, is mysteriously interwoven.(l22) 
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However, for Pannenberg the debate about humanity's prior 
knowledge of God comes under the label of "apologetics'' rather 
than "natural theology".(l23) 
Revelation is thus indirect(l24) just as humanity's 
relation to the infinite is indirect, mediated through human and 
worldly events: 
... indirect self-revelation, as a reflex of his 
activity in history. The totality of his speech and 
activity, the history brought about by God, shows who 
he is in an indirect way.(l25) 
This means that a whole range of events, activities and words 
can indirectly express something about God. Revelation as God's 
self-revelation, in the narrower sense, is the whole of history. 
Just as there is no direct, unmediated knowledge of God there is 
no directly referential unequivocal use of language with 
reference to God. Pannenberg rejects any theory of analogy 
close to that of Rahner - which co-ordinates the unknown to the 
known, as diametrically opposed to the reduction to mystery 
which he sees as the outcome of humanity's knowledge of God. 
Analogy assumes despite all dissimilarity a common logos between 
God and finitude. This is not acceptable to Pannenberg. As 
Kant demonstrated, conclusions about God drawn from analogy are 
"allowable" in schematizing, i.e. in understanding a concept, 
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but cannot be used to infer. What is said about God on the 
basis of his actions has a "doxological" structure for 
Pannenberg, and this historical basis is the only basis for such 
statements.(l26) The description "doxological" here means that 
these statements about God are the expression of adoration of 
God because of his works. In this act of adoration the "I" of 
the worshipper is sacrificed and along with it, the conceptual 
univocity of his speech: i.e. the usual human sense of a word 
which becomes equivocal in the act of transfer of their finite 
contents to God's eternal essence, is surrendered to God's 
freedom, and our words are transferred to his sublime infinite -
they become equivocal in relationship to their ordinary meaning. 
"They are thereby set in contrast to their ordinary meaning. 
They become mysterious and this can even have a reflexive, 
renovating influence upon everyday linguistic usage." This 
change is inaccessible to us except within the continuing 
relationship of adoration. 
God is not .. in analogy, to our speech about him, but 
rather ... metaphorically speaking he makes our 
metaphorical speech his own through his revelation and 
thereby for the first time gives our words of praise 
their ultimately valid content. The correspondence of 
our words to God himself has not already been decided, 
but is yet to be decided.(l27) 
Doxological statements are thus proleptic because they can only 
be made with a view to the totality of reality, the future from 
which their meaning is decided.(l28) 
Theological Anthropology 
Pannenberg's view of revelation is also determinative of and 
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determined by his anthropological insistence that the human 
being is a historical being. The human being's historicity is 
"in and because of the orientation of his openness for being 
generally toward God and thus toward a possible revelation", as 
Rahner saw(l29), although in Rahner the emphasis on the process 
of history is missing. "Only in the mode of history can the 
destiny of man for fellowship with the infinite God take 
shape. "(130) This is the truth of humanity which the 
anthropological sciences can never fully arrive at: this 
historical nature of humanity is the principle of human 
individuation and it is part of the "openness" which is 
essential to a human being(l31), for "the question of what man 
is is really the question of the destiny of man and thus of the 
future of man"(l32): 
... the essence of man,like his salvation, the 
fulfilment of his destiny, consists in openness for 
God. Openness for God is the real meaning of the 
fundamental structure of being human, which is 
designated as openness to the world in contemporary 
anthropology, although this designation means an 
openness beyond the momentary horizon of the world ... 
Conversely, God's revelation means at the same time 
essentially the opening of men for God.(l33) 
The assertion of humanity's openness re-opens the question of 
human freedom - closed in the materialist's view of the world. 
Although there are tensions between the modern view of freedom 
and the Christian view the modern view has its origins in the 
Judaeo-Christian tradition: it is not a self-evident fact of 
human nature. However it is an essential part of humanity which 
is achieved only in the encounter with others, and ultimately is 
revealed by Christ, in whom freedom is liberated in love.(l34) 
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The human being exists in a state of freedom and dependence. 
The human being is free because of his or her status within 
creation, because of liberation by the future which is the basis 
of creation. Yet this liberation is itself dependence, the 
human question "lives from the event of the divine answer": 
In that man's existence is communicated by the 
question about his destination and fulfilment, he is 
already borne by the reality at which such inquiry is 
directed. 
So the question of human existence is the question about God 
because this brings out its real meaning.(l35) 
This is the human being's self-transcendence which 
distinguishes human beings from the rest of creation(l36), and 
involves their ability to reflect and to transform their milieu 
on the basis of their capacity for the projection of a future 
different from their present.(l37) This theological view of 
humanity is arguable in scientific and anthropological terms and 
this is crucial for Pannenberg as the arena of apologetics, of 
the unavoidable confrontation between Christian theology and 
Enlightenment atheism. 
Theology has to learn that after Feuerbach it can no 
longer mouth the word 'God' without offering any 
explanation; that it can no longer speak as if the 
meaning of the word were self-evident; that it cannot 
pursue theology 'from above', as Barth says, if it 
does not want to fall into the hopeless, and what is 
more, self-inflicted isolation of a higher glossolalia 
and lead the whole church into this blind alley . 
... the first and fundamental choice between theology 
and atheism in fact lies.in the understanding of man, 
in anthropology.(l38) 
What this Christian apologetic must do is to demonstrate the 
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essential religious dimension of human being as making talk 
about God meaningful: to demonstrate that simply by the way they 
live, human beings presuppose a vis-a-vis on which they are 
infinitely dependent.(l39) such an apologetic can demonstrate 
that it belongs to the essence of human existence to hope in an 
openness which goes beyond every finite human situation and that 
in the individual's own life the search for the definition of 
humanity finds no final answer. This exercise of hope and trust 
by every human being "materially thematizes" the divine reality 
which grounds the unity of the world and thus every human being 
has some level of knowledge through this exercise of this 
mystery.(l40) It can also demonstrate the unity of reality as 
history as disclosed in Christianity - and thus it exercises 
and demonstrates ''Christian solidarity with the godless."(l4l) 
So there must be a theological anthropology which relates 
to the way human beings are. Pannenberg demonstrates this type 
of study in What is Man? He is particularly concerned with hope 
as an expression of openness, but also with personality, 
dominion, imagination and trust in the world and others, 
self-consciousness of temporality and awareness of a destiny, of 
need for fulfilment. The anthropological sciences provide a 
phenomenological picture of humanity, supplementing each other 
to provide a concrete picture. The contribution of Christianity 
to anthropological study and to the development and experience 
of the structure of human existence itself has been the eternal 
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value of the individual and his life, and the distinctive 
element in Christian anthropology is the assertion that humanity 
is reconciled to God in Christ.(l42) The anthropological 
sciences also help with the evaluation of religious experience 
and the question of illusion by 
grasping the fundamental anthropological structures of 
human behaviour (Verhaltens) which manifest themselves 
in the psychologically observed modes of behaviour 
(Verhaltensweisen) but may also be concealed by 
them. (143) 
It is necessary that the Christian claims for God's revelation 
in Christ stand the test of human beings' experience of reality 
today.(l44) It provides evidence for Christian claims for 
existence; in the human being's existential awareness of the 
future there is evidence that our life is related to an abundant 
future which transcends all finite happenings.(l45) 
In his Theological Anthropology Pannenberg takes on in more 
detail the initial task of a theological anthropology, i.e., the 
exploration of the phenomenon of human existence within the 
social sciences, with a view to their religious and theological 
implications. "Openness" is the phenomena upon which he 
particularly focuses, relating this concept of social 
anthropology to that of the imago dei. Outlining support for 
his argument within Christian tradition and in Scripture, he 
expounds the image of God as being a matter not of the 
humanity's created constitution as such, but of human beings' 
destiny for union with God. The image of God is humanity's 
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destination revealed in Christ and which, therefore, cannot be 
lost. He sees the empirical and scientific 
correlate of this idea in the anthropologists' ideas about 
self-realization, developed under the influence particularly of 
Herder. This future orientation of humanity is seen, according 
to Pannenberg, in its "exocentric" nature, that which 
distinguishes it from all animal life. This is to be seen in 
practical and specific ways as well as religious ways, e.g. 
dependence on the environment and other human beings, the extra 
nos of faith.(l46) That which places human beings in solidarity 
with animal life, however, and which results in a state of 
tension with human exocentricity, is centredness or 
egocentricity: sin, which Pannenberg also relates to 
anthropological research (see p.205ff below). 
Pannenberg sees Tillich, Brunner, Rahner and Ebeling as 
attempting to take on this very task of theological 
anthropology. However in opposition to an anthropology such as 
Rahner's, which he sees as decisive for theology as such, 
Pannenberg insists on the limits of this anthropology as an 
apologetic prolegomena to Christian theology but not as 
Christian theology itself. The central problem of such an 
anthropology is whether openness presupposes a supporting ground 
or is expressive of the self-creative power of human beings. It 
can show that religious experience is a constituent part of 
humanity, but it cannot take us beyond the human being's 
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awareness to proof of the reality of God. Such proof of 
extra-subjective reality is only encountered in the context of 
experience of the world, i.e. in history, and such knowledge of 
the truth is only final with the end of history.(l47) 
Pannenberg's emphasis on history thus fulfils various 
functions. It provides theology with the crucial link with the 
reality of the way human beings experience themselves to be and 
with the way they are seen in the sciences, and it thus prevents 
theology from retreating into an unfalsifiable subjectivity, by 
making theology publicly accessible. It also gives theology 
unity and comprehensive scope in the understanding of history as 
revelation. More than this, the understanding of reality and 
revelation as historical is the Scriptural view, based on 
Scripture's understanding of God's character. However, as with 
Rahner, we may find cause to be critical of Pannenberg's own 
adherence to the first of these functions (the link with 
reality), that is, it is questionable whether Pannenberg's own 
anthropology and epistemology really relate to the way human 
beings experience themselves to be. 
God and Creation 
As the basis of history, establishing its continuity, God's 
faithfulness and his fulfilment of promises is a key datum: 
indeed this is how the Bible sees the phenomenon of the 
continuous connection between the new events of the present and 
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the events of the past.(l48) However, God's transcendence over 
history and creation is more than this. The absolute future is 
fundamental as the point from which all things can be seen in 
their totality and can thus be known. So, to be truly 
transcendent God must occupy that position at the end of all 
things, and that position is his transcendence. God is the 
power of the future. This is related not only to Pannenberg's 
emphasis on unity but also to his understanding of truth. He 
claims that the Hebrew view of truth, as opposed to the static, 
abstract Greek ideal, exemplified in Plato's pure forms, is 
dynamic and historical. Ultimate truth happens as a process. 
Because this requires the completion of the process, "What a 
thing is is first decided by its future, by what becomes of 
it."(l49) Pannenberg traces the development of the idea of 
history as goal-oriented, rather than mythically past-oriented, 
throughout the Old Testament and especially in Paul.(l50) 
It is from the future that the abiding essence of 
things discloses itself, because the future alone 
decides what is truly lasting.(l5l) 
This is not a purely metaphysical notion but is linked with 
the apocalyptic tradition, within which Jesus' person and 
ministry must be seen, which saw Yahweh as the Lord of all 
nations and history. Yahweh therefore has all knowledge and 
truth as the final resolution of all historical contradictions 
and it is only in relationship with God that humanity can claim 
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true knowledge and can hope for the future. Three ideas are 
essential to this: unity, the future and sovereignty. God's 
sovereignty - his corning to his sovereignty - establishes unity, 
and his corning means that he has the power of the futures of the 
human beings in his rule. As the power of the future, God is 
the origin of human freedom, which cannot be understood as 
deriving from what already exists: it is the gift, from the 
future, of possibilities which do not yet exist. God's being is 
not an objectified being presently existing in its fulness 
because it is his rule which is in the process of corning to be. 
It is thus as the corning God that God reveals to freedom its 
future. However because of the ontological priority which 
Pannenberg accords to the future - not merely epistemological 
priority - this does not mean that there is development in God, 
as Whitehead and Hartshorne maintain, because what turns out to 
be true in the future will be evident as having been true all 
along.(l52) This is the implication of the message of the corning 
Kingdom of God. It is God who places finite reality into being 
by distinguishing it from his own powerful future, and it is he 
who unifies history as the power confronting all creatures 
alike. God's eternity is his being the future of all ages.(l53) 
... The very idea of God 
future beyond himself. 
demands that there be no 
He is the ultimate future. 
This in turn suggests that God should be conceived as 
pure freedom. For what is freedom but to have the 
future in oneself and out of oneself? In his freedom, 
God is present to himself and keeps present to himself 
everything that is past, of which he has been the 
future... Thus he keeps his past creatures in the 
present of his future.(l54) 
God is also personal not by analogy with human personality but 
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as the origin of the understanding of humanity as personal. 
There is a vagueness and indeterminateness in the events of 
nature and this contingency is a presupposition of the effort to 
make events purposeful, but also for understanding the future as 
personal and to speak of God as a personal power.(l55) 
By virtue of all these things, God is the answer to human 
questionableness, i.e., human openness, but this is as the 
presupposition of this questionableness, not merely its 
expression. As this presupposition, God is "wholly other", as 
we saw in Pannenberg's theory of doxological language. He is 
incomprehensible mystery, which is part of the openness of the 
future as still full of possibilities, although this is a 
hiddenness within revelation; it is not an abstract 
propertylessness because it is demonstrated in specific, 
contingent events with a concrete meaning, through which God 
assumes properties into his essence. "Precisely the God who 
acts in a personal manner in such deeds is the one who because 
of his freedom is 'wholly other' ."(156) Neither does this mean 
that God is aloof and separated from humanity because he is 
involved in concrete human existence, a mystery which is 
"affirmative" of human existence. This, again, implies that the 
absolute reality is active, personal and reliable. God is not 
transcendent so as to be self-sufficient.(l57) God's goal in his 
Kingdom is his concern and intention for the transformation of 
the world through his rule, and the guidance of God's providence 
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is necessary, given the inability of humanity to produce their 
own identity through their own actions: "If the history of the 
human race is to be a formative process, leading to a £ulfilled 
humanity, it can be such only under divine providence."(l58) 
God's creation is also seen from the perspective of his 
futurity. Biblically it is as Creator that his history is 
universal, incorporating all events and continuities, all the 
experience, plans and deeds of human beings, despite their 
sinfulness, as the media of his will. God's creativity is also 
an exercise of love as well as power (the power of the 
future).(l59) However Pannenberg's doctrine of creation is also 
radically affected by his understanding of time: creation occurs 
from the end of all things, from the future, and this is why 
Scripture says that creation is in and through Christ. The 
eschaton which has appeared in Christ represents the time and 
point from which creation took place because in it the true 
nature of creation is revealed for the first time.(l60) 
It is this view of creation and not the mythological view, 
which sees reality as oriented to the past, which characterises 
the true understanding of God and the world. While Pannenberg 
is concerned with the proper importance and universality of 
myth, he characterises mythical thought as thought oriented and 
directed towards a primal and archetypal period in the past and 
194 
as existing in the Old Testament in conflict with the 
understanding of reality as directed towards the eschatological 
future.(l6l) 
For the man who thinks and lives cultically and 
mythically, then, the decisive event has already taken 
place in the early mythical period and all his 
endeavours are directed towards gaining as here, in 
his present life, in that very early event ... The 
mythical past is the only meaningful reality for him 
and the future is meaningless insofar as it is unable 
through cult to play a part in the mythical past.(l62) 
In the Old Testament history itself takes on the function of a 
primal age providing the basis of the present age, i.e., the 
Exodus becomes an archetype within limits: pursuing this 
language for Pannenberg Jesus' history becomes primal history, 
the basis of reality, although Pannenberg does not use this 
language because he sees the eschatological understanding of 
reality as the way of thought which is characteristic of 
Christianity, developing through the Old Testament and into the 
New Testament, liberating Israel from the pattern of a primal 
age which determined everything, and demonstrated by Jesus' 
self-interpretation and his history.(l63) As the "religion of 
promise" Christianity first sought salvation in a future which 
is still open, instead of in the earliest past. The mythical 
element of the New Testament is in the archetypal and universal 
significance of Jesus but the general framework is 
eschatological. Theology, Pannenberg says, has not realised the 
task involved in the co-inherence of creation and eschatological 
future in Jesus, 
because its doctrine of creation remains within the 
confines of a thinking oriented towards the mythical 
origin of the primordial age, in contrast to the 
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eschatological character of the message and history of 
Jesus.(l64) 
Pannenberg is thus not concerned with the Genesis narrative 
as a major key to understanding humanity and sin in the present. 
Although he does say that the Genesis narrative is an 
aetiological saga, but in the form of a myth(l65), he, 
unfortunately for our purposes, does not expound its 
aetiological significance but dwells on its mytholgical nature. 
This mythological nature includes, for Pannenberg, the 
significance of the primordial time as an origin and explanation 
for the basic characteristics of human life and also the 
pre-eminence of the primordial time as the state to which 
humanity must return. It is the latter point which is most 
significant for Pannenberg, this pre-eminence of the original 
state being replaced in the developing Jewish, and ultimately 
Christian, view of history by orientation to the future. 
Pannenberg does also discuss some of the problems involved in 
maintaining a real fall, because of the assertion this calls for 
:of an original, perfect state, and he indicates the problems 
this raises for Muller, Kierkegaard, Tillich, Brunner, Niebuhr 
and Ricoeur. He affirms an alternative to this way of thought 
in terms of the image of God as humanity's future destiny, but 
does not do so in terms of sin which, as we shall see, causes 
problems. 
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Pannenberg sees the traditionally central ideas of 
Christian anthropology as creation in God's image and sin, 
related in some way to Adam's fall, but he asserts that these 
alone do not indicate the distinctively Christian element in 
theological anthropology(l66); this element is humanity's 
reconciliation in Christ. The assertion of Adam's freedom 
followed by sin he sees as a compromise of Christian thought 
with stoicism, in the acceptance of an element of freedom 
alongside the insistence on the human need for salvation. 
Pannenberg does see sin as something given, rooted in the 
structure of human nature, but what is most important about 
human beings is that they are determined from and for the future 
by reconciliation in Christ, and are oriented to the future in 
openness which is their essential nature. 
Redemption and the Incarnation 
In Christ creation is also "mediated into sonship'' and thus 
reconciled with God. This is one of the ways Pannenberg 
expresses the event of salvation in Christ.(l67) We have noted 
above Pannenberg's rejection of the distinction between Historie 
and Geschichte and that between the Jesus of history and the 
Christ of faith. For Pannenberg Jesus• significance as Saviour 
and his designation as divine lie within his history. He 
presupposes that Jesus' history carries its meaning within 
itself: meaning is inherent in event and this is why God can be 
revealed in history without an accompanying explanation. This 
principle finds its ultimate demonstration in Christ's life and 
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meaning.(l68) The principle of the priority of the future is 
also demonstrated here and it places the emphasis of 
Pannenberg's Christology firmly on the resurrection. It was the 
resurrection and not Jesus' pre-Easter activity and claims which 
established his unity with God which is the starting point of 
Christology. Jesus' claims were always related to the question 
of future validation and the context of apocalyptic thought 
within which Jesus saw himself is crucial for this 
interpretation. Although the resurrection of Jesus, rather than 
that of all humanity, was not in line with Jesus' expectations, 
it confirmed his pre-Easter activity and his person as being 
divine. Pannenberg does not want to say that Jesus became 
something he previously was not, because the confirmation of 
Jesus in the resurrection had retroactive force, and thus 
constitutes his revelational identity with God.(l69) Because the 
historical Jesus is one with God and thus reveals him there can 
be a definitive, absolute revelation of God which is consistent 
with Pannenberg's understanding of revelation as mediated 
through history. As such a revelation of God, Jesus is the 
anticipation of the end, when revelation will be temporally 
complete and history will be seen as one. The resurrection as 
well as constituting and revealing Christ's identity with God, 
reveals the final determination of creation: life out of death. 
This is what creation is for, for life with God, for 
eschatological perfection.(l70) So the resurrection reveals 
human freedom and destiny. Thirdly, the resurrection reveals 
God's rule (this is really one with the revelation of God in 
·.~ 
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Jesus), as the rule of the one who raises Jesus and is thus seen 
to be one with him. As the medium of the revelation of God in 
this way Jesus was 
only a forerunner. He revealed the redeeming love of 
God precisely as the forerunner and herald of God's 
still imminent Kingdom. His message was preliminary 
and precisely in that way he participated in and 
revealed the ultimate reality, the love of God.(l7l) 
The resurrection is however not just the revelation of these 
things, but it establishes them. Jesus' unity with God, as we 
noted above, is established by resurrection, and so is the unity 
of history.(l72) It is in Christ that the future becomes 
determinative because it has happened, in advance, in him. 
This future has already become determinative of the 
present since the appearance of Jesus. In virtue of 
the public ministry and destiny of Jesus it has become 
possible to live one's present existence in its 
current, concrete configuration in the way it appears 
in the light of God's future and thus in his ultimate 
truth.(l73) 
in the ministry of Jesus the futurity of the 
Reign of God became a power determining the present ... 
such presence of the Reign of God does not conflict 
with its futurity but is derived from it and is itself 
only the anticipatory glimmer of its coming.(l74) 
So, in Christ, creation and the eschatological future belong 
together and man's destiny, for which he is created from the 
future, is fulfilled.(l75) "In his person, Jesus has become the 
fulfilment of the human destiny to community with God'', in him 
the "true man, the real human being that is the destiny of us 
all has appeared."(l76) This fulfilment is in Jesus' union with 
God which is the fulfilment of that "openness'' which is 
constitutive of humanity. "As the new man who brings the 
destiny of man in general to a fulfilment superior to the first 
199 
creation, Jesus is the Son of God."(l77) Christ's fulfilment of 
human destiny becomes very important in Pannenberg's Theological 
Anthropology. Christ is the prototype, revealing human destiny, 
the image of God, only the visible appearance of which could 
bring that image to us in completion. In this historical 
once-for-all saving event, the eschatological destiny of the 
human being becomes present and operative.(l78) A specific 
explanation of how human openness is made possible is that in 
Christ God's incomprehensibility is endurable.(l79) This already 
determinative and transforming presence of the Kingdom of God is 
God's creative love, and is also known as the overcoming of the 
Spirit. ( 180) 
Pannenberg also shares Rahner's metaphysical use of the 
terms "essence" and "existence" although he tends to use 
"appearance" rather than "existence" quite often, because what 
exists is of course determined by the future and thus may not be 
what it appears to be. God's essential presence is one with 
appearance in Jesus. This proleptic presence of God is 
described as the anticipation not of our final essence and 
significance, i.e., communion with God which is the destiny of 
all humanity, although realised ln a myriad ways.(l8l) Indeed 
the possibility of metaphysical statements expressing "essences" 
depends on anticipations of a future which has not yet appeared 
and Pannenberg's metaphysics thus depends on his view of 
time.(l82) The ''essence" of human life, as opposed to its actual 
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character, includes what is "not yet" but what is nonetheless 
determinative, and "essential" human nature thus becomes a 
matter of destiny for which Christ is decisive.(l83) It is 
important, however, to see this understanding of "essence" in 
the context in which Pannenberg places it in Theological 
Anthropology. It is not the timeless "essence" of Tillich, 
which is to be projected back to the beginning of human life and 
seen as an original, given state, but it is a human 
characteristic, seen in religious and ethical experience.(l84) 
Salvation is thus accomplished as the eschatological summation, 
the "reconciliation of humanity across all chasms". 
'Salvation' means nothing else than the fulfilment of 
the ultimate destiny towards which man is aimed, for 
which he seeks in his entire behaviour. Salvation is 
the wholeness of his life for which he longs but never 
finally achieves in the course of his earthly 
existence .•. Only through the granting of salvation, 
however, is the essence of man realized ... God's 
revelation means the salvation of men, fulfilment of 
their destiny, of their essence(l85), 
which we have seen above, is achieved in Christ. 
Despite the great emphasis on the resurrection Christ's 
death is also significant for Pannenberg, and one aspect of this 
significance is also related to the disjunction between essence 
and actual existence, the "not yet'' of the destiny achieved in 
Christ, i.e., sin. 
In terms of human openness to God Christ's death is 
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self-sacrifice, not in his intention to die, because he had no 
prior knowledge of his death, but in his acceptance of it. 
Jesus found his life again by being prepared to give it up for 
God's kingdom, as we also should be prepared.(l86) The cross 
also manifests the universality of sin which is presupposed by 
the universal salvation achieved. In Human Nature, Election and 
History Pannenberg affirms this reconciliation as the 
distinctive feature in Christian anthropology, in the cause of 
which Christ died for all humanity.(l87) The cross may only be 
understood in the light of the resurrection, but seen thus, it 
is seen as punishment suffered in our place for the blasphemous 
existence of humanity.(l88) While Pannenberg accepts the New 
Testament interpretation of Jesus' death as expiatory sacrifice 
in the light of the cultus, this is not its real significance. 
It is the human who needs reconciliation because of sin, not 
God. Christ's sacrificial devotion was to the world rather than 
to God.(l89) However Christ's death can be seen as 
substitutionary, as vicarious penal suffering, in a sense 
although it must be seen as such only in the light of the 
resurrection, not of the incarnation. However, Christ's death 
is seen as taking up and overcoming our death(l90) as well as 
dealing in some way with sin. 
Pannenberg's explanation of Christ's death as substitution 
is unique and complex, and depends heavily on his understanding 
of the resurrection as retroactively justifying Jesus' 
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pre-Easter life. By the resurrection it was revealed that 
Christ was righteous, that he was not in fact the blasphemer he 
was crucified as by the Jews: his condemners were therefore due 
for punishment, not because of the law- because in terms of the 
law prior to the resurrection they were right to crucify Jesus -
but because he whom they condemned turned out to be the one whom 
God legitimated.(l91) The fact that the blasphemer deserves 
rejection by God i.e. death, is a consequence, independent of 
Jewish understanding, of the fact that God as Creator is the 
source of life so that anyone who turns away from God cuts 
himself off from life. This connection between sin and death, 
Pannenberg argues, unlike Paul's ideas of vicariousness, is 
still valid today. The universality of the substitution by 
Jesus is established by this universal validity of the link 
between sin and death. The Jews as blasphemers represent all 
humanity in their rejection of Christ, and Jesus thus died for 
all. Pannenberg sees the idea of vicarious suffering also as 
tenable today because substitution is a universal phenomenon in 
social life, grounded in the social character of existence per 
se. With this presupposition, 
one is permitted to understand Jesus' death as a 
v1carious event in view of the unique reversal that 
the one rejected as a blasphemer is, in the light of 
his resurrection, the truly just man, and his judges, 
in contrast are the real blasphemers. 
This can be seen as authorised by God because Jesus' rejection 
was for the sake of the law which God himself gave to Israel, so 
we can say that: 
God himself, who raised Jesus, had laid on him the 
punishment for blasphemy ... he let Jesus go to his 
death in place of the people whose resistance to Jesus 
is revealed in the light of his resurrection to be 
rebellion against God. 
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Jesus' death was therefore the death of the sinner, the death 
which seals the exclusion from God's nearness, from the source 
of life. Because Jesus has suffered this death for all, the 
godforsakenness of death is overcome for all humanity, we need 
no longer die alone and without hope. 
Humanity 
Humanity's role is to recognise the reality we have outlined 
above, and to live in the light of it; i.e. to live in hope and 
in openness to the future. We will question later whether this 
is not in fact a reduction of salvation, like that of Barth and 
Brunner, to a merely noetic acknowledgement of the existing 
state of affairs. By such trust human beings can participate in 
the truth of God.(l92) The centrality of Christ to God's 
revelation and salvation is reflected in his importance as the 
criterion of salvation: it is on the basis of the individual's 
reaction to Christ, acceptance or rejection, that he or she is 
accepted or rejected by God: the essence of all things is 
decided on the basis of orientation to Christ.(l93) Individual 
decision is necessary and refusal will meet with God's 
judgment.(l94) The decision for Christ is the decision in which 
one "trustingly takes tt1is event as the ground on which he 
stands ... self-surrender, in the exact, literal sense of a 
placing of one's reliance entirely upon that to which one 
entrusts himself."(l95) 
204 
This decision involves anticipation of the future which is 
founded in the meaning of the Christ-event, "as it offers itself 
to knowledge. To this extent, knowledge of the revelationary 
event establishes the believing trust in which it issues."(l96) 
Human beings must therefore understand the significance of 
Christ's history, a meaning which is inherent in the event, so 
that they will know that they are related to the centre of 
history.(l97) True faith is sparked through the open 
appropriation of the event: 
all truth lies right before the eyes, and ... 
its appropriation is a natural consequence of the 
facts. There is no need for any additional perfection 
of man as though he could not focus on the 
•supernatural' truth with his normal equipment for 
knowing.(l98) 
It is a truth which is open to general reasonableness. The 
obvious implication of this is that every individual must 
involve himself or herself in historical criticism because the 
meaning of the Christ-event involves an understanding of its 
historical context, particularly that of apocalypticism. 
However, Pannenberg says that the ordinary Christian may never 
come to rational certainty about the truth of Christianity, but 
may nonetheless assume its vindicability by others in the 
future~(l99) The Church and theologians in particular must work 
particularly hard in today's climate to make such an assumption 
possible, "to recover an atmosphere favourable to the reception 
of the Christian truth , to make belief easier. However the 
Church should at no point use coercion in its promulgation of 
God's message because coercion presupposes that human nature is 
opposed to God's rule, whereas in fact it cannot ultimately be 
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opposed.(200) This is the continuity between humanity and God 
commented on above, and to which I will return. In line with 
this understanding of humanity as basically open and salvation 
as a "natural" recognition, is the note of optimism in 
Pannenberg•s view of humanity. Although he wants to distinguish 
this from any kind of "evolutionary optimism", Pannenberg does 
see the Church as more mature and humanity as "more nearly come 
of age" with our century, with the general rejection of 
authoritarianism, and the clear implication is that he sees in 
process "a truly human integration of life in all dimensions of 
social activity" of which only God could be the source.(201) 
There is, however, a problem in all this, in human understanding 
and acceptance of the message of God's coming Kingdom: sin. For 
Pannenberg as for Barth, Brunner and Rahner, sin is only really 
understood from the perspective of salvation, which of course 
for Pannenberg is the perspective of the future. It is only 
retrospectively, on the basis of the Christian understanding of 
ourselves, that we can identify certain structures of behaviour 
as sinful. 
Sin is the common denominator of everything that 
resists the spirit of transformation into the glory of 
God. Sin resists this spirit inside the human 
person ... Along with the perishableness of death, 
therefore, suffering and disease - even before them -
sin must be overcome.(202) 
However Pannenberg is not happy with many traditional 
understandings of sin or with the guilt consciousness often seen 
as a necessary prerequisite for salvation, because of the 
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growing split between such piety and reality. ''Sin" in modern 
understanding is not the expression of a human being's 
experience and does not relate to this immediacy of experience, 
but is its explanation. To overcome the split and connect with 
reality, Pannenberg calls for a concept of sin which relates to 
the fundamental non-identity in the human situation due to the 
tension between egocentricity and self-transcendence: it is this 
situation that needs overcoming(203), particularly in a 
situation where people are more aware of meaninglessness than of 
guilt.(204) Pannenberg is concerned specifically with Barth's 
understanding of sin and his denial of any connection between 
Christian statements about sinfulness and empirical data. 
Although Pannenberg would not try to "prove" the existence of 
sin any more than that of God by empirical observation, he 
sees the reality of human life as giving witness to the 
Christian understanding of sin and as verifying, specifically, 
its universality and radicality. It is the fact that the 
universality of sin becomes known in the light of the Christian 
revelation (and as the presupposition of this revelation) which 
justifies us in looking for the root of human sin in the 
universal natural conditions of human existence.(205) 
Pannenberg 
non-identity, 
pursues this 
"contradiction", 
understanding 
talking 
Of sin as 
of sin as 
"self-contradiction", the "contradiction" between destiny and 
actual reality(206), and as connected with the present 
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"antagonisms" of life, its misery, absurdity, selfishness and 
acedia.(207) The "contradiction" to self and to destiny is 
manifested as closedness to the future, distrust and unbelief 
which result in the building of defences against the future, 
through seeing it as a prolongation of what exists, rather than 
the creative origin of reality. Pannenberg also describes this 
as self-centredness, egocentricity, which is in tension with 
human self-transcendence.(208) This closedness can prevent the 
human being from the otherwise natural recognition of the 
meaning of Jesus' history: it is thus a matter of ignorance or 
misundersanding. So Pannenberg says that the will can refuse 
the voice which calls towards fulfilment of human destiny only 
when that voice becomes unclear, although unclarity may be 
characteristic for human behaviour. It also involves error 
because it mistakes self-centredness for true self-interest 
which finds fulfilment only in God.(209) In this context 
Pannenberg claims that a human being can never decide against 
God as an original, free decision because humanity has an 
openness towards God, a hidden tendency towards that which can 
fulfil and because the reply comes from God to the question of 
human freedom above and beyond every "self-made encasement of 
mind". So this is not a choice as other finite possibilities: 
human beings rather "fall" into sin indirectly through their 
relations to other human beings and to things, as a consequence 
of their behaviour. 
Here they live in fundamental error about themselves, 
since their true self-interest is not identical with 
their self-centredness which asserts itself even in 
dedication to a finite person or task, but which could 
find fulfilment only in the openness of the self to 
God. 
208 
This error about humanity's destiny is not seeing it from the 
perspective of the future, and so Pannenberg speaks of the 
"self-centredness of temporality"; the tension between self and 
reality returns also in the contrast between human temporality 
and eternity.(210) Pannenberg relies very much on Augustine in 
his understanding of sin as a perversion of human desire which 
is, in itself, good. Human beings choose sin because of its 
deceitful nature, thinking that it is good and this mistakenness 
about what is good and evil is the meaning of the bondage of the 
will. Evil is thus chosen only sub ratione bani: God is 
rejected because of the view that the idea of God is a human 
construct; his commandment is scorned because of doubt about 
what his will is. There is, however, no freedom against good or 
against God. Evil is only ever chosen unwittingly. 
To outside observers the behaviour of such individuals 
may suggest that they are choosing between what is 
good for them and in itself and other possibilities 
and that in the process they forgo the good. 
Observers can look at the situation in this way 
because they can judge what has in fact been chosen to 
be bad or evil. But the persons making the choice 
cannot but regard the object chosen as good; otherwise 
they would not have chosen it.(2ll) 
This is closely linked with Pannenberg's understanding of 
responsibility. Human freedom and responsibility is not a 
matter of choice between good and evil. Freedom is - in an 
Augustinian sense freedom for the good. Human beings' 
responsibility for their unwitting choice of evil and for sin 
which is a structure of their being is based not on their 
ability to do or be otherwise but on the basis of their true 
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destiny. This also means that the responsibility of humaniy to 
God is founded on the fact that God is the ground of human 
self-realization, so that responsibility to self 
responsibility to God. 
Freedom has to do with personal existence as a single 
whole which manifests itself in individual actions and 
decisions, with the result that human beings claim 
their present life situation as their own in the light 
of their human destiny. Therefore in keeping with 
their consciousness of their own destination they know 
themselves to be responsible for their own condition 
and activity and for turning the natural and social 
givens of their own life situation into a fulfilment 
of their destiny.(212) 
It is our consciousness that this destiny is really ours 
which justifies our acceptance of responsibility for the 
distance between our existence and behaviour and our goal.(213) 
In this sense sin is rooted in the structure of human life, its 
givenness and Pannenberg accepts this as the kernel of truth in 
the doctrine of "original sin": sin characterises the empirical 
reality of human existence, essence in 
ego-centricity and ego-obstructedness to God.(214) 
Pannenberg expounds his understanding of sin as centredness 
in some detail in Theological Anthropology, drawing quite 
heavily on Augustine's understanding of concupiscence, and 
relating this idea strictly to his understanding of human 
destiny as the image of God. Pannenberg sees human nature as 
involving a conflict between exocentricity and egocentricity, 
which is a structure of animal life in general. In humanity 
this tension takes the form and this is sin - of pride in 
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which priority is given to human egocentricity over a 
destination which transcends self-centred human existence.(215) 
This is a distortion of human subjectivity and of the natural 
order of creation as Augustine maintained. It is Kierkegaard's 
"dread" which is already an expression of sin, and this 
distortion, which co-determines human behaviour, should be seen 
as a structural element of human life and behaviour 
which is marked by a tension between the centralist 
organization which human beings share with all animal 
life and especially with its more highly organized 
forms, and the exocentric character which is peculiar 
to human beings.(216) 
Sin is thus not first of all something moral, but is closely 
connected with the natural conditions of our existence. Human 
beings are therefore sinful Qy nature, by the natural conditions 
of their existence, but this does not mean that their nature as 
human beings is sinful, i.e., their essential nature as 
exocentric.(217) These structures of hostility to the future are 
the elements of discontinuity in history and to them the future 
appears as wrath not forgiveness.(218) It is therefore finitude 
from which human beings need deliverance: 
The experience of finitude has become more radical ... 
The depth of being now appears as something enigmatic, 
as an absurdity. It is no longer experienced as an 
ecstatic expansion of our own being but as a painful 
limit. ( 219) 
The power of the future - salvation - is thus seen as "the power 
of contradiction to the present, and releases forces to overcome 
it. Just for this reason is it able to rescue and 
preserve."(220) 
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So, finally, the Church's task is a critique of the 
structures - social, political and ethical - which are hostile 
to the future, and the proclamation of the corning Kingdom, and 
of the understanding of reality 
that is inspired not by the past nor by eternal 
structures but by the power of the future.(221) 
CRITIQUE 
The initial impression gained from this brief analysis of Rahner 
and Pannenberg is that the place each of them gives to the idea 
of sin is very much determined by their metaphysical interests 
and ideas of humanity and salvation: this impression is 
reinforced by further consideration. Both are very concerned 
about unity and continuity, the unity of reality and of 
knowledge, and these emphases have significant effects on the 
doctrine of sin, which I will consider broadly in two sections. 
The first Will be concerned with the effects of the 
understanding of humanity which we have seen in Rahner and 
Pannenberg's thought; the second with those of their 
understandings of salvation - both of these of course needing to 
be seen within the larger framework we have sketched in our 
analysis. 
Rahner and Pannenberg share a vigorous concern for 
apologetics firstly because they see the need for a better 
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relationship between theology and the world and secondly because 
humanity is methodologically central to both their theologies. 
This apologetic emphasis is welcome and undeniably necessary for 
the Church. However the way in which they see their theology as 
relating to everyday human life is open to question. Rahner's 
transcendental method depends heavily on his understanding of 
the human being as the transcendent knower, an understanding 
which he sees as self-evident. The influence of Jaspers' idea 
of boundary-situations is evident, an idea which Barth 
criticised, denying that knowledge of our knowledge can lead 
beyond the view of ourselves as natural phenomena, or that 
looking at the "frontier" situations of death and conflict can 
lead to any knowledge of true humanity.(222) These criticisms 
also apply to Rahner, as Barth questions why such situations 
should give meaning to life because human beings, as often as 
not, pass through many of these situations quite unaffected, 
they are intrinsically bearers of the mystery of 
transcendence and life. It is quite possible to react to such 
conflicts with rebellion, lethargy or boredom. Barth claims 
that the existential thinker attaches too much importance to 
self-transcendence to fob us off with assurances about the 
wholly other. Although it can demonstrate humanity's openness, 
Barth demands evidence for the assertion that human existence is 
actualised only through this proposed relation to the 
transcendent. This parallels Pannenberg's criticism 
specifically of Rahner that theological anthropology cannot take 
us beyond a demonstration of humanity's openness to God.(223) 
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There are criticisms of Rahner's methodology and 
transcendent anthropology which are not in themselves at issue 
here and which require far more lengthy discussion. What is at 
issue here is the effect of this methodology in terms of 
Rahner's concept of sin. As I have indicated this methodology 
is open to criticism in that it may have insufficient grounds 
for asserting the connection between the transcendent self and 
knowledge of God or of mystery, or between the definition of 
humanity as transcendent, and human experience of life as 
meaningless or despairing. The criticism which arises more 
directly from this thesis is that it asserts a metaphysical and 
epistemological continuity between God and humanity which does 
not leave sufficient room for sin, and is thus likely to be 
inadequately related to the way humanity is. Rahner asserts 
that Adam's fall has affected humanity, but it is not clear what 
this effect is. Although, as we have noted, original sin is 
called "sin" only analogously, the Genesis "saga" is seen by 
Rahner as an explanation of the continual, at least partial 
determination of the human situation by the objectification of 
guilt.(224) However this determination is severely limited in 
what it can mean by the determinative continuity noted above: 
continuity is the bottom-line definition of humanity in a way 
which is central to Rahner's methodology and sin therefore 
cannot be discontinuity. A human being has an awareness of 
transcendence and Rahner makes this awareness unfalsifiable by 
asserting that it is unconscious: humanity is unconsciously 
Christian. Whilst acknowledging the truth of the idea of the 
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ambiguity of human actions and the impossibility of ultimately 
knowing true decision and action from the results of 
determination and co-determination, this notion seems to be true 
neither to human beings' experience of themselves nor to the New 
Testament idea of the Christian faith which is emphatically seen 
as a matter of decision and commitment rather than as a natural, 
implicit or unconscious state of being. To assume such a state 
of being assumes that sin either has been dealt with, so that it 
does not affect this state, or that it has no real power anyway, 
that it does not matter. Again, sin is limited to ignorance of 
humanity's true status. 
To question the "anonymous Christian" thesis on the grounds 
of sin is also to question whether a human being can come to 
true knowledge of God only through knowledge of himself or 
herself. Rahner is assuming that because human abilities and 
activities involve human beings in a domain that only God can 
explain, then Qy that fact a human being acknowledges God: this 
is not a necessary or obvious conclusion, particularly if we 
take account of sin. Rahner cannot take up the potential of his 
anthropological apologetic for demonstrating human beings' need 
in terms of their lack of fulfilment, their frustration and 
anxiety, at least as prolegomena for the Chrlstian proclamation, 
because these symptoms are subsumed within the human being's 
relation to God. It is ironic that a theology which is so 
concerned to connect with human beings' understanding of 
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themselves should have so little real place for the experience 
of alienation and despair, such as many existentialist thinkers 
recognise. 
one reason for this is that Rahner•s understanding of 
humanity (though still an understanding of humanity per se) is 
of humanity as redeemed: it is also an effect of his 
understanding of salvation, the already-inaugurated ontological 
divinisation of humanity, salvation which is one with creation. 
Although Rahner does not speak of creation as the overcoming of 
chaos as such, creation and incarnation are one act of grace and 
there is a sense in which creation is salvation for Rahner: it 
is at least the beginning of the process of salvation, as in the 
chaos myth of the beginning. However this overlaps with the 
tragic influence in Rahner•s understanding of the "prison van" 
of finite existence, and in his distinction between essence and 
existence. What Rahner says here is not clear: on the one hand 
he wants to distinguish between the essence of humanity, the 
potentia obedientialis which is already fulfilled in Christ, and 
the human being's finite existence this is certainly very 
close to the tragic myth - on the other hand, he says that grace 
penetrates both, humanity as concrete existent being is 
determined by the supernatural act which is not different from 
the natural. 
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In terms of Rahner's metaphysics of humanity there is room 
for an understanding of sin as determinative, in terms of sinful 
existence as opposed to essence, although such an understanding 
would be tragic or gnostic, rather than Christian if sin were to 
be tied so closely to existence as such: theologically there is 
no room for sin because of the supralapsarian nature of 
salvation, which in turn affects Rahner's theological 
anthropology: sinful, finite existence is also permeated by 
grace from the very beginning, even from before the fall. If we 
were to reconstruct the myth of the beginning which is implied 
by this it could be a synthesis of the chaotic and the tragic 
and the Adamic, whereby creation is effectively salvation, but 
that which the human being is saved from is guilty and finite 
existence. This is reinforced by Rahner's rejection of the 
historical states of humanity as created, fallen and redeemed. 
It is highly significant that Rahner feels the need to defend 
himself from the charge of pantheism or gnosticism in his view 
of humanity as created to make God's self-communication 
possible. According to my argument above such a defence is 
certainly necessary because the continuity between God and 
humanity, established by creation and salvation, seems to 
subsume human nature as sinful and thus, to some degree, 
independent. Rahner's defence is that humanity is free, however 
this freedom is dubious because of humanity's determination by 
grace.(225) 
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Rahner does want to preserve human choice, the ability to 
reject God, and with it the "not yet" of salvation, but this is 
the point at which sin involves paradox for him: the possibility 
of rejecting God is a contradiction, because God has already 
decided the outcome of history. This resort to contradiction is 
an inadequate if genuine attempt to preserve human freedom, and 
with it the reality of sin, because of the weight of all 
Rahner's statements about the supralapsarian economy of 
salvation by which creation is salvation, which is thus achieved 
before the fall. It is also about God's decision in Christ 
about the outcome of history, in the light of which judgment and 
perdition are always "relegated to brackets" as the fear which 
commands hope, not as a possibility demonstrated by its 
fulfilment: our status in Christ is "terminative" if not at 
present fully determinative. Although Rahner continually 
appends a caution against doing away with human freedom to 
choose, this is what he does in practice(226), in his 
affirmation of the victory of God's freedom and forgiving love 
even over the refusal of his creatures.(227) This is the 
"soteriological" continuity between God and humanity. The 
conflict is thus really external to humanity, it is already 
resolved purely by God's grace. Even the dualism between 
essence and existence is not really determinative, and although 
there may be uncertainty about the future because of the 
impossibility of distinguishing between free and determined 
action, this uncertainty is within the framework of the 
fulfilment of humanity, and the decision about humanity already 
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taken in Christ. Christ is, and has achieved the assumption of 
human nature by God. So sin and human freedom are thus an 
affirmed part of Rahner's theology, the paradox of the enslaved 
will which Ricoeur isolates as central to the Adamic myth, is 
lost and sin is seen as paradoxical only in brackets alongside 
freedom, because of the efficacy of God's victorious salvation 
and because of the place this gives humanity within creation and 
as the transcendent knower of God. The muttered appendix 
"without destroying human freedom", however often repeated, is 
not allowed to affect either the certainty of universal 
salvation, or humanity's status and role in its concrete 
existence as well as in its essential nature, as constituted by 
God's grace. Rahner's understanding here is close to that of 
Barth and subject to the same criticism in terms of implicit 
universalisrn.(228) 
As we saw, humanity is also central methodologically for 
Pannenberg as the questioning subject. I would dispute, 
however, whether his description of the human being as 
essentially open and always questioning is a sufficiently 
comprehensive description. Pannenberg sees human beings as 
basically constituted by openness, always searching, and their 
appropriation of the truth, which follows from their 
understanding of history, is a "natural" process. Pannenberg is 
here also relying on continuity between God and humanity. While 
his anthropology enables him to enter into important debate with 
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contemporary anthropologies, his assumption of human ability to 
interpret events correctly without accompanying explanation or 
interpretation can only be methodologically determined. This 
element of continuity lies behind Pannenberg's ascription of 
responsibility to the human being wholly on the basis of a 
recognition of one's true destiny. He asserts that human beings 
do recognise what their destiny is and therefore accept 
responsibility for it. Human beings develop a reflective 
relation to themselves and to ultimate unity which renders 
conceptual categorization possible, and they have at every point 
a knowledge of transcendent mystery.(229) This assertion 
requires further substantiation or explanation in the face of 
the common human experiences of alienation and misunderstanding. 
This also raises the question which Pannenberg does not deal 
with (because he assumes this recognition) of whether a human 
being is guilty if they fail to recognise their true human 
destiny. There is some recognition of this in Pannenberg's 
allowance for us to rely on other people's validation of the 
truth, but it seems to me that with this allowance Pannenberg 
1~ses much of his case against subjectivism, at least in its 
-~r1ication to more than an intellectually aware elite. This 
~eems to be something of an ~armchair anthropology~ which lacks 
a genuine awareness of our contemporary cu:ture. It is an 
drtthropology which certainly has adverse ·~·JJ.::-equences for sin: 
its postulation of continuity between God and humanity, so that 
human belief follows naturally from the (natural) recognition of 
revelation in history, debars sin from being discontinuity such 
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that a human being cannot or will not recognise revelation and 
cannot or will not believe.(230) 
In terms of his anthropology, because the appropriation of 
truth is an indirect process, mediated through history and 
dependent on the exercise of human abilities (but not inherent 
in that exercise) there does seem to be real room for the 
freedom in human response which is necessary for sin. There is 
a conflict within the human being between openness or closedness 
to the future. It is defined as that which resists the future, 
ego-centricity, which may include, but is much more than, human 
selfishness. As such, however, it is not a decision the human 
being takes, or an act of wilful rebellion, but it is a 
mistakenness about where the fulfilment of human destiny or 
desires lies. Human nature cannot ultimately be opposed to God, 
we cannot consciously choose against God. Pannenberg does want 
to maintain both the voluntary character of sin and its 
rootedness in the natural conditions of human existence and 
maintains that sin, as a perpetuation of natural centrality, 
accomplished in the will, does not befall the will as a fate 
which is alien to it.(23l) However it is a fate in the sense of 
being unavoidable and being linked to the choice of will only 
unwittingly. It seems that Pannenberg emphasises the rootedness 
of sin in human nature at the expense of the voluntary nature of 
sin, and this weakening of the voluntary is furthered by the 
determinative nature of the future destiny of humanity. 
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Pannenberg's idea of sin is commonly criticised as not 
allowing the possibility of self-abandonment as sin(232), and 
his theology is seen as not adequately dealing with the problem 
of a fallen creation.(233) Secularism is seen as impossible for 
Pannenberg because finite humanity is already "in touch'' with 
God and faith is a correct technique of historical investigation 
for finding him.(234) The charge that Pannenberg's salvation is 
purely noetic may not be entirely fair, as he specifically 
points out that faith is not knowledge, but trust based on 
knowledge, and that in Scripture knowledge is a far broader 
concept than our current understanding. However it is purely 
noetic in the sense that it is a matter of recognising an 
already-established state of affairs. Sin is not a threat to 
this process of recognition because the resultant reconciliation 
is established from the future in Christ, despite the 
possibility of an unwitting deviation on the part of the human 
being.(235) 
A more fundamental problem in Pannenberg's understanding of 
sin arises from his metaphysical framework. Firstly there is 
the metaphysical distinction between essence and existence 
(appearance) by which sin becomes something affecting only human 
existence, but not humanity's essence. We noted that Rahner's 
view of finite existence is almost a gnostic or tragic view of 
imprisonment, except that this realm is also determined by the 
supernatural. Pannenberg shares the same "tragic" tendencies in 
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seeing finite existence as that from which humanity needs 
rescue, particularly because it involves a temporally bound and 
therefore incomplete understanding of reality. If human beings 
could see the unity of history they would understand and would 
trust the future as a natural process. Because of their 
position within time, their finitude, they cannot see the whole 
and therefore cannot have true knowledge: it is really finitude 
from which they need rescue. This bears more similarity to the 
orphic myth which Ricoeur outlines, than to the Christian 
anthropological myth where humanity needs rescuing from sin, 
which includes human rebellion, but not from existence itself. 
Problems arise also with the effects of Pannenberg's view 
of salvation on his view of sin, insofar as for him also 
salvation is already achieved. Pannenberg does not talk 
specifically about God achieving human acceptance of salvation 
as do Barth and Rahner. However it is an essential part of his 
metaphysics not only that Christ is the fulfilment of human 
destiny for openness, that he has dealt witL sin, receiving its 
punishment for humanity and thus abolishing it(236), but that he 
is the anticipation of the future, God's future and purpose for 
humanity. In him we can see beforehand what the future will be, 
a future in which all will be taken into sonship. There is some 
ambiguity here because Pannenberg does accept the possibility of 
judgment in this future, dependent on the human response to 
Christ, while talking about the fulfilment and salvation of all 
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humanity. Again, emphasis is given to the unity of salvation, 
not to the possibility of being lost, by Pannenberg's other 
ideas and by the structure of his theology. It is the unity of 
the history of salvation, of revelation, which is important and 
which is revealed and thus inaugurated in Christ. Pannenberg's 
thought does seem to lead towards a universalism which he 
himself would not want to espouse. 
Not only is the unity of history revealed in Christ, but it 
is revealed as determinative of the present. A notoriously 
difficult aspect of Pannenberg's thought is the question of the 
priority of the future which, it seems clear, Pannenberg does 
want to insist is ontological as well as epistemological. 
Christ's history does not merely reveal what will be, he 
establishes what will be - the reign of God - and what will be 
is determinative for the present. This must mean that humanity 
is saved. If Christ is the anticipation of humanity's final 
essence then he must also, as the power of the future, be the 
determination of humanity's final essence. Resurrection is the 
content of salvation, the verdict of acceptance o~ the death 
Christ died on behalf of blasphemous humanity, and the 
resurrection has been revealed as being humanity's future. This 
~s seen in the unity of creation and eschatology in Christ which 
"assigns" eschatological perfection to creation and humanity. 
This is why the human being in his or her sinfulness is in 
conflict with actual reality, as well as with their 
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destiny.(237) Once again the sinner seems to occupy some kind of 
reality other than that which is real, as for Barth. The 
conflict of sin thus becomes, for Pannenberg, not so much a 
conflict in humanity as a dualism between its exocentric nature, 
its destiny as the image of God, that is, its essential nature, 
and its egocentric nature which is part of human animal 
existence, creatureliness. It is not a conflict in the will 
because the the will, though it may be mistaken, is directed to 
the good. It is also a conflict of humanity with itself, and 
only in consequence with God. 
In this eschatological orientation Pannenberg wishes to 
detach himself entirely from the mythical way of thinking which 
sees the primal past as the basis and aim of reality. He wants 
to reach beyond the tension between the two ways of thought in 
Scripture. This is not unlike Rahner's rejection of the 
successive stages in the human status before God, and has 
similarly unacceptable results. In reaching beyond this 
tension, Pannenberg loses the very tension which is essential to 
the doctrine of sin. To be sure the tension between the two in 
the New Testament involves the fact that it is the future which 
is aimed at, and which is already in some way present, rather 
than the recovery of the past. However the creation story 
throughout tradition has, in some way or other, established and 
explained tne reality of sinful humanity as a real obstacle to 
God's plans for the future of the world: sin is a reality which 
225 
is not derived solely from the fact of redemption. We noted 
that Pannenberg does describe Genesis as aetiological, but he 
does not explain what this means. In failing to consider the 
question of whether God or humanity is resposible for sin, and 
in leaving Genesis out of his positive account of sin, 
Pannenberg leaves himself open to the interpretation that God 
creates humanity already sinful, Deus causa peccati, and that 
the overcoming of this already sinful nature is a necessary part 
of human development. In doing away with the tension between 
past and present, mythology and eschatology (except the 
ambivalent persistence of this tension in terms of appearance, 
which is however also determined by the future) Pannenberg 
effectively denies the determining power of sin on human history 
or on the ultimate future, on essential human nature. 
Pannenberg's exposition of centredness in Theological 
Anthropology is valuable and should certainly be seen as part of 
what sin means, but in limiting sin to thlS aspect Pannenberg 
has lost a significant part of the Christian understanding of 
sin, in particular its nature as a conflict, ·not merely a 
non-identity, within humanity, and between humanity and God. 
This problem is maybe reflected in the ambiguity in Pannenberg 
over whether or not sin is evil. He sa~both that human 
weakness which is manifested as sinfulness can be described as 
evil only in view of its extreme consequences in hatred of God 
and of one's fellow human beings, and that sin is evil even in 
its root.(238) 
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In conclusion, the content and significance of sin is 
radically constricted in both Rahner's and Pannenberg's thought 
because of th€ methodological place they give humanity (ie. the 
significance of the human being as the knower of God, a role 
which is dependent on continuity between God and humanity) and 
because of the over-determination of their metaphysical 
frameworks in which human essence and existence are already 
determined as such by salvation. A continuity is asserted 
between humanity and God in terms of human transcendence and 
openness, which makes the recognition of revelation and 
resultant belief in and knowledge of God into a natural process; 
also in terms of the human status as already saved. Sin cannot 
therefore mean discontinuity in these areas of metaphysics, 
epistemology and soteriology. The only room which is left for 
it is in the ambiguous and unchristian idea of tragic 
"existence .. , which does not defend the Deus non causa peccati, 
and tr1at of "appearance" as opposed to "essence"; as we have 
seen, even tnis role for sin is inadequate as it, too, is not a 
real determination of humanity. An understanding of sin as a 
"tensive symbol" (see ChapterS p274+ and Chapter6 pp2'Mit below) 
incorporating some of Ricoeur•s insights could, again, be 
helpful in the constructionof a doctrine of sin which would 
avoid the tendencies exhibited in Rahner aPd Pannenber's 
thought. As we noted in Chapter 3 (p.ll7ff) careful exposition 
of the fall narrative as part of the symbolism of sin, with its 
distinction between the events of creation and salvation and its 
emphasis on human responsibility for sin, would guard against an 
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unacceptably tragic view of existence which not only denies the 
reality of human freedom but also implies that God is 
responsible for sin. Such an understanding of sin, taking the 
paradox of freedom and determination m be essential and 
determinative of human existence, would also safeguard the 
reality of sin and the impotance of human beings, their freedom 
and their role in salvation. A correct appreciation of the 
breadth of the meaning of sin, as a symbol invoking a range of 
idEas, corresponding to the breadth of human experience, would 
prevent any undue restriction of the significance of sin whereby 
it does not ultimately affect human will or reason which is good 
(as for Pannenberg), or whereby it comes to mean no more than 
mistakenness about the true state of affairs, or it is relegated 
to some strange, different level of reality. 
An understanding such as this, which will be discussed 
further in the following two chapters, would not only account 
more fully for human experience but would correspond to a more 
satisfactory account of salvation. In contrast to this project, 
sin functions for both Rahner and Pannenberg, as part of the 
explanation of why salvation is necessary and why salvation is 
not yet complete, but it is not allowed to determine the 
understanding either of humanity or of salvation in any 
significant way and the paradox which always accompanies the 
idea of sin is located in its very reality or possibility, 
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rather than contributing to a deeper understanding of what sin 
is. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PAUL RICOEUR 
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Having examined the doctrine of sin in the thought of Barth, 
Brunner, Rahner and Pannenberg, and having considered the 
problems associated with the doctrine and the effects on it of 
differing approaches we will now look in greater detail at the 
work of Paul Ricoeur. As Ricoeur is a philosopher, not a 
theologian, the material with which we will be dealing is quite 
different from that of the preceding two chapters and the 
sub-headings will be correspondingly divergent. Ricoeur's work 
is, however, of great theological interest as we have suggested 
in our analysis in chapters 3 and 4. 
Ricoeur is concerned with sin for two related reasons. 
Firstly, he is engaged in the wider project of a philoso?hyof 
the will, seeking to explore the nature and potential of the 
human subject. This project leads him to an exploration of 
fallibility and fault - i.e. sin as a "dislocation" and 
"wounding'' of the subject, and as thus affecting the human quest 
for understanding. Secondly, as part of this philosophy of the 
will, Ricoeur examines the nature and role of language, which is 
impotant because it makes explicit and provides access to being, 
a reality which is not immediately available. This interest in 
language leads Ricoeur to his analysis of sin and evil as the 
best example of the process of symbolisation whereby human 
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beings express and interpret their fundamental reality.(l) 
While Ricoeur ascribes great significance to the human 
experience of alienation he assumes a more basic meaningfulness 
within existence. Ricoeur's "central intuition" or 
pre-philosophical experience is that existence and being are 
ultimately meaningful, there is a surplus of meaning over 
meaninglessness.(2) Although "existence" here does not have 
Pannenberg's technical meaning of existence as opposed to 
essence, it incorporates this meaning. Ricoeur is affirming the 
meaning of existence as human beings experience it in their 
estrangement and guilt. He is particularly concerned to affirm 
this in opposition to Jaspers and the existentialist tendency to 
confuse finitude and guilt: 
this confusion of guilt and finitude appears to me to 
be one of the gravest confusions of contemporary 
'existentialist' philosophy. ( 3) 
Ricoeur traces this "ontologization" of guilt back 
Kierkegaard's "fault at birth''(4) and sees in Jaspers that 
guilt tends invincibly to become a misfortune of 
existing which is absolutely past the possibility of 
pardon and redemption. 
Is there any deliverance 'from the tragic when the 
negativity of guilt is given with man's nature?(5) 
to 
Reconciliation takes on the colour of an amor fati: it is the 
acceptance of existence as it is given with its finitude and 
guilt. "This gift introduces into the centre of freedom a sense 
of necessity." 
Can the tragic be surpassed when the human condition 
is guilty in itself and when Transcendence is not in 
some way a 
instead of 
being?(6) 
forgiving, saving, 
a rather abstract 
life-giving power, 
order of absolute 
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Ricoeur accepts it as a merit that existentialism brought the 
negative experiences of life to the centre of reflection, but he 
wants to establish a "style of 'Yes'" over against 
existentialism's "style of 'No'". For Ricoeur joy is 
primary.(?) The human being is the mediation of the two poles of 
affirmation and negation, which mixture is human fragility. 
Sadness, the non-necessity of existence, may force itself upon a 
human being, but the more original of the two poles is 
affirmation of the origin and ground of existence, of the 
goodness of being. 
Behind the anguish about the end of history is hidden 
a desire to contribute to a meaningful history. 
Deeper than the anguish for the inevitability of guilt 
is a longing for deliverance. Finally, the ultimate 
anxiety that everything might be built on an evil 
foundation is the reverse of a most profound 
affirmation, that of the goodness of being itself.(B) 
Man is the Joy of Yes in the sadness of the finite.(9) 
Philosophy for us is a mediation of the yes and not a 
surly intensification of the no.(lO) 
Fallibility 
Ricoeur begins his work Philosophy of the Will with will as an 
anthropological and existential theme, but with ontological 
importance as well, as Van Leeuwen argues.(ll) To get from an 
eidetic analySlS of the main functions of the will (Freedom and 
Nature) to ontological analysis (The Poetics) what Ricoeur calls 
an ''empirics" of the guilty will is necessary. In the reality 
of existence the pure structures of the will are always 
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disfigured, and so Ricoeur has to deal with the question of 
finitude and guilt. Van Leeuwen describes this empirical 
analysis as "a concrete 
ontology."(l2) 
The experiences of 
indissolubly bound to 
point beyond fault 
Transcendence. The 
approach, via negativity, 
guilt and captivity are 
imaginations of innocence. They 
to a creative life-giving 
integral experience of the fault 
and its mythical counterpart, the vision of innocence, 
are closely linked with an affirmation of 
Transcendence.(l3) 
to 
Because "In fact there is no direct, nonsymbolic language of 
evil undergone, suffered or committed",(l4) a symbolics of evil 
is necessary. 
Ricoeur begins the study with Fallible Man. He is 
concerned with fault as something of a "foreign body" in 
humanity, not as a feature of fundamental ontology. It is only 
conceivable as an accident, an interruption. "The fault is 
absurd", it has no principle of intelligibility and there can 
therefore be no eidetic description of it, only an 
empirical.(l5) He is therefore concerned with fallibility, 
before fault: faced with the fact of fallenness he is concerned 
to see, empirically, what made fault possible. This is where 
Tillich would bring in his exposition of essence and existence, 
and the temptation of self-actualisation. However Ricoeur 
specifically chooses the centre of perspective of an "ethical 
vision" of the world. He talks more about this choice of 
perspective in The Symbolism of Evil (see below). This means 
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that his effort is continually to understand freedom and evil Qy 
each other. It is not a decision about the root origin of evil 
but about a description of the place where it appears. 
Choice of this 
declaration of 
centre of perspective is already a 
a freedom which admits its 
responsibility, avows to look on evil as committed and 
avows its responsibility to see it isn't committed. 
This avowal links evil to man as author not just 
manifestation. This act of taking-upon-oneself 
creates the problem. It is a starting point not a 
conclusion. It places the problem of evil in the 
sphere of freedom.(l6) 
Fallibility and fault are obviously not synonymous for Ricoeur. 
His working hypothesis is that fallibility is to do with a 
certain non-coincidence of human beings with themselves, a 
disproportion of self to self. 
It is not surprising if evil enters the world with man 
as he is the only reality which presents this unstable 
ontological constitution of being greater and lesser 
than himself.(l7) 
The feeling of disproportion of self to self is the interior 
reflection of the human being's mediation between being and 
nothingness, the infinite and the finite, and thus attests to 
the original fragility of human reality. Fallibility is thus 
revelatory of the problem of philosophical anthropology this 
paradoxical structure of human being, "suspended between a pole 
of infinitude and a pole of finitude."(l8) 
The first pre-philosophical stage of the precomprehension 
of fallible humanity is the "Path~tique of Misery" found in 
Plato, with human beings as hybrids, the offspring of finitude 
and infinitude, a mixture of Meaning and Appearance, and in 
Pascal: 
The 
For, after all, what is man in nature? A nothing in 
comparison with the Infinite, an all in comparison 
with nothing, a mean between nothing and all.(l9) 
second philosophical or transcendental stage 
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of 
comprehension is approached via the faculty of knowing, as the 
most objective approach, and as a model of the mediation between 
finite and infinite, perceiving and naming. 
This ability to express sense is a continual 
transcendence, at least in intention, of the 
perspectival aspect of the perceived here and now ... 
Language transmits the intention, not the perception 
of what is seen. The word becomes a sign ... in the 
sign dwells the transcendence of the logos of man.(20) 
From here Ricoeur goes on to look at feeling, the philosophy of 
which is concerned with the gap between the purely transcendent 
exegesis of disproportion, and the lived experience of misery. 
Feeling is a manifestation of a relation to the world which is 
"accessible only to ... a feeling which is reason but not 
knowledge."(21) The "universal function of feeling is to bring 
together" - the human being and things, being and being. 
By interiorising all the connections of self to world, 
it gives rise to a new cleavage - that of self from 
self. It makes perceptible the duality of reason and 
sensibility, organic and spiritual.(22) 
The duality of feeling is between epithumia sensible desire 
for pleasure, stemming from vitality - and eros - the specific 
desire of reason for happiness. The areas in which the human 
being seeks to give concrete form to life are having, power and 
worth, and there is tension here also between the primordial 
innocence of these quests and the corrupted passions connected 
with them. These are the "disproportions" in human feeling. 
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Feeling is caught between the ''indefinitude of the thumos", 
which is itself positive, because human beings are given impetus 
by the quests for concrete being, but it also brings on the 
menace of the evil infinitude of desire, of insatiability. 
These tensions are the fragility of the restless heart. This 
mixture in humanity, the mediation between original affirmation 
and existential negation, is fallibility. 
As it is never secured, the 'yes', the power to exist, 
man's effort is always vulnerable ... Man remains a 
'desir d'etre', longing for a ground of being in a 
lack of being. This situation of finitude and 
fragility, sets man a double task: he has to 
understand himself more concretely, to interpret his 
existence as a conflict of strivings, of limitations 
and possibilities, or desire and effort; and he has to 
search for signs which affirm his confidence in the 
sense of being and give a basis to his original 
affirmation. It is to this double task that Ricoeur 
seeks to give an orientation in his hermeneutical 
theory.(23) 
This sounds not unlike Tillich's exposition of essence and 
existence. The crucial difference for the doctrine of sin is 
Ricoeur's insistence that fallibility is not fault. Between the 
possibility and the reality of fault there is a leap, as between 
an anthropological description of fallibility and an ethic.(24) 
It is this transition from innocence to fault, 
discovered in the very positing of evil, which gives 
the concept of fallibility all its equivocal 
profundity. Fragility is not merely the 'locus' the 
point of insertion of evil, nor even the'origin' 
starting from which man falls; it is the 'capacity' 
for evil. To say that man is fallible is to say that 
the limitation peculiar to a being who does not 
coincide with himself is the primordial weakness from 
which evil arises. And yet evil arises from this 
weakness only because it is posited.(25) 
Freedom for Ricoeur involves choice: "If man ceased being this 
power to decide, to act and to consent, he would cease to be a 
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man, he would be an animal or a stone - the fault would no 
longer be a fault."(26) The hiatus of method between the 
phenomenology of fallibility and the symbolics of evil gives an 
expression to the hiatus between fallibility and fault in 
humanity itself, which hiatus is human freedom. 
With the symbolics of evil we come then to a consideration of 
fault as opposed to fallibility, and the question of language. 
Fault is not accessible to empirical description because of its 
irrationality. It has an "elementary opacity" obstructing 
access to intelligibility. It can however be accepted as such: 
... if theology opens our eyes to an obscure segment of 
human reality, no methodological 3 priori should 
prevent the philosopher from having his eyes opened 
and henceforth reading man, his history and 
civilization, under the sign of the fall.(27) 
A "concrete mythics" is necessary to deal with the "coded 
language" which speaks of the passions which affect the will. 
The "myths" of fall, exile, chaos et.c., must be seen as 
secondary elaborations of the more fundamental "language of 
avowal" which is itself symbolic (i.e. the "primary symbols" of 
stain, sin, guilt) and so requires a hermeneutic. Ricoeur's 
symbolics is structured around a schema of primary symbols 
sin, stain and guilt - which are expressive of the experience of 
fault; secondary symbols, the narrative development of symbols 
into myth; and tertiary symbols, gnosis, speculation - the 
formulation of "doctrine'', e.g. original sin. His method is 
that of the history of religions, and he is concerned with the 
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development of this complex symbolism, its context in the Jewish 
people and its relationship to contemporary symbolism and myths. 
His point of departure is therefore language not being but his 
view of hermeneutics is "ontological". With Heidegger, Ricoeur 
believes that human being is hermeneutic. "He is the being who 
lives while giving meanings to his world: the world is the 
horizon of his interpretations." Van Leeuwen notes that Ricoeur 
also goes beyond Heidegger in renewing the epistemological 
question of hermeneutics: 
Thus Ricoeur is a representative of a fourth type of 
hermeneutics trying, on the one hand, to hold on to 
the indispensable existential and ontological role of 
hermeneutics and, on the other hand, to the need for a 
hermeneutical method which can stand up to the 
standard of science.(28) 
Ricoeur says the task of this hermeneutics is 
to show that existence arrives at expression, at 
meaning and reflection only through the continual 
exegesis of all the significations that come to light 
in the world of culture. Existence becomes a self -
human and adult only by appropriating this 
meaning.(29) 
Understanding is thus a mode of being which exists through 
understanding. So hermeneutics is "grafted" onto phenomenology. 
Ricoeur defines the essence of symbol near the beginning of 
The Symbolism of Evil under six points(30): 
1. Symbols are signs - expressions of speech communicating a 
meaning. 
2. Symbol conceals a double intentionality - narrower than sign 
having opacity, a second analogical meaning beyond the literal. 
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3. The analogical bond is unobjectifiable the symbol is 
donative, the primary meaning makes us participate in the 
second. 
4. Symbols precede hermeneutics evoking meaning in the 
opacity of enigma, unlike allegory which is already hermeneutic. 
5. Symbolic language is bound essentially to its context, the 
analogy is part of the meaning - unlike symbolic logic. 
6. The analogical meaning is spontaneously formed and 
immediately significant, unlike myth, a development of symbol in 
the form of narrative, and articulated in a time and space of 
its own. So, for Ricoeur symbols are to be taken in their 
original context, demythologised - that is, no longer seen as 
explanations - and reinstated as symbols, so that as such they 
will give rise to thought.(3l) They do this through their 
symbolic or metaphoric function. Central here is Ricoeur's 
understanding of language as polysemic: words are accumulative, 
they acquire a differentiated meaning from their previous use 
and will acquire more meaning from future use. Language is 
''structure and process, system and innovation."(32) This means 
that the word is a tensive entity "governed by a system that 
wants to restricL it to a limited range of possible meanings, 
and it is involved in a process of innovation and transgression 
of its possibilities."(33) 
Symbol is related to metaphor in various ways: 
a. it hides an indirect, figurative meaning behind an indirect 
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literal one. 
b. it exists only in an interplay of meanings (metaphor 
consists in the tension between an absurd and a metaphorical 
meaning). 
c. its secondary meaning is brought to light through 
interpretation. 
d. it is untranslatable because its surplus of meaning 
functions through the dynamics between its meanings. 
e. it associates different levels of meaning - metaphor does 
this through metaphorical resemblance, which is indissoluble 
from the initial incompatibility between things. The symbol 
assimilates different things. 
Van Leeuwen notes that this understanding of symbols through 
metaphor guards against the tendency to forget that symbols do 
not offer a direct participation in the symbolized: they call 
for interpretation, and by giving a broad definition of the 
symbol as a structure of first and second meaning Ricoeur holds 
symbols open to more possible interpretations: Symbolism is a 
relation of meaning to meaning, of second meaning to 
first meaning, regardless of whether that relation be 
one of analogy or not, or whether the first meaning 
disguises or reveals the second meaning.(34) 
However, whereas metaphor is a free invention of discourse, 
symbolism is a "bound'' sort of language. Ricoeur expounds this 
boundness in terms of the symbol's poetic, cosmic and oneiric 
dimensions which Van Leeuwen sums up as follows: 
So it seems that the whole hermeneutical theory 
reviewed up to now is summarized in the dialectic of 
the archeological and the teleological directions of 
interpretation. In certain symbols human discourse is 
bound by unknown emotional drives so that it is 
'transcended from below' (CI 330: f.326). But by its 
'spiritual' and 'poetic' functions discourse is 
liberated from this bond to the archaism and becomes 
the instrument for discovering novel meaning.(35) 
This dialectic of the archeological and teleological 
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is 
Ricoeur's concern in The Conflict of Interpretations. He 
pursues the "necessary" opposition between phenomenology of 
religion and the psychoanalytical interpretation of religion, 
the opposition between the Spirit and the unconscious, the order 
of the ultimate and the order of the primordial.(36) Both, he 
says, are legitimate in their own context. 
The exact same symbols are endowed with these two 
dimensions and offer themselves to these two opposing 
interpretations. 
The final perspective for the endless interplay is the 
"eschatological dimension". The ego is decentred in the 
subjection of human beings to their arche or infancy, and in 
their evolution towards a telos which the works of culture open 
up.(37) A third decentering is the eschatological: humanity 
receives symbols of a meaningful ground under the arche and a 
meaningful horizon of the teleological project. Symbols 
manifest the dependence of the self as an absolute 
source of existence and meanings, on an eschaton, an 
ultimate end towards which all the figures of the 
spirit point.(38) 
So we come back to Ricoeur's conviction of a surplus of meaning 
in this assertion that the power of language to open up the 
world to reveal deep structures of reality, is ultimately 
founded on the power of being to reveal itself to humanity. 
This is why Ricoeur sees the symbolism of evil as worth 
studying, because it will open up reality. His language here 
sounds very like Tillich. Again Van Leeuwen sums up: 
In symbols of the sacred man experiences his belonging 
to a dimension of meaning which is 'the horizon of 
(his) archeology and the horizon of (his) 
teleology' ... , the horizon of meaning in which life 
was, is and will be. But, as a horizon, it remains at 
a distance, beyond human grasp. It is the horizon 
which 'gives' meaning and which 'invites' ever new 
explorations and creations of meaning.(39) 
The Symbolism of Evil. 
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Ricoeur calls the experience of evil "the birthplace of 
hermeneutics".(40) Evil is a "contradiction" that has always 
required an answer, and it is an observation that ''the preferred 
language of fault appears to be indirect and based on 
imagery."(4l) He begins with the encounter of Jewish and Greek 
thought as the fundamental intersection that founds our culture. 
Since our existence begins with it, this encounter has 
become necessary, in the sense that it is the 
presupposition of our undeniable reality. This is why 
the history of the consciousness of fault in Greece 
and in Israel will constantly be our central point of 
reference; it is our 'nearest' origin, in this 
spiritual economy of distance.(42) 
Anyone who wished to escape this contingency of 
historical encounters and stand apart from the game in 
the name of a non-situated 'objectivity' would at the 
most know everything, but would understand 
nothing.(43) 
At the lowest or most primordial level, we must begin with the 
confession of sins, which 
furnish the myth with a substructure of meaning ... 
Through confession the consciousness of fault is 
brought into the light of speech; through confession 
man remains speech, even in the experience of his own 
absurdity, suffering, and anguish.(44) 
Ricoeur notes at the start that though speculation is not 
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autonomous, and myths are secondary, neither is there any 
immediate consciousness of fault that can do without these 
elaborations. Experience as an abstract is detached from the 
totality of meaning for didactic purposes, but it can be 
expressed only by means of the primary symbolisms and the whole 
circle of confession, myth and speculation must be understood as 
an entity. 
a. The confession of sins 
Ricoeur sees confession as having a threefold character, in line 
with the experience it brings to light: blindness, 
equivocalness, scandalousness. The experience expressed is 
still embedded in emotion, fear and anguish, it is complex, 
including different layers of guilt, sin and defilement and it 
moves to language and questioning because it is disconcerting 
and incomprehensible. This confession of sins is the background 
for an analysis of the primary symbols of the experience of 
fault: defilement, sin and guilt. In this analysis Ricoeur is 
concerned with the development and growth of the symbolism by 
which each form is superseded by the next, but is also retained 
and transformed. 
The two aspects Ricoeur isolates within defilement are 
objectively, the idea of impurity, stain, something 
quasi-material which infects by contact, and subjectively, 
ethical terror the human's entry into the ethical world by 
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fear. This latter has its origin in the intuition of the 
connection between defilement, vengeance and physical suffering. 
The physical order is taken up into the ethical in a first 
sketch of causality. 
Ricoeur notes that the dissociation of the ethical world of 
sin and the physical world of suffering has been 
one of the greatest sources of anguish for the human 
conscience... suffering has had to become absurd and 
scandalous in order that sin might acquire its 
strictly spiritual meaning ... Henceforward it will be 
impossible to co-ordinate doing evil and suffering 
evil in an immediate expression.(45) 
These two traits are passed beyond and yet retained in the 
vocabulary of pure and impure, katharos, with its oscillation 
between ethical and physical, where defilement is related to a 
defining word and a human environment(46), and in an ethical 
transformation of fear which, expressed in words, is no longer 
simply a cry but becomes an avowal, in demand for justice, 
expectation of restoration of order and worth, and hope for the 
disappearance of fear. 
Sin is the second symbol.(47) The dominant factor here is 
the covenant. That is, sin presupposes a theistic perspective, 
whether monotheistic or polytheistic, and the God or gods are 
anthropomorphic, not "Wholly Other". Sin is a religious 
dimension before it is ethical, violation of a personal bond not 
transgression of an abstract rule. Its context is the 
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reciprocity of vocation and invocation the Word again is 
involved. Ricoeur looks at the objective and subjective poles. 
The objective is to do with the Word, with the prophetic and 
ethical moment of prophecy: it is "the revelation in an infinite 
measure of the command that God addresses to man"(48), which 
applies itself to and is in tension with the finite commandment. 
This tension Ricoeur sees as the basic structure of the 
covenant: 
on the one side, an unconditional but formless demand 
that finds the root of evil in the 'heart'; on the 
other, a finite law that determines, makes explicit, 
and breaks up sinfulness into innumerable 
'transgressions', subjects for a future casuistry. If 
this dialectic is broken, the God of the infinite 
demand withdraws into the distance and the absence of 
the Wholly Other; or the legislator of the 
commandments becomes indistinguishable from the finite 
moral consciousness and is confounded with the witness 
that the Just One bears to himself. In this double 
manner the paradox of distance and presence which 
constitutes the 'before God' is abolished at the heart 
of the consciousness of sin.(49) 
The subjective pole is put under the heading of the Wrath of God 
a new quality of anguish, interpreted in a historical and 
communal way, with the Day of Yahweh as its most powerful 
symbol. So evil is seen as a human responsibility, though not 
yet personalised. The bond of the covenant is stretched, but 
not broken. God's Wrath is no longer the vindication of taboos 
or the resurgence of the primordial chaos, but the Wrath of 
Holiness. There is a rhythm of distance and presence: 
In the moment of invocation the sinner becomes fully 
the subject of sin, at the same time as the terrible 
God of destruction becomes the supreme Thou.(50) 
With this development of fault from defilement to sin the 
vocabulary changes. Sin is still the experience of a power, 
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something positive, as with defilement, but in being rupture of 
a relation it is negative also. The symbolism of sin as 
Nothingness is the most opposed to the idea of defilement. Sin 
is a missing of a target, deviation, rebellion, alienation. 
Ricoeur notes the connection of these terms with a view of the 
human being as "nothing", as a breath of air, vanity.(Sl) 
However sin is also positive, and so defilement is retained. 
Sin is the human being's positive position within the covenant, 
which confers onto sin a general transcendence in relation to 
the consciousness of guilt. Sin is also personal and communal -
confession of sins presupposes a concrete universality, an 
enigmatic bond of hyperbiological and hyperhistorical unity, 
lost later with the personal imputation of fault. Sin is 
thirdly within God's absolute regard. "God, not my 
consciousness, is the 'for itself' of sin".(52) Self-awareness 
is the attempt to approximate the absolute view, which is the 
possible truth of the knowledge of oneself. It preserves the 
reality of my existence beyond my consciousness of it and the 
reality of sin beyond the feeling of guilt. Fault and 
transcendence are closely linked. It is integral to fault that 
it is experienced as fault before God, i.e. as sin. This is 
seen also in the paradoxical connection between the myth of 
innocence and the eschatological myth. Freedom remembers its 
integrity to the extent to which it expects a complete 
deliverance. "There is a Genesis only in the light of an 
Apocalypse. That is enough to understand that we cannot suspend 
the fault without suspending Transcendence."(53) 
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Ricoeur outlines the various symbols which express this 
duality of positive and negative, of passivity and activity. we 
have already noted his criticism of existentialism for 
concentrating too much on negativity: he sees the primordial 
experience and symbolism of sin as expressing both. In line 
with this, there is a duality between the corresponding pictures 
of salvation as return, and as buying back.(54) 
The third schmema is that of guilt. As a whole this 
analysis is concerned with the idea of the guilty human being as 
a movement of rupture from the ideas of defilement and sin, and 
secondly as a movement of resumption by which the symbolism of 
defilement and sin is restored along with that of guilt. Within 
this there is also analysis at a more detailed level of the 
splintering of the concept of guilt. Whereas sin is 
hyper-ethical and ontological, guilt is ethical and subjective -
it is the achieved internality of sin. As the demand becomes 
ethical, the subjective pole of responsibility must be a centre 
of decision~ "There is henceforth an 'l' because there is a 
'thou'" to whom the Prophet addresses himself ir the name of 
God. When the "!'' is emphasised, conscience becomes the measure 
of evil and consciousness of fault becomes guilt, and not sin at 
all. The experience of sin is thus indlVidualised and the idea 
of degrees of guilt develops. 
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Ricoeur goes on to look in considerable detail at the 
splintering of the idea of guilt, which occurs in three ways: 
A. movement towards ethico-juridicial experience - the working 
out of guilt in relation to penal imputation, conceptual 
advancement through legislation, legal contests and judges' 
sentences. 
B. ethico-religious experience, development of scruples, with 
emphasis on practical living of the law, essentially practical 
bond between humanity and God, and the development of the idea 
of guilt as loss of a degree of worth. The extreme of the 
personalisation of guilt and the polarity of the just and the 
wicked. 
c. psycho-theological the "impasse of guilt": the curse of 
the law by which one is accursed without being cursed ~ anyone, 
as the law becomes atomized and juridicized. 
conscience becomes isolated and hopeless. 
The accused 
So with the symbolism of guilt fear and exteriority come into 
force again. With the experience of freedom a new captivity 
emerges, of human beings to themselves. Ricoeur describes this 
as an "inward" transposition of the earlier symbols of captivity 
and infection, in which their symbolic nature is quite clear as 
they are used to denote a dimension of freedom. 
The point we have reached through this analysis of symbols 
is that of the "Servile Will". This is the central point to the 
experience and the language of evil. It is because this paradox 
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is insupportable for thought that guilt must have recourse to a 
prior symbolism. 
The riddle of the slave-will, of a free-will which is 
bound and always finds itself already bound, is the 
ultimate theme that the symbol gives to thought.(55) 
This is the conclusion of Ricoeur's analysis of the symbolism of 
evil which we must work from as the "intentional telos of the 
whole symbolism of evil". 
if theology cannot be thought, if it is, in the 
proper sense of the term, unavowable, still, what it 
wants to say - and cannot say continues to be 
pointed to in the basic structure of the tragic hero, 
innocent and guilty.(56) 
b. The myths of the beginning. 
The next stage is to look at the secondary symbols, the myths of 
beginning and end, of fall and exile, which are the medium of 
the primary symbols. Ricoeur is concerned With 
demythologisation not demythisation: loss of the element of 
pseudo-knowledge which treats myths as explanations, in order to 
recover the myth as myth, to conquer the mythical dimension. 
The myth has a way of revealing things that is not 
reducible to any translation from a language in cipher 
to a clear language.(57) 
This stage is necessary because the myth adds to the revelatory 
function of the primary symbols. In particular: 
the myth makes the experience of fault the centre of a 
whole, the centre of a world: the world of fault. 
The myths of beginning and end embrace humanity as a whole in 
one ideal history. "Humanity" is manifested as a concrete 
universal in Adam. This universality gets a concrete character 
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from the movement of the narration. The narration also accounts 
for the transition from innocence to guilt in terms of leap and 
passage between essential being and historical existence, and 
thus has an ontological bearing. Narration is what adds a new 
stage of meaning to that of the primary symbols. The myth, as 
narration, puts the present experience of fault into relation 
with the totality of meaning. This is another reason for 
Ricoeur's concern with myth, because of his own conviction of 
meaning. 
Ricoeur looks at four types of myth about the origin and 
end of evil, the theogonic, the Adamic, the tragic and the 
orphic. The Adamic is the one he spends most time on, as he 
ascribes pre-eminence to it.(58) The tragic is the myth he sees 
as closest to the Adamic. This is the myth where fault is 
indistinguishable from existence, the divine and the diabolical 
are not distinguished. Initiative in fault is traced to the 
divine, although Ricoeur notes that a tragic theology, as such, 
is not explicitly formulated, because this would mean 
self-destruction for religious consciousness: God's holiness or 
innocence is always formulated elsewhere. Salvation is within 
the tragic, not from it, and when the tragic vision is true to 
itself, he claims, the only consistent deliverance is tragic 
pity. Ricoeur sees this as close to the Adamic myth because the 
latter, despite its affirmation of the holiness of God and the 
sin of humanity, has tragic elements in the implication of 
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radical, anterior evil, the avowal of evil as non-historical in 
the figure of the serpent. This is also seen in the future of 
Job, which penetrates beyond the ethical vision, with the 
irreducibility of the evil of scandal (i.e. the suffering of 
the innocent) to the evil of fault. "Thereupon there begins the 
foolish business of trying to justify God: theodicy is 
born."(59) The contradiction between Adam and Job is 
transcended, Ricoeur claims, by the third figure of the 
suffering servant, where sin and suffering are bonded at a 
different level than retribution. We will come back to this 
role of suffering again. 
The myth of chaos, the theogonic myth, is close to the 
tragic in its modern forms. It is the myth which interprets the 
passivity and seduction of evil in terms of the resurgence of 
primordial chaos. The Babylonian creation myth falls into this 
category. There is no place for the fall here because the 
problem of evil is already resolved in the primordial conflict. 
There is no history of salvation as distinct from creation. 
Because the tragic is invincible at the level of humanity and 
unthinkable at the level of God, the learned theogony assigns 
the tragic to the origin of things, making it coincide with a 
logic of being by means of negativity. "The wicked God of 
tragedy becomes a logical moment in the dialectics of being." 
Ricoeur admits that his philosophical anthropology does not have 
the power to posit or refute this thought that evil is a 
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category of being. But again he points to Christology as the 
way forward in dealing with the problem, Christology in which 
suffering in the divinity is a moment which both completes and 
suppresses tragedy. The choice between consolidation of the 
tragic in a logic of being, or its inversion in a Christology 
depends on the Poetics of Freedom, which is to be the third part 
of Ricoeur's Philosophy of the Will. 
The orphic myth, or myth of the exiled soul, Ricoeur sees 
as the furthest from the Adamic myth typologically, though 
historically very influential in contaminating it. The orphic 
myth is isolated in its separation of body and soul, as it 
develops the apparent externality of seduction and tries to make 
it coincide with "body". Ricoeur notes the emphases and stages 
in the Hebrew-Christian symbolism of evil which anticipated the 
transition to orphic symbolism: the themes of banishment and 
defilement. A new stage in the process was represented by 
N.P.Williams' ''twice-born" experience: the experience of Paul, 
Augustine and Luther which Ricoeur identifies as "as 
anti-voluntaristic as possible", although in Paul the Adamic 
emphasis on the individual counts against the drift to gnosis. 
With Adamic speculation, which removed Adam increasingly from 
being a symbol of the humanity of the human being, and with 
ascetic and mystic forms of Christianity, Christian tradition 
adopted the opposition between contemplation and concupiscence, 
soul and body. 
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The crucial distinction between these three myths and the 
Adamic is that the Adamic myth is "the anthropological myth par 
excellence". It "presupposes the Jewish experience of sin and 
guilt and marks its maturity." It also gives the human being 
real responsibility and insists on the freedom which Ricoeur 
sees as fundamental. 
To try to understand evil by freedom 
decision. It is the decision to enter 
problem of evil by the strait gate of human 
(it) expresses the choice of a 
perspective... to understand evil by 
itself an understanding of freedom.(60) 
is a grave 
into the 
reality ... 
centre of 
freedom is 
Ricoeur stresses that the myth receives from the experience 
which precedes it and its symbols, not vice versa. He notes 
that Adam is not an important figure in Scripture, and was 
consolidated in retroaction from Christology. However it is an 
important contribution in working out the positive motifs of 
this strictly anthropological myth of evil, whilst destroying 
the basis of all the other myths, with its ethical monotheism. 
In terms of the Jewish experience, the spirit of repentance 
gives itself, in Adam, the symbol of universality. The myth 
also extends to all humanity the great tension between 
condemnation and mercy which the prophets taught, and it 
prepares for speculation in exploring the point of rupture 
between the ontological and the historical. The origin of the 
goodness of humanity and of evil in history are strictly 
divided. 
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Throughout his analysis Ricoeur relates what he says about 
sin to the corresponding views of salvation, and in particular 
the types of the myths of the beginning. In the theogonic or 
chaos myth salvation is an original dimension, like evil, the 
problem of which is resolved from the beginning as part of the 
creative act. "In this 'type' there is no problem of salvation 
distinct from the problem of creation."(6l) To this Ricoeur 
ascribes the importance of cultural-ritual reenactment as a bond 
between every historical conflict or drama and the drama of 
creation. In the tragic myth, any deliverance other than 
"sympathy" is excluded: tragic "pity", "an impotent emotion of 
participation in the misfortunes of the hero, a sort of weeping 
with him, and purifying the tears by the beauty of the song." 
In truth, salvation in the tragic vision, is not 
outside the tragic but within it. 'Suffering for the 
sake of understanding' - that is tragic wisdom, that 
is 'tragic knowledge' , to speak like Karl Jaspers.(62) 
The orphic myth of exile is the principle and promise of 
"knowledge", "gnosis" and purification by that knowledge. 
The idea of happiness - eudaimonein - is at the point 
where the magical vision and the philosophical vision 
meet; for "happiness" is the "good soul", and the 
"good soul" comes to a man when he "knows", when 
knowledge is the ''strongest" and desire the 
weakest.(63) 
For the Adamic myth, however, salvation is necessary and 
possible and is centred in the person of Christ, the second 
Adam. 
As the ritual-cultural vision of life was coherent 
with the creation-drama, as the spectacle of Terror 
and Pity went with the wicked God of tragedy, and as 
the odyssey of the soul is the answer to the 
wretchedness of bodily existence, so it can be shown 
that the eschatological representations of the Man to 
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come are homogeneous with the fall of the first 
Man. ( 64) 
Pardon is seen as an interpersonal relation, based on the 
reciprocity of a gift, and on voluntary substitutive suffering, 
and this leads to a new creation, in the midst of human being 
not the separation of soul from body. It is the succession of 
figures of the Son of Man, judge, king and suffering servant 
which leads to an understanding of "the one who insures the 
ultimate symmetry between the Adamic figure of the myth of 
origin and the series of eschatological figures namely the 
figure of the 'Second Adam'".(65) There is, however, 
progression, not just similitude in comparison between first and 
second Adam. So the pessimism of the fall abounds in order that 
the optimism of salvation may abound. 
Ricoeur looks at the structure of the myth in terms of the 
instant of the fall, and the drama of temptation. As an event, 
an instant, the fall is a caesura ending the time of innocence 
and the beginning of the time of malediction. Innocence, 
inserted in the creation story, is posited as a before, sin is 
attested not to be our original reality, but to be contingent. 
As a drama representing a lapse of time and several characters, 
the myth is concerned with temptation. Through the serpent, the 
commandment - the ethical limit - is alienated, and the meaning 
of finiteness is obscured so that the evil infinity of desire 
to constitute the reality of humanity. The woman 
represents the point of least resistance of finite freedom to 
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the appeal of the evil infinite. With the serpent we come back 
again to the servile will: he represents the tradition of evil 
as already there, and of evil's radical externality in the 
cosmic structure. Humankind is not absolutely evil, to sin is 
also to yield. 
Adam is for all men the prior man and not only the 
exemplary man; he is the very priority of evil as 
regards every man; and he has himself his other, his 
prior, in the figure of the serpent, already there and 
already sly ... 
We must express, also, "evil as tradition, as historical 
concatenation, as the reign of the already there."(66) Ricoeur 
goes on to look at the symbols of the end which are homogeneous 
with the symbols of the beginning in Adam.(67) 
After outlining the characteristics of the four myths 
Ricoeur concludes that the best place to listen to, hear and 
understand what all the myths teach is the place where the 
pre-eminence of one of those myths is proclaimed still today 
the .Z'Idamic myth. (58) In theological terms, the doctrine of sin 
and the symbolisation of its origin belong to faith only 
secondarily, and derivatively, as part of the prolegomena of 
faith, as the best counterpart to the gospel of deliverance. 
The bond uniting the Adamic myth to the "Christological'' nucleus 
of faith is the bond of suitability. The symbolic description 
of human being in the doctrine of sin suits the announcement of 
salvation in the doctrine of justification and regeneration. In 
philosophical terms, the doctrine is revealed in so far as it is 
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revealing, in so far as it challenges. So the philosopher must 
wager his belief and win or lose by putting to the test of 
self-understanding the revealing power of the symbol. Finally, 
Ricoeur's concern in The Symbolism of Evil is with the 
appropriation of the other myths, which is part of the 
pre-eminence of the Adamic, so that the whole cycle of myths is 
recapitulated. He sums up this recapitulation: 
The myth of the fall needs those other myths, so that 
the ethical God it presupposes may continue to be a 
Deus Absconditus and so that the guilty man it 
denounces may also appear as the victim of a mystery 
of iniquity which makes him deserving of Pity as well 
as of Wrath.(69) 
The last chapter of The Symbolism of Evil points towards the 
Poetics which will conclude Ricoeur's Philosophy of the Will: 
the order towards which humanity reaches by their poetic 
explorations of life's truth and destination. "The symbol gives 
rise to thought." This is the basic value of the symbolics for 
Ricoeur. Through a ''creative interpretation of meaning" Ricoeur 
wants to move forward to pure reflection, enriched with what we 
gain from our symbolic knowledge of evil, a "revivification of 
philosophy".(70) Van Leeuwen notes Ricoeur's distinction between 
the tasks of philosophy and theology, in the polarity between 
theology's '''pathos' of authority" and philosophy's '''pathos' of 
freedom as defiance." He notes that in de-absolutising 
philosophy however, Ricoeur has also surely prepared the way for 
dialogue between de-absolutised philosophy and de-absolutised 
theology. 
Should not theology, too, be aware of its interpretive 
character, i.e. the fact that it remains at a 
distance from the full meaning of the biblical 
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message?(7l) 
The role of the symbol in general hermeneutic terms, in the 
question of the point of departure for theology, is an area of 
debate which is not my direct concern here. However what 
Ricoeur says must have relevance for a more specific theological 
concern for the doctrine of sin. He applies his thought 
specifically to the doctrine of original sin. 
c. Speculation on sin 
This doctrine comes at the level of tertiary symbolism - it is a 
rationalisation and speculation of the myth of the fall, in 
which the "concept" becomes quasi-gnostic, involving 
quasi-juridical knowledge of guilt and quasi-biological 
knowledge of transmission. Although intended to be 
anti-gnostic, in Augustine, with the insistence that evil is not 
being but doing, the concept becomes increasingly (quasi-) 
gnostic in the connection between evil and nature in Augustine's 
struggle against the Pelagians. So original sin became a 
"concept", a rationalisation of the myth of Adam as if it had 
proper consistency. It is a "false column" to the 
Jewish-Christian edifice where the Adamic myth itself is a 
"flying buttress rather than a keystone".(72) However Ricoeur 
does not despair of original sin altogether. He claims that it 
is still a rational symbol of what we mean in the confession of 
sins. By "deconstructing the concept" we can hopefully retrieve 
the "orthodox" intention, the strict sense, the ecclesiastical 
meaning of original sin. This meaning comes back to the servile 
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will. Ricoeur sees the specific intention of the doctrine as 
referring to the realism of sin as a mode of being, its communal 
dimension and its power. Obviously the idea of the servile will 
must be prominent in an application of Ricoeur to the problem of 
sin on a broader level, which includes what is indicated by 
original sin, but also goes beyond it. 
Ricoeur's conclusion, then, is that the symbol "gives rise 
to thought", "Beyond the wastelands of critical thought, we seek 
to be challenged anew."(73) 
What we need is an interpretation that respects the 
original enigma of the symbols, then lets itself be 
taught by them, but that, beginning from there, 
promotes the meaning, forms the meaning in the full 
responsibility of autonomous thought.(74) 
Finally then, it is as an index of the situation of 
man at the heart of the being in which he moves, 
exists, and wills, that the symbol speaks to us ... 
All the symbols of guilt deviation, wandering, 
captivity - all the myths - chaos, blinding, mixture, 
fall, - speak of the situation of the being of man in 
the being of the world.(75) 
We have begun to see the theological potential of Ricoeur•s 
work in chapters 3 and 4 when we considered the implicit 
"beginning-mythologies" involved in the thought of Barth, Rahner 
and Pannenberg. We saw the significance of the Genesis 
narrative - the mythology which, for Ricoeur, is essential to 
the symbolisation of sin - in its intention to make sin a matter 
of human history rather than exclusively a matter of ontology or 
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metaphysics. Ricoeur's analysis of the relationships between 
the alternative mythologies was borne out by our recognition, in 
the thought of Barth, Rahner and Pannenberg of elements and 
emphases which belong more properly to the non-Christian 
mythologies which Ricoeur outlines, and of the destructive and 
unacceptable results and correlates of these intrusive elements. 
In these chapters we also saw that the paradox of freedom and 
necessity is indeed central to the meaning of sin, and that 
there is an inevitable symmetry between ideas of sin and of 
salvation such that changes in the one will affect the other. 
Ricoeur's ideas have thus been seen already to be of value 
as a critical tool, but this application could be taken much 
further than can be attempted here. Ricoeur himself has not yet 
pursued his theory into practice, but the aptness of his 
analysis for theological criticism and and understanding 
provides hope that his understanding of the language of sin and 
evil as symbolic, and his explanation of the rise and context of 
these symbols, relating them to their originating experience, 
assessing their- relationship of opposition and inter-dependence 
with alternative mythologies and recognition of and regard for 
the symmetry between the symbols of the beginning and the end 
may make a positive and fruitful contribution to a contemporary 
Christian understanding of sin. 
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Norman Perrin makes use of Ricoeu~'s work (and that of 
Wheelwright) applying an understanding of symbol to the idea of 
the Kingdom of God.(76) He distinguishes his argument from 
Ricoeur's in that he sees the symbol of the kingdom of God as 
evoking the myth of God who created the world, and who is active 
on behalf of his people in the world. He sees the symbol as 
functioning by is evocative power and being effective on this 
ground. His definition of myth, quoting Alan Watts, is "a 
complex of stories ... which for various reasons human beings 
regard as demonstrations of the inner meaning of the universe 
and of human life."(77) The myth derives its power, in turn, 
from its ability to make sense of the life of the Jewish 
peopl-e.(78) Kingdom of God is thus a symbol of cultural range 
rather than a primordial symbol, such as sin, in that kingdom of 
God arises from historical experience and from myth. However, 
Ricoeur does maintain that the myth adds to the meaning of the 
symbol, that confession, primordial and historical experience 
must be 
taken together, and he is also concerned with the historical 
experience of the Jewish people of God's commandments, judgments 
and mercy. We have seen the interdependence of the symbol and 
the myth within systematic theology. The chief difference 
between Perrin's application and my own is in the cultural 
specificity of the kingdom of God, which has not the 
universality of the experience of sin. 
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Perrin refers to both Ricoeur and Wheelwright in calling 
the kingdom of God a ''tensive symbol" as opposed to a 
"steno-symbol", a sign or concept. This is equivalent to 
Ricoeur's distinction between a sign and a symbol(79), and that 
of D.Cox who sees the distinction as being the fact that symbols 
provide a bridge between the conscious and the unconscious and 
thus participate in the reality communicated as the top of the 
iceberg, the first step of the influence of the unconscious on 
the conscious, through images.(BO) The symbol becomes a concept 
if it 
constantly represents or evokes one idea, by one to one 
correspondence, so that it is used as a verbal shorthand. He 
quotes Wheelwright, 
A symbol, in general, is a relatively stable and 
repeatable element of perceptual experience, standing 
for some larger meaning or set of meanings which 
cannot be given, or not fully given, in perceptual 
experience.(Bl) 
As for Perrin, for the kingdom of God, so I would argue for sin: 
Other possibilities arise if kingdom of God is seen as 
a tensive symbol, in the message of Jesus, and if the 
myth it evokes is seen as true myth, i.e., as a 
narrative means of demonstrating 'the inner meaning of 
the universe and of human life', or as a means of 
verbalizing one's basic understanding of the 
historicity of human existence in the world in 
language meant to be taken seriously but not 
necessarily literally.(82) 
In the concluding chapter we will draw together the 
different aspects and problems which have emerged as 
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As we consider conclusions arising from the preceding study we 
should recall the aims outlined in the introductory chapter. 
These consisted of 
l) an exploration of the doctrine of sin, its "shape", the way 
it "works", the questions and answers it is seen to raise and 
provide and its relationships to other doctrines; 
2) an experiment in the critical use of Ricoeur's analysis of 
the symbolism of evil, particularly of the myths of the 
beginning; 
3) a pursuit by way of experimental hypothesis(l) - of my 
argument that sin is apt to be defined in too narrow and limited 
a way, thereby losing its essential meaning, that this 
limitation goes with distorted systematic relationships with 
other doctrines - particularly the doctrine of salvation - and 
that such limiting definitions of sin can be helpfully 
understood as a misappropriation of the idea of sin which fails 
to treat it as the symbol it is, and as involving a specific 
mythology. 
These three aims come together in my concluding remarks and 
suggestions about sin's nature as a tensive symbol. My 
conclusion, at the most basic level, is that the picture of sin 
which has emerged from my analysis - its shape, the way it 
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"works" - can indeed be understood as a tensive symbol, and that 
such an understanding would result in a more satisfactory 
exposition of the meaning of sin. As we consider what is 
involved in this view of sin we will see how such a notion helps 
us to understand the way in which the doctrine "works" 
systematically, that is, the questions it raises and its 
interrelationships within a systematic theology. As well as 
including some of Ricoeur's insights about the symbolism of evil 
and considering their value, in particular his analysis of the 
mythologies of "the beginning", this identification of sin as a 
tensive symbol will also help us to understand how and why the 
doctrine is liable to be defined too narrowly and how such a 
limited treatment can and should be avoided. 
By way of a brief summary - the implications of which will 
be considered as this chapter proceeds - the designation of sin 
as a tensive symbol means that sin is an idea or doctrine which 
collects (and thus to some extent simplifies) and represents a 
range of meanings and issues. These meanings and issues need to 
be thus represented or symbolised in order for us to express 
them and to be able to discuss them. This need for a symbol 
arises out of the range and complexity of the meanings and 
issues concerned and out of the inherent paradoxes which are 
involved in sin. so we need some such symbol as sin for two 
major reasons. One is the practical reason that we need some 
kind of short-hand to enable us to talk about sin, because it 
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includes so many meanings. The second reason is that the human 
experience of sin is something opaque; it goes beyond human 
comprehension and cannot be objectified except via particular 
instances, not only because of this breadth of meaning and of 
reference, but because it is a paradoxical experience. 
Ricoeur outlines the development of the Jewish 
understanding of sin through its articulation by means of 
various images such as stain, missing the target, defilement. 
An essential part of what sin means is anthropological: it is 
the confession by human beings of their own conflicting 
experiences of shame, guilt, responsibility and unavoidable 
fate. This confession of sins is the ''substructure of meaning" 
behind the myth and the symbolism.(2) This is what Vanneste 
means when he describes our explanation of sin as a "theology 
that is, a human way of conceiving and expressing a reality 
beyond complete explanation. Because we realize the limited 
character of our knowledge, we can be more cautious in 
objectivizing our concepts."(3) As we saw in the last chapter, 
Ricoeur traces the process of the development of ideas about sin 
through primary, secondary and tertiary symbolism to the point 
where ultimately a "concept" is developed which rationalises, 
and thus becomes a "false column" like original sin.(4) Much of 
what is said about symbol applies to sin: 
the vast mass of the most important truths are known 
to us and communicated to others under the forms of 
symbols with a penumbra of indefinable suggestion.(5) 
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This is the kind of use of language with which Ricoeur is 
concerned, and which I am applying to sin in general. Sin's 
nature as a symbol has thus to do with human beings' ambiguous 
experience of themselves, and here lies its spontaneity and 
opacity, as that experience is immediate and conflicting. Sin's 
symbolism involves the expression and confession of human 
experience as well as reflection on and conceptualisation of 
those feelings 
symbolisations. 
Ricoeur's primary, secondary and tertiary 
It points to something which lies beyond the 
human capacity to rationalise, even to articulate. "(Symbols) 
function in man's communal life by representing larger wholes 
having special significance and power over men's lives."(5) It 
is thus not appropriate to try to "define" sin as a rigid 
concept with a fixed content, although even as a tensive symbol 
it has limits which we will discuss in due course. 
Sin's symbolic function is thus the expression of human 
experience, which is ultimately incomprehensible, and it is also 
the collection of a range of meanings (including this 
experience) which we will consider below. It is a tensive 
symbol because the range of meanings which is symbolised 
involves ambiguity and paradox. This means that just as the 
existential human reality of sin involves tension and paradox so 
the symbol - the doctrine of sin - involves tension and paradox 
because it refers to a multitude of meanings between which there 
is tension. It is not a sign or a "steno-symbol" (7), it does 
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not have one-to-one correspondence to any single, objectifiable, 
comprehensible reality but refers to a number of meanings some 
of which conflict with each other. The symbol is itself alBo 
tensive in its very existence as an attempt to express and 
denote something which is ultimately inexpressible, an 
experience which goes beyond words. Such an understanding gives 
the doctrine of sin a flexible and "elastic'' quality. It does 
not have a clear, static content or a clearly defined outline 
and is thus, as we have seen, prone to be limited in its range 
of meanings either specifically and deliberately, or by default 
by the over-determination of some other prior concept or 
understanding. 
The analysis which was undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4 
confirms the complex nature of sin as a doctrine which must be 
seen within a systematic context. In positive terms this means 
that it can only be understood, properly when seen in relation 
to the doctrines of God, creation, salvation and humanity. We 
have seen this exemplified negatively in the thought of Barth. 
Whereas Barth, when talking about sin as a human phenomenon, is 
convinced of the reality of sin and astutely describes its forms 
(particularly as self-deception), the reality of sin seems to be 
questionable when it is seen in relationship to creation and 
salvation in Christ. Similarly with Rahner and Pannenberg it is 
in its relation to salvation and to redeemed humanity that sin's 
significance is called into question. When talking about sin, 
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its nature and its effects on human beings and their 
relationships all three of these theologians have illuminating 
insights to offer. However when these estimates of sin, which 
seem to take account of its force and its real effects on human 
nature, are weighed against the effects on humanity of salvation 
and election it is these latter determinations which are seen to 
be predominant in such a way that the actual existence or the 
radical nature of sin is called into question. The importance 
of seeing sin in terms of these interrelationships is also 
highlighted by the fact that my criticisms of Barth, Rahner and 
Pannenberg were focused largely on the implications of their 
thought for our understanding of humanity, its role and the 
extent of human freedom. 
This assertion - confirmed by the analysis in Chapters 3 
and 4 that sin must be seen in terms of these 
interrelationships is illuminated and confirmed by an 
understanding of sin as a symbol. That is to say, sin's nature 
as a symbol - as representing a whole range of meanings 
determines the way in which the idea of sin functions within a 
theology, and thus requires the kind of systematic analysis we 
have outlined. For sin to function properly within a theology 
its range of meanings should be understood, and this range of 
meanings immediately brings the doctrine into relationship with 
the doctrines of creation, salvation and so on. So sin must not 
be treated as a single, simple concept which may be defined£ 
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priori, or which may be understood from one particular 
perspective, for example from the perspective of salvation. An 
understanding of sin solely based on a prior understanding of 
salvation (for example, of salvation as that which is already 
achieved and which determines human nature and existence) may 
result in a view of sin solely as that which is overcome, so 
that sin may be seen as having no real effect on human nature 
and existence. Such a definition would fail to account for 
human freedom and for the fact that sin persists after the fact 
and the acceptance of salvation. This further reference of sin 
to human freedom means that our understanding of salvation 
should take account of the human will to sin, should incorporate 
the notions of forgiveness and repentance and should seriously 
address the question of the possibility of human beings 
rejecting salvation. 
so sin, by its very nature as a symbol, refers to a cluster 
of meanings and issues which require that the doctrine should be 
seen in its context in order to be correctly understood.(B) 
The range of meanings which are symbolised by sin can be 
divided into two broad categories. Firstly, there are 
particular questions, issues and references which are part of 
the logic of sin. These are the "formal'' meanings of sin, i.e. 
the meanings which relate to sin as an idea, a doctrine, its 
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symbolic function and the way it "works". These formal meanings 
particularly demand that sin should be seen in the systematic 
context indicated above. That is, it should be seen always in 
relation to other ideas and doctrines, those concerning God, 
humanity and salvation. Secondly there is a range of "material" 
meanings which relate more immediately to sin as a concrete, 
observable human phenomenon. This range of material meanings 
involves ideas about the forms taken by sin and the way in which 
it affects human beings as an existential and dynamic reality. 
A. The formal meanings of sin. 
The first set of elements or cluster of meanings which are 
symbolised by sin include the following (which are clearly 
interlinked with each other). Firstly, sin has reference to 
God. As a notion of wrongness or evil sin requires a 
corresponding notion of rightness or good in order for it - sin 
to be recognised as wrong. Within Christian theology this 
takes the form of reference to God, so that sin may be seen as 
rebellion against God, transgression of God's law, alienation 
from God or judgment by God. Sin may alternatively be seen as 
part of God's purpose, so that the relationship between God and 
sin may be dealt with through the explanations of supra- or 
infra-lapsarianism, the fall and thus sin - being explained in 
relation to God's will and plan. Similarly the distinction 
between God's ordination or permission of sin may be brought in 
here. 
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Related to this reference of sin to God is its reference to 
"the beginning'', as we have indicated in the designation of 
supra- and infra-lapsarianism as ways of dealing with the 
inevitable reference to God. Just as sin inevitably raises the 
question of the good, of the standard against which it is judged 
to be sin, so this relationship of sin and God, wrong and right, 
inevitably raises the question of the origins of sin. The 
dualistic explanation that good and evil are equal forces which 
have always existed is unacceptable within the framework of 
Christian theology because of its ethical monotheism. God, who 
is good, is the only ultimate and original force, so that 
reference to God is reference to the good origins of reality. 
This means that we must either ascribe the authorship of sin to 
God - and this explanation has generally been condemned with the 
affirmation that Deus non causa peccatum, and the affirmation of 
the goodness of God's creation- or we must explain how sin came 
to be despite the origins of all things in God's creation. So 
sin, within Christian theology, needs to be related to the 
beginning, and so the Adamic myth affirms the goodness of this 
creation and ascribes responsibility for sin to human beings as 
an act of free human will. However we should note that the 
origin of sin is not thereby thoroughly accounted for because of 
the presence of the serpent. The narrative sets the limits that 
Deus non causa peccati and that human will is a partial 
explanation for sin, but the question is not solved. We will 
consider this further when we look at the paradoxical nature of 
sin. 
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So the question of the beginning, which is related to -
even derived from - the reference of sin to God, has been dealt 
with by various doctrines of creation and fall such as those 
Ricoeur outlines. With Ricoeur I assumed, throughout my 
analysis, that the Christian doctrine of sin involves a specific 
mythology - the Adamic. This assertion was originally made on 
the basis of Ricoeur's analysis and his wager that the Adamic, 
anthropological myth is the best counterpart to the gospel of 
deliverance and hope, that it is the most revealing, and that it 
reaffirms what is essential to the other myths. We now have 
further foundation for this assertion in the conclusions to the 
analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 where we found that it was 
Brunner's concept of sin, based on an understanding of the 
Adamic myth, which best preserved the essential paradox of sin, 
the symmetry between sin and salvation and human freedom in this 
process. We also saw some of the effects of failing to maintain 
the limits established by the Adamic myth. These effects 
included the implication that God is indeed the cause of sin or 
that sin determines humanity as a fate rather than being an 
expression and result of human freedom. This experiment in the 
critical use of Ricoeur's ideas provided interesting and 
suggestive insights in the analysis of Barth, Brunner, Rahner 
and Pannenberg, and could also be applied to some of the key 
figures throughout the history of Christiar. thought about sin 
such as Augustine, Calvin and Schleiermacher. The question of 
''beginning-mythologies" has provided an evaluative criterion 
confirming the dubious nature of some of these conceptions of 
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sin and has enabled greater understanding of the problem of the 
paradox of sin, inasmuch as the correct locating of the paradox 
- within humanity and within the nature not the reality of sin 
(that is, sin is a paradoxical reality, but it is real) -
depends on the maintenance of the distinction between creation 
and fall, and creation and salvation. It also thus involves the 
maintenance of some historical aspect to sin, as part of 
humanity's progressive history, rather than of human ontology. 
Only thus is the ''anthropological" nature (to use Ricoeur's 
terminology) of the Christian mythology retained, that is, some 
degree of human freedom and responsibility for sin, and only 
thus is the Deus non causa peccati clearly defended. However 
this is a complex issue because of the reflection, within the 
Adamic myth, of the paradoxical nature of sin, with the 
existence of the serpent and of temptation standing over against 
the ascription of responsibility to human beings. Sin's range 
of meanings is tensive at this point, because the Adamic myth is 
not a simple explanation of sin (as we noted above) in terms of 
human freedom. Although the fall is ascribed to human freedom, 
the source of sin also goes further back in the presence of the 
serpent, "already there and already sly". The symbol, sin, in 
its tensive range of meanings and here in its mythology reflects 
and expresses the paradoxical human experience of sin as 
something which we choose to do and for which we are responsible 
and yet something in which we are already involved and which 
influences our choice. This is why Ricoeur says that the 
different myths he considers are interrelated, their 
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relationship is not one solely of conflict, but there is an 
element of tragedy in the Adamic myth, with the presence of the 
serpent.(9) 
This means that the critique of Barth, for example, is not 
a matter of measuring Barth's theology against a check-list of 
criteria for a correct understanding of sin. If an element of 
tragedy or fate is perceived in the thought of Rahner or 
Pannenberg this is not necessarily unacceptable because of the 
presence of this paradoxical element in the Adamic myth. It is, 
rather, a matter of balance and of maintaining rather than 
seeking to resolve the paradox, or allowing it to be resolved by 
default, by overemphasis on one aspect at the expense of the 
other. We should struggle to maintain and to understand 
"both-and'', not "either-or". So Barth, although he correctly 
perceives that sin is something which precedes and enslaves 
human beings, and is not purely a matter of human choice, and 
that there is something paradoxical about the very possibility 
of sin in view of God's nature, emphasises the impossibility of 
sin at the expense of its reality. Sin becomes, for Barth, that 
which has been defeated and destroyed and the sense of its 
present and paradoxical reality is lost. Barth's 
explanation of Nothingness also not only loses the distinction 
between creation and fall which is necessary, in some form, to 
preserve the Deus non causa peccatum, but it loses the tension 
of balance between the fact of sin and the paradox of the 
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possibility of sin, so that sin becomes defined for Barth in 
terms of impossibility. The impossibility of sin dominates 
Barth's understanding, it is not balanced by a similar or equal 
emphasis on sin's actual reality. The meaning of sin as that 
which has potent reality and which exists in opposition to God 
is lost. Sin's full range of meaning is thus not recognised by 
Barth because of the way in which he deals with this reference 
of sin to God and to the beginning, and because of his emphasis 
on the complete and determinative nature of salvation. 
Something essential to the complex of meanings is lost and so 
the balance of the whole becomes distorted. 
The question of precisely how we should interpret the 
Adamic myth is not answered in this thesis, although Brunner and 
Ricoeur's expositions have been found to be helpful, but we have 
come, through our analysis, to the same conclusion as Perrin 
that: 
The symbol evokes the myth and when the myth becomes 
questionable or unacceptable, then the use of the 
symbol changes or the effectiveness of the symbol is 
lost. The symbol is effective only where the myth is 
held to be valid.(lO) 
This conclusion is consonant with the analysis of Kelsey who 
sees the abandonment of the Adam story, in favour for that of 
Jesus, as a key feature in the development of theological 
anthropology in this century, a development where the two 
categories of the human being as sinner and as knower of God 
collapse into the one relationship of consciousness of God. In 
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his incisive analysis Kelsey questions whether theologians have 
not thus evaded 
dependence. ( ll) 
the question of human autonomy and 
The second element which is part of the logic of sin is 
reference to humanity. As well as representing something which 
is "wrong" or "evil", which requires the "right" and "good" 
which refer sin to God, sin is also something relational, it is 
something which is always "against" or "between" or "away from" 
and thus requires two reference points which, for Christian 
theology, are God and humanity. (Sin will, of course, also 
involve conflict between one human being and another but this is 
taken to be a part of the conflict betweeen each human being and 
God). 
The reference of sin to humanity also includes the 
epistemological and existential questions of human experience as 
the source of the confession of sin and as a criterion in 
assessing the adequacy of doctrines of sin. Sin is a part of 
human experience and our understandings and explanations of sin 
must have a dynamic relationship to human experience. Sin may 
be operative in all spheres of human existence and behaviour and 
our understanding of sin should illuminate human experience, as 
well as being informed by it. These issues are, however, too 
broad and complex to be dealt with in this thesis although they 
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are crucial areas which would have to be discussed in any 
thorough theology of sin. 
The reference of sin to humanity is a very immediate and 
concrete reference because part of sin's meaning relates to 
human experience, to particular events, actions or attitudes 
which we identity as wrong, or sinful. This aspect of sin's 
meaning, in terms of the effects of sin on human nature and 
human relationships, will be considered in my second category of 
the material meanings of sin. However there is a more formal 
relationship between sin and humanity because of the necessity 
we noted above of two referents, God and humanity. The way in 
which we interpret this reference of sin will depend on our 
conception of human being ~ se, and on our understanding of 
the relationship between God and humanity; that is, our 
understanding of what kind of relationship is possible or 
appropriate between God and humanity. So we see that for Barth 
the relationship between God and humanity - determined very much 
by God's nature does not allow for a rejection or act of 
rebellion on humanity's part and the conflict of sin takes place 
between God and Nothingness rather than between God and human 
beings. This is so because of Barth's explanation of 
Nothingness which, as we saw in Chapter 3, sees Nothingness as 
that which is already defeated and because of his emphasis on 
salvation and election as events which are accomplished for us 
in Christ and which therefore happen to and not in us. This is 
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an imbalance in Barth's thought which results not only in an 
inadequate understanding of sin but in a distortion of the whole 
"system" of sin's meaning so that Barth's estimate of humanity 
and his understanding of salvation also suffer. 
Similarly with Rahner and Pannenberg we saw that a basic 
continuity between God and humanity is assumed such that human 
beings have innate knowledge or ability for understanding of God 
and of revelation.(l2) I criticised this assumption in Chapter 4 
not only on the grounds of its inconsistency with the observed 
realities of ignorance of God and inability to understand 
Christian revelation, and with the Christian assertion of 
estrangement and alienation between God and humanity, but also 
because it upsets the balance of sin's meaning. Sin may, as a 
result, be restricted in meaning to ignorance, this restriction 
being accompanied by an inadequate view of humanity and 
particularly of human freedom and a correspondingly restricted 
view of salvation. So ideas about sin have reference to our 
ideas about what it means to be human, and what our relationship 
is, as human beings, to God, so that one will affect the other. 
Sin also has reference to humanity in its reference to the 
beginning in the question of the origin of sin, as we noted on 
p.289 above. This is the issue of human freedom. If we accept 
the limits of the Adamic myth, that is, that human beings are 
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responsible for sin and yet are tempted by some preceding sinful 
reality, then we are plunged into the turbulent debate about 
freedom and determination. If, however, we do not accept these 
limits the results are less satisfactory than the acceptance of 
the paradox and the debate. Either human beings can become 
pawns in an unchristian determination of existence by fate, or 
God can become responsible for sin or sin becomes entirely a 
matter of individual, personal free choice. In the latter case 
the doctrine of sin loses its relationship with sinful human 
reality where sin is much more than such free, conscious, 
individual choice, and with Scripture where sin is recognised 
also to be a power enslaving human beings. The reference of sin 
to humanity therefore requires, like its reference to God, that 
we accept paradox as part of the meaning of sin. There are two 
seemingly irreconcilable facets of sin's meaning both of which 
must be maintained. Again as we noted in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
failure to maintain this precarious tension of "both-and" 
results not only in a deficient view of human nature but also in 
a limited view of salvation: where sin abounds, grace abounds 
and vice versa. That is, if our understanding of sin, of that 
from which we are saved, is limited, then our understanding of 
salvation itself is likely to be correspondingly limited. 
These two references of sin, to God and to humanity, are 
its basic formal constituents and unify its range of meanings, 
establishing sin as something which is seen over against God and 
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which is in some way "between" God and humanity. A third 
reference of sin which is equally important within Christian 
theology but which is, in some ways, derivative from the first 
two, is the reference of sin to salvation. It is derivative in 
the sense that salvation is one way of dealing with and 
explaining the relationship between sin and God and between sin 
and human relationships. It is also, however, part of the logic 
of sin because sin raises the question of the possibility of 
salvation, even if this possibility is ultimately rejected. 
Within Christian theology of course this reference is seen in 
the role of sin as the presupposition of salvation in Christ. 
The "problem" of sin as something which "should not be" is in 
some way dealt with or answered in salvation and our 
understandings of sin and salvation are mutually dependent. We 
learn more of one by insight into the other. So the questions 
are raised of the possibility of salvation, of the form which 
such salvation would have to take in view of the need (ie. 
sin), and of the status sin has in view of the Christian 
affirmation of the accomplishment of salvation in the historical 
events of Christ's life, death and resurrection. We have sen 
this relationship in our critiques in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Firstly, in our application of Ricoeur's ideas to our analysis 
we saw the correspondance between particular views of creation 
and fall, and particular understandings of the nature of 
salvation; for example, in the "tragic" view where finiteness is 
fallenness, salvation may be little more than a sort of tragic 
pity, and where sin is identified with ignorance salvation will 
299 
be understood in terms of knowledge.(l3) 
We also saw the relationship between sin and salvation in 
our conclusions in Chapters 3 and 4 that in the thought of 
Barth, Rahner and Pannenberg (to differing degrees and in 
different ways) the accomplishment of salvation is emphasised to 
such an extent that the present reality and force of sin and 
estrangement between God and humanity are lost.(l4) Our 
conclusion is that sin must indeed be seen in relationship to 
salvation, but that if salvation is over-emphasised then the 
reality of sin may be forfeited. I will return to this 
reference of sin to salvation in the conclusion to this Chapter 
as I think it is an area of particular significance and 
potential for our understanding of sin. 
With this third reference of sin we have the three elements 
of the traditional schema of creation, fall and redemption and 
we noted in Chapters 3 and 4 the implications of the abandonment 
of this schema in favour of one determined solely by salvation 
or election in Christ. So with Barth, Rahner and Pannenberg the 
emphasis is very much on the achievement of salvation, in view 
of which not only the extant reality of sin but also human 
freedom is threatened. Once more the balance of the meanings of 
sin is upset, one reference - that to salvation - is emphasised 
at the expense of another reference - that to humanity - and the 
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result is a distortion of the whole. 
Following on from the relationship between sin and 
salvation is developed the reference of sin to eschatology. 
This is the outworking of the relationship between sin and 
salvation into the possibility of condemnation and it is an 
important factor in the paradox which is involved, as in the two 
sections above, in the reference of sin to savlation. This 
paradox is present because of the Christian affirmation that 
with Christ salvation was achieved but that the completion of 
the schema is still future. It is the tension between salvation 
as achieved and as not yet complete, the co-existence of 
salvation and sin. We have criticised various theologies on the 
grounds of implicit universalism. If all are saved then what 
ultimate significance does sin have? The question of judgment 
and universalism is one which has been thrown up but not 
answered by this thesis, but the development of a theology of 
sin would have to consider in greater depth the ultimate results 
of sin. 
It has been a critical point when looking particularly at 
the thought of Barth, Rahner and Pannenberg, that their 
understandings of salvation, subsuming sin, lead to universalism 
in various degrees. The question of universalism is not itself 
at issue here i.e. whether or not universalism is tenable 
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within a Christian theology; and this question is not discussed 
at length by any of the above. It is not adequate, without 
dealing with the question at length, to dismiss a particular 
conception of sin solely because it implies or leads to 
universalism. However I think it is fair, from a position 
within the Christian tradition, to say that universalism is 
unacceptable when its basis is a depreciation of sin and of 
human freedom. The importance of both of these has been upheld 
since the origins of Christianity, and any theory Of 
universalism must take them into account in a way which the 
implicit universalism we have noted does not. It is certainly a 
valid criticism of Barth on the grounds of his own rejection of 
universalism.(l5) 
These, then, are the formal references of sin, involved in 
the logic of sin and thus contributing to its range of meanings. 
It is because these issues are part of sin's meaning that sin 
must be seen in its theological context and related to other 
doctrines. This understanding of the range of meanings which 
are collected up in the symbol sin helps us thus to understand 
how the doctrine "works" in its theological context. We have 
explained why the doctrine of sin is inseparable from these 
wider theological issues and how a failure to maintain the right 
balance between these various references even though this 
means accepting paradox - leads to a distortion of the whole. 
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B. The material meanings of sin. 
Sin also includes a range of more material meanings. This 
thesis has concentrated on the formal aspects of the doctrine 
and its interrelationships rather than on these more specific 
meanings but the formal and the material have only been 
separated as an expedient for closer analysis and they should be 
seen as mutually dependent. What I mean by "material" here is 
the content of the doctrine in terms of its existential meaning. 
That is, sin as it occurs and affects us and our relationships 
and lives as a dynamic reality. Because this thesis has 
concentrated largely on the formal nature of sin - ie. on sin 
as an idea or doctrine - this section will indicate this range 
of material meanings by sketching out the issues and questions 
involved rather than by making specific suggestions. 
This broad range of material meanings can be related to 
Ricoeur's understanding of the symbolism of evil as a process 
for Ricoeur in which the symbols develop along with the 
community's penitential experience, which they express, each 
stage of this development contributing to the following and to 
the preceding stages. This development is part of the polysemic 
nature of words: their meaning is accumulative and progresses 
and develops with their usage. For sin this links the doctrine 
closely to human experience, as confession endows the word with 
different shades of meaning. As a tensive entity - rather than 
a sign or steno-symbol - the word is : 
governed by a system that wants to restrict it to a 
limited range of possible meanings, and it is involved 
in a process of innovation and transgression of its 
possibilities.(l6) 
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The suggestion that sin has a range of such material meanings 
answers numerous protests against specific limitations of sin's 
meaning: for example, against its limitation to a moral category 
or an individual phenomenon.(l7) It also corresponds to various 
analyses of the Biblical material.(lB) This range of meanings is 
open-ended as human experience is open-ended, and should be 
equally multi-faceted, unless we can justify the exemption of 
any particular area of human experience from the effects of sin. 
I suggested in my critique of Rahner and Pannenberg that we 
cannot assume that human reason will function in a particular 
way so as to lead human beings to salvation because this is to 
assume that reason is not affected by sin. This raises the 
question as to whether sin is self-limiting because our ideas 
themselves cannot be exempted from the effects of sin and thus 
might be expected to be inadequate. Similarly with any other 
area of human nature or experience; the breadth of the meaning 
of sin should correspond to the breadth of human experience. 
So sin's range of meaning includes sin as active and 
passive, negative a lack or deficiency and positive, 
individual and personal and collective or communal, freely 
chosen action and innate disposition or state. It includes the 
dialectic of the unconditional demand and finite law, i.e. sin 
and sins, the hyper-ethical and ontological aspect often thought 
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of as sin as well as the ethical and subjective: guilt. Also 
included in some way in the developing symbol of sin is physical 
suffering, and Ricoeur notes that when sin is separated from 
suffering, as strictly spiritual, then suffering becomes absurd 
and scandalous.(l9) It also includes the elements traditionally 
distinguished as "original sin" and "actual sin". As many 
writers on original sin have affirmed, the core of the doctrine 
of original sin, which is essential to the Christian 
understanding of sin and should thus be retained, is the paradox 
of the antecedence of evil, the tragic depth of sin which 
transcends understanding, so that sin is, paradoxically, both 
that for which we are responsible and that which we "cannot 
help". To say as Augustine and others said, that original sin 
is sin "only improperly so-called" is based on the 
presupposition that sin necessarily involves individual, 
responsible decision and will and that an inheritance of any 
kind cannot therefore be sin. I have suggested that sin means 
more than this and includes this essential paradox of original 
sin, that we are sinful in some way before we individually sin. 
Indeed this paradox is essential to what sin means. With this 
understanding of sin it becomes unnecessary to distinguish 
between sin and original sin in the precise way in which they 
have been distinguished in Lhe past. Both are included in the 
broad scope of sin's symbolism which includes that for which 
human beings are responsible and that for which they are not 
responsible but in which nonetheless they are involved, and for 
which they suffer. This is the involuntary at the heart of the 
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voluntary to which "original" sin refers. This also means that 
so-called ''natural evil" can be seen as part of what sin means: 
part of the fallenness of the created order. It is within the 
tensive meaning of sin that the paradox lies, in the 
juxtaposition within human beings of individual guilt and 
inevitability, not in the antecedence of sin per se. That is, 
the antecedence of sin is not in itself paradoxical. What is 
paradoxical is that sin is both antecedent, and a matter of 
individual human freedom and will. 
As with the formal elements, so with the material, the 
meaning of sin involves paradox. It is a tensive symbol. It 
would be the job of a systematic theology concerned with sin -
the project to which this thesis points to work out the 
tensive relationships such as that between sin as an individual 
choice and personal responsibility and sin as a communal 
responsibility. For example, is it valid to speak of "national 
guilt"? How does personal responsibility relate to this? 
Another tension to be explored is that between sin as personal 
choice and responsibility and the sin which is already there. 
Can we work towards a contemporary exposition of the meaning of 
original sin? There has been some significant work on this 
problem, relating both of the above issues in reinterpretations 
of original sin as collective sin, the ''sin of the world".(20) 
Having insisted that we must recognise both aspects - "original 
sin" as some kind of determination by sin, sin as a power and 
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temptation, and "actual sin" as our personal actions and 
attitudes(2l) - we should go on to explore the relationship 
between the two. How do temptation and personal responsibility 
work together? Is it possible to make any precise distinction 
between original and actual sin? Although we cannot start this 
exploration here what is important is that the limit has been 
established that both aspects must somehow be maintained. 
Connected with these questions is the traditional idea of 
concupiscence. Is there any validity in seeing material, bodily 
existence as sinful in some way, or as the "occasion'' of sin. 
Is this what Pannenberg is doing in speaking of our "animal" 
nature as egocentric and thus sinful and as conflicting with our 
"exocentric" nature which is part of our specifically human 
nature which is oriented towards God? Also connected with the 
discussion about original and actual sin is the relationship 
between sin and guilt. Is guilt always to be based on personal 
responsibility and decision? This, again, relates back to the 
possibility of collective guilt. 
Sin's range of material meanings corresponds specifically 
to its formal reference to God in that our understanding of sin 
will depend on our understanding of God and of our relationship 
with God, also on our understanding of the nature of salvation. 
So sin may be described as ignorance, rebellion, finitude, 
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impossibility, disobedience or alienation depending on whether 
this relationship is seen in terms of knowledge or being, or as 
a relationship which is analogous to human relationships between 
subjects and monarchs or leaders or lawgivers, or between 
friends or family. In relationship particularly to salvation, 
sin's meaning includes the question of the sin of believers. Is 
there a qualitative difference between the sin of believers and 
that of non-believers? Is apostasy a real possibility? What is 
the unforgivable sin? How does the possibility of such an 
unforgivable sin relate to salvation and to the balance between 
sin and salvation? 
As with the formal meanings of sin so with the material 
meanings concentration on any one aspect to the neglect of 
others may well upset the balance of the whole. That is, the 
resulting picture of sin and of sinful humanity may be deficient 
and this deficiency may extend to the understanding of 
salvation. The material issues sketched out above also 
correspond to the formal in their affirmation of paradox, such 
as that of sin as individually willed and yet prior to human 
choice. The presence of such paradox is hardly surprising given 
the complex and paradoxical nature of human experience. Indeed, 
we should be suspicious of any supposed representation of this 
experience which does not reflect the paradox which is inherent 
in it. Such paradoxes are therefore not problems to be solved 
but provide limits to be explored and such exploration within 
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limits will result in a more satisfying doctrine of sin than 
results from the attempt to resolve or deny the paradox.(22) The 
role of paradox and the possibility of explaining such paradox 
require further explanation but for the purposes of this thesis, 
which cannot undertake such explanation, it is important to 
affirm that the paradox is inherent and unavoidable in the 
meaning of sin. 
The discussion in greater detail of the material content of 
sin would include the exposition of some of the formal limits 
established above. One which we have already noted is the 
exposition of what it means in practice for us to be free and 
yet in some way determined. Another would be further 
consideration of the "beginning mythology'' which provides limits 
which we have seen to be necessary to our understanding of sin. 
I have argued, with Ricoeur, for the necessity of maintaining a 
fully Christian understanding of the beginning and of 
maintaining a distinction between creation and fall. However 
having delineated this boundary in the most basic way we would 
have to go on to consider, in more detaiJ, just what this means. 
We would also have to consider the relationship between the 
various mythologies of the beginning (as outlined by Ricoeur) 
and their impact on and conflict with the Christian tradition. 
This project raises particular problems because of the complex 
relationship between Christian theology, evolutionary theory in 
all its forms, and the social sciences; but the limits we have 
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discovered should provide guidelines in this discussion.(23). 
I have outlined above the range of meanings, formal and 
material, which are collected by the symbol "sin". I have 
suggested why these meanings are essential to our understanding 
of sin and this has also been demonstrated in the analysis in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Having said that sin involves all these 
meanings, can we articulate more clearly the way in which these 
elements hang together? We have said that these elements are 
necessary, that they are involved in the logic of sin and in its 
reference to the originating human experience of sin, and that 
sin as a symbol collects up all these meanings. It is helpful 
also to see these meanings working as as a system, a complex of 
interrelated elements, which are symbolised by sin. A system 
here is understood as a set of elements standing in 
interrelation(24) a continuous, boundary-maintaining, variously 
related assembly of parts (25), so that change in one element 
may produce changes in the whole, and such that the interraction 
between the elements may include tension. When we talk of sin 
as symbolising a system of meanings it should be stressed that 
"system" here is not a static, rig1d, totally rational and 
self-sufficient construct such as that which Brunner rightly 
rejects(26): it is not something to be constructed and imposed 
on the material. It is rather a way of understanding the 
doctrine, the shape of which should be allowed to emerge through 
the analysis of theology and of human experience and confession. 
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The "system" is something to be discovered from the kind of 
anaysis which was undertaken in Chapters 3 and 4. There are 
four particular elements of such an understanding of system 
which make it an appropriate model for understanding sin's range 
of meanings. 
l. First, the system consists of elements which are 
interrelated and there is thus a balance constituted by these 
interrelationships. The implication of this is that the balance 
may be upset if one element is left out or given too much 
weight. Changes in one element may affect the whole in a chain 
reaction. We saw this effect in the thought of Barth, Rahner 
and Pannenberg where particular understandings of the 
relationship between God and humanity were determinative for the 
whole system of elements represented by sin. I suggested that 
the resulting systems were unbalanced. 
2. Second, the system is "boundary-maintaining". It has 
limits and and may be self-limiting. Some of these limits were 
very clear in our analysis: Deus non causa peccati, monotheism 
and the goodness of God, the respcnsibility of human beings and 
the anteriority of sin expressed ~11 L~e Adamic myth. The 
necessity of balance in the system is also a limit. For 
example, there is be symmetry between sin and salvation so that 
an understanding of sin which corresponds to an unacceptable 
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understanding of salvation cannot itself be accepted. The 
Christian affirmation of the achievement of salvation in Christ 
is also a limit for sin because it means that sin is ultimately 
conquered. This particular limit can, however, be interpreted 
in different ways depending on our conception of eschatology, of 
punishment and the possibility of being lost. A topic for 
further discussion would be whether or not the boundaries are 
traversible, as the possibility of being lost might traverse the 
limit of sin's ultimate destruction by salvation in Christ. 
Similarly the possibility of an unforgivable sin might destroy 
the necessary symmetry between sin and salvation. We suggested 
earlier that sin may be a self-limiting idea because of the 
necessity of allowing for the effects of sin on our rationality 
and thus on ideas such as that of sin. The presence of paradox 
within thesystem is another limiting factor which we will 
consider belovJ. 
3. Third, the system is open, not closed. 
includes two elements. 
This openness 
a. Firstly it includes the interchange between its various 
elements.(27) we have already explored this interchange, and 
noted that it should result in a balanced whole, this balance in 
itself constituting a limit for the system. so a particular 
element within the system should not be understood either as a 
self-contained unit which will determine other elements but will 
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not itself be determined by them, or in terms of only one such 
interrelationship, unless such an understanding can be 
specifically justified. The whole system of interrelationships 
must be allowed to inform our understanding of any particular 
element. So, for example, we suggested that Barth sees sin too 
exclusively in terms of its being overcome by Christ in election 
and does not relate it sufficiently to human freedom and the 
reality of human experience. In exploring this understanding 
further it would be necessary to ask whether there are elements 
within the system which are primary in some way, which are 
determinative for but not determined by other elements - for 
example, the reference of sin to God. Changes in such an 
element might then have greater impact on the whole than other 
changes. That this may be the case is indicated by the status 
of sin traditionally as the presupposition of salvation, and the 
common practice of beginning with Christology and salvation and 
working back to sin as that from which we are saved. This means 
that the ''balance" which we have talked about need not be a 
static balance between equal parts, but the ideal might involve 
what might me called an imbalance between more and less weighty 
elements. So whereas it is important to be able to recognise a 
system which is unbalanced and which does not give due weight to 
particular elements, thlS does not mean that we should aim for 
some ideal balance of co-equal elements. It is not the balance 
for its own sake which is important, but correct relationships 
between the different elements. Identifying those elements or 
relationships which are primary is another way of drawing up 
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limits as well as providing guidelines for a more material and 
existential exposition of sin. 
b. The second aspect of the system's openness involves the 
necessarily dynamic relationship between our existential 
experience of sin and our expression and conceptualization of 
sin as an idea. This relates to Bertalanffy's definition of an 
open system as a system in exchange of matter with its 
environment, presenting export and import, building-up and 
breaking-down of its material components.(28) This discussion 
relates to the epistemological question of the role of human 
experience, a question which we noted before is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. It is, however, an area which should not be 
overlooked. 
My critique in Chapters 3 and 4 included the charge that 
the theological anthropologies in question do not seem to be 
true to the way humanity is. I made such criticisms of Rahner's 
"anonymous Cttrislian" thesis and his use of Jaspers' boundary 
situations, also of Pannenberg's account of the human being's 
role and use of reason in the process of revelation through 
historical events. In both cases 1t is lmplied, or stated, that 
gaining knowledge of God is a nat~ra~ process of recognition 
because of human "transcendence" and openness. Both Rahner and 
Pannenberg have worked out complex anthropologies and are 
concerned with the apologetic application of what they are 
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saying to human beings' experience of themselves. Obviously 
their anthropologies cannot be dismissed simply by stating that 
"humanity isn't like that". A satisfactory critique would 
include the formulation of an alternative theological 
anthropology corresponding with the understanding of sin which 
we are developing. Such an investigation would necessarily 
entail the examination of the philosophical roots of these 
anthropologies, which we are likewise unable to carry out here. 
However there must be a point at which any anthropology is open 
at least to question on the grounds of its applicability to 
observed reality, and of its failure to interact with the 
existentialist tradition with its assertion of the human 
experience of alienation and lack of meaning, although we cannot 
dismiss an anthropology on the basis of this accusation alone. 
This is to take seriously Barth's complaint about Rahner's 
anthropology for its inadequate relationship to empirical 
reality. Maybe an understanding of human experience as the 
"environment" of the system which sin symbolises would be a way 
of understanding the process whereby human experience and 
Christian doctrine surely must be related, and must inform each 
other. 
This relationship between human experience and the symbol, 
sin, means that the symbol must be open-ended because the human 
experiences which it expresses are open-ended. Human freedom, 
which is one of the elements of the system, thus means that the 
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system is, again, self-limiting in that it has an in-built 
safeguard against becoming fixed or static. This openness 
corresponds to the open-endedness and contingency of human 
experience. As Dillistone argues, in his conclusion in Myth and 
Symbol, true symbols have a flexible, expansive and open-ended 
nature because of their relation to a reality which is richer 
and more mysterious than itself(29): in this case the reality of 
human experience. This openness allows for the possibility of 
change and development in the doctrine which should thus also be 
contingent to some extent. The possibility of change in the 
doctrine and the suggestion of the necessary relationship 
between the system and its environment are also relevant to the 
discussion of the relationship between systematic theology as a 
whole and other systems of thought, such as those in which 
evolutionary theory is an element. Such elements can have 
drastic effects on some elements of systematic theology, if not 
on theology as a whole, and an understanding of the 
relationships between open systems and between systems and their 
environments might be a constructive way of understanding this 
process. Buckley notes that the response of closed systems to 
the intrusion of external elements is the loss of organization 
or change in direction of the system, whereas the response of 
open systems is elaboration or a change of structure to a higher 
or more complex level.(30) These possibilities raise all sorts 
of questions which we cannot begin to discuss here, but it is 
significant to note even the possibility of this kind of 
openness. 
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4. The fourth aspect of sin's systematic meaning is that 
the system involves tension. The relationship between the 
elements in a system may include interaction or competition. We 
have noted throughout our analsis and our exposition of sin as a 
symbol that there are paradoxes which are inherent and essential 
to sin's meaning. I have focused particularly on the paradox of 
freedom and determination, on sin as an individual 
self-determination and yet as also "already there", Ricoeur's 
"servile will". This paradox is, on Ricoeur's account, at the 
heart of the Genesis narrative which attributes responsibility 
for sin to human beings, but which also posits evil as already 
therein the serpent. There are other tensions: between God's 
goodness and power and the very possibility of sin existing at 
all, and between sin as something which was conquered in Christ 
and which is still extant and powerful. Another tension is that 
between the assertion of continuity between humanity and God, 
because human beings are created in God's image and could not be 
without God and the assertion of discontinuity because sin is 
"between" God and human beings, involving estrangement, 
alienation and separation. These paradoxes and tensions lead 
Barth and Brunner to characterise sin as "contradictory" and 
Barth to describe it as the "impossible possibility". We have 
seen throughout our analysis that the fact of these paradoxes is 
part of sin's meaning and as such is irrepressible. If we 
attempt to resolve the paradox in one direction or the other 
then it simply emerges elsewhere, and this other location may be 
less acceptable than the original paradox. So Barth correctly 
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sees sin as paradoxical, but emphasises the impossibility so 
much that the possibility is virtually lost, and the very reaity 
of sin is the location of the paradox. Barth asserts so 
strongly that the events of Christian savation occur to and not 
in human nature and history, that both his anthropology and his 
soteriology suffer as a consequence with human beings becoming 
passive objects in the process of redemption. Not only does 
Barth relocate the paradox but he sees it as contradiction. 
We have seen the unacceptable results of this relocation of 
paradox in Barth's definition of the impossibility of sin. They 
can also be seen in Rahner's understanding of the possibility of 
rejecting God as a contradiction and in Pannenberg's assertion 
that the sinful human being is (as sinful) in conflict with 
actual reality. Rahner seeks to make sin "intelligible" and he 
does this by seeing it within a supralapsarian framework which, 
as for Barth, involves and depends upon an inadequate 
anthropology, because election and salvation precede the fall 
and Rahner thus takes insufficient account of human freedom. 
Although Rahner asserts a conflict within humanity between the 
two existentials of Adam and Christ, in soteriological terms the 
conflict is already resolved outside humanity and the paradox 
re-emerges in the possibility of rejecting God: even here the 
dialectic is very one-sided, it is an almost nominal 
possibility, an appendix. For Pannenberg the paradox of sin is 
that it is a mis~aken view, in "contradiction" to reality, it is 
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limited to appearance not essence and thus exists within 
humanity only as a matter of wrong knowledge, not as a 
determination of human existence. These contradictory 
statements are unacceptable. They either evacuate sin of 
essential meaning or they result in confusion. An understanding 
of sin as a symbol, gathering up a whole system of interrelated 
meanings enables us to accept paradox as part of the system and 
as part of the symbol's reflection of human reality. The 
balance of the system relies not only on interaction between its 
elements but on tension between them and because this tension is 
part of the symmetry or "balance'' of the whole it must be 
maintained. We must accept the paradoxes Which are involved in 
sin's meaning. The presence of paradox is another way in which 
the symbol is self-limiting. That is, its collecting, 
simplifying function is limited at the point at which paradox -
which is part of human experience - is reflected in the symbol. 
The process whereby human experience is symbolised as sin will 
not therefore lead us to logical consistency or rational 
clarity, nor should we expect it to do so. Such clarity and 
consistency would involve the loss of the symbolic 
representation of human reality. As Ricoeur says, 
No great philosophy of the totality is capable of 
giving an account of the inclusion of the contingency 
of evil in a meaningful design - either the thought of 
necessity leaves contingency aside or so includes it 
that it entirely eliminates the 'leap' of evil which 
posits itself, and the 'tragic' of evil which always 
precedes itself; the tragic symbols speak of a 
'mystery of iniquity' that man cannot entirely 
handle.(3l) 
So we must resist the impulse to simplify and clarify to the 
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point where the paradoxes which are part of human reality are no 
longer part of the meaning of sin.(32) Brunner manages to 
maintain the balance between accepting, and expounding the 
paradox. Despite his denial that sin can be "systematised'' - a 
system being "a unity in itself without contradiction" and 
despite his assertion that every attempt to systematise it 
transforms sin into a negative magnitude(33), Brunner maintains 
the paradox and his exploration of its nature and its 
relationships with other doctrines leads to a compelling view of 
sin which not only relates to human experience but also 
maintains the necessary symmetry with salvation. So, as we saw 
in Chapter 3, Brunner's thought about sin is more satisfactory 
than that of Barth for whom the paradox is largely resolved, in 
practice, by the general emphasis of his thought.(34) So 
although sin is paradoxical, it is not contradictory and it must 
be allowed its vital place within Christian theology. 
Ricoeur plnpoints the connection between the mystery of sin 
and philosophical anthropology - a connection we have noted as 
lacking in Rahner and Pannenberg -
The initial pathos, reduced by transcendental 
reflection, is recovered in a theory of praxis and 
feeling. But the pre-understanding of pathos is 
inexhaustible. That is why philosophical anthropology 
is never completed. Above all it is never done with 
its task of recovering the irrationality of its 
non-philosophical source in the rigor of reflection. 
Its misfortune is not to be able to save both the 
depth of pathos and the coherence of logic.(35) 
To repeat the quotation from Pascal which prefaces this thesis: 
The knot of our condition takes its twists and turns 
in this abyss, so that man is more inconceivable 
without the mystery than this mystery is inconceivable 
to man.(36) 
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It seems therefore that we must adopt Niebuhr's view that 
"the paradox be accepted as a rational understanding of the 
limits of rationality and as an expression of faith that a 
rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to a truth which 
logic cannot contain"(37), within the kinds of limits which 
Ricoeur outlines.(38) We must maintain both sides of the paradox 
and explore their relationship in order to gain greater insight 
into the meaning of sin. 
By way of conclusion I will suggest one particular element 
of sin's meaning which calls for greater exposition. This 
element is the relationship between sin and salvation. We have 
noted the unavoidable relationship between sin and salvation in 
the critiques in Chapters 3 and 4 and earlier in this chapter. 
However although humanity has been defined in the light of 
redemption (often in such a way that sin's meaning becomes 
limited or distorted), the implications of this relationship 
have much greater potential for contributing positively to our 
understanding of both sin and salvation than has been widely 
realised. 
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Both Ricoeur and Brunner see an understanding of redemption 
in Christ as the way forward in our exposition of the meaning of 
sin. Brunner denounces theoretical solutions to sin as false 
because they try to solve the problem by way of thought. The 
way forward is rather the recognition of the paradox as £ 
reality which can only be eliminated~ another reality.(39) He 
sees the theological means of coping with sin (as opposed to the 
philosophical way which is theodicy) as eschatology, as God's 
act of redemption where the reality of sin, the "contradiction", 
corresponds to the reality of the decision of faith, wherein the 
human being is severed from their sin.(40) We also noted 
Ricoeur's pointers towards Christology, and in particular the 
figure of the suffering servant, as possible answers to the 
problems of sin. He sees two options with regard to the element 
of the tragic within Christian thought~ its consolidation within 
a logic of being, or its inversion in a Christology, the 
inclusion of suffering within divinity.(4l) He suggests that to 
cope with the "mystery of iniquity which man cannot entirely 
handle" maybe we have to include the divine in the darkness, as 
the God of Job appears in the heart of the tempest.(42) Barth, 
despite the difficulties we have outlined in his thought, also 
says "It is here, where God himself has become man, that the 
deepest truth of human life is manifest: the total suffering 
which corresponds to total sin."(43) We have throughout our 
analysis noted the symmetry between sin and salvation and 
between inadequate understandings of sin and inadequate 
understandings of salvation. A contributing factor is the 
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emphasis on Christ as revealer, on the Incarnation itself as 
salvation, with a corresponding decrease in emphasis on Christ's 
sufferings, and the effects of this through the formulation of 
anthropology in terms of Christology. If our anthropology is to 
be based to some extent on our Christology, (and this is a major 
trend in contemporary systematic theology) then the inclusion of 
suffering within that Christology must relate to what we say 
about sin. The symmetry must also include the paradox of the 
servile will, of fate and freedom, maybe in the way Ricoeur 
suggests: 
Whatever may be the meaning of this 'Suffering 
Servant', whether he be a historical personage, 
individual or collective, or the figure of a Savior to 
come, he reveals an entirely new possibility that 
suffering gives itself a meaning, by voluntary 
consent, in the meaninglessness of scandal.(44) 
Rahner talks of Christ's death as the reconciliation of the 
dialectic of activity and powerless suffering (cf. Chapter 4 
p.l65f). Brunner, again, affirms the inevitable connection 
between the Cross and the human situation, and the sense in 
which the Cross must happen(45). 
This calls for a study of Christ's suffering in relation to 
sin. However we must note again our earlier conclusion of the 
danger of understanding sin from only one perspective. The 
suffering of Christ should not become the one perspective from 
which we understand sin, but it is a crucial perspective, 
particularly as a corrective, standing alongside those of 
creation, anthropology and human experience. So the tension 
323 
between creation and salvation is maintained, the archeological 
and teleological aspects of the symbol, in Ricoeur's language. 
The perspective of God's suffering in Christ does have a special 
place though, not as the chief or sole determination of sin, but 
as its solution, its counter-part, the place where the paradox 
is balanced by a corresponding paradox. Salvation, seen as 
involving the divine suffering, far from minimising sin's 
significance, thus emphasises it. We noted in various 
theologies the uneven relationship whereby salvation was 
stressed so much that sin came to be seen as mattering hardly at 
all. our conclusion is that the relationship should be 
symmetrical so that the systematic as well as the existential 
significance of sin corresponds, as presupposition, to the scope 
of salvation: as sin abounds so grace abounds. So the paradox 
of sin is mirrored and balanced in the paradox of the Cross: sin 
as alienation from self, in freedom and necessity, alienation 
from God, alienation from humanity and the world - all these 
meanings are balanced and resolved in the paradox of God dying, 
of isolation within the Trinity, of the rejection of the Creator 
by the creature and of Christ's death as fate and freedom, 
victim and victor.(46) Our theology will thus be dominated not 
by sin but by salvation because sin is seen in the perspective 
of salvation which expands the context to include the 
resurrection and the still future nature of God's kingdom. 
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CHAPTER SIX FOOTNOTES 
1. Cf. Chapter l pp.l3f. (cf c.FN4) 
2. p.6. M.Stancliffe notes that by symbols we all make sense 
of a new experience, defining it in terms of something 
familiar, "Symbolism and Preaching", in Myth and Symbol, 
ed. F.W.Dillistone. 
3. A.Vanneste, "Toward a Theology of Original Sin", p.212. 
Ramsey describes the fall as "a particular case in point" 
of the misunderstanding of religious language as if it 
worked "like ordinary matter-of-fact language", whereas in 
fact religious language, like scientific language, employs 
models as a means of being articulate about mystery. 
Religious Language, p.82. He talks about the various 
models used to describe God and argues that we should use 
as many models as possible and from these develop the most 
consistent religious discourse possible."Talking about 
God", in Myth and Symbol. 
G.Daly applies Ramsey's description of this process 
specifically to the doctrine of original sin, looking at 
the "way we turn 'fiduciary' language into analytic 
language, seek to validate it on the empirical plane, and 
in consequence lose the sense of its isomorphic character." 
"Theological Models in the Doctrine of Original Sin". It 
is the relationship between the model and the reality which 
should be isomorphic, p.l23. Daly's argument is that a 
number of different models are used in the concept of 
original sin, some of them (particularly the genetic) 
unnecessarily, and that these models need to be sorted out 
linguistically before we can reformulate original sin, 
where we see isomorphic language collapsing into the 
language of literal correspondence. He does note Ricoeur 
as providing an alternative model in his traditional 
interpretation of the fall, but does not note the clear 
connection with what Ricoeur says about original sin 
rationalisation of the Adamic myth (SE p.63). 
as a 
His 
argument for a number of models to contribute to a correct, 
"fiduciary'' understanding dovetails into my argument for a 
broader understanding of sin. 
Cf. also the various understandings of symbol listed by 
Dillistone, "The Function of Symbols in Religious 
Experience", in Myth and Symbol. 
4. SE p.239, cf. CI p.270. 
5. H.R.Mackintosh, ~of Modern Theologv, p.9. 
6. Kelsey, The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology, p.28. 
7. Cf. Perrin, Chapter 5 pp.273ff. 
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8. This is similar to Tillich's description of reconciliation 
as one of 
a group of concepts which for two thousand years 
have successfully resisted all attempts at 
precise definition and systematic ordering. 
Salvation and regeneration, redemption and 
atonement, justification and sanctification 
belong to this group; and so does reconciliation. 
Each points to one total act by means of a 
different systematic material and with a 
different emphasis. The total act is the 
re-establishment of an original but disrupted 
unity ... 
"Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought", p.5. 
9. Don Idhe explains how this reciprocity between the myths 
gives the Adamic myths secondary limits, with the 
second-degree avowal of evil as non-human, and that these 
limits save the Adamic myth from sterile moralism and 
condemnation of humanity. Hermeneutic Phenomenology. 
10. "The Interpretation of a Biblical Symbol", p.366. 
ll. 
This conclusion supports and begins to answer Williams' 
analysis of the problem of sin, "Sin and Evil" in Christian 
Theology. He isolates the rejection of the literal 
historical schema of creation and fall as one of the 
constituents of the problem, the others being the 
re-emergence of the gnostic identification of finitude and 
sin and of the {nevitability-responsibility debate. Cf. 
Appendix A, p.344f. The direction in which Williams looks 
for a solution is an "Irenaean" theodicy as seen in 
Schleiermacher. I have already indicated some of the 
problems in Schleiermacher's view (cf. Chapter Two, 
p.52ff), but I would also question whether the concreated 
imperfection and immaturity of humanity can really function 
as the antecedent evil which Williams sees as vital without 
thereby leading to the Manichean dualism he wants to avoid. 
In the ordaining of sin by God, for redemption, and in its 
"point of entry" in the human need for development, sin 
either becomes necessary or superficial. Either way, by 
using this schema to explain sin and to deal with the 
dilemma it seems that the "central intention of the 
doctrine - the self-imposed bondage of the will - is lost" 
in the face of the ''virtually inescapable" nature of sin. 
If the Irenaean theodicy does provide a way forward we must 
first have a basis for guarding against these consequences 
more specifically: the myths are iconoclastic towards each 
other, as well as influential. 
Kelsey, "Human Being", in Christian 
The significance of the Christian 
also noted by Eliade, who sees 
Theology. 
"beginning mythology" is 
myth as necessary to 
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humanity and suggests some of the myths with which the 
Christian myth is currently replaced. "Myths, Dreams and 
Mysteries", Myth and Symbol, cf. I.P.Culianu, "Mircea 
Eliade at the Crossroads of Anthropology." 
Humanity's "search for a usable past" is felt, from a very 
different perspective, by Letty Russell, and W.W.Berry, 
commenting on Russell, talks of the necessity for an 
integration of past, present and future in terms of human 
responsibility such as symbolized traditionally in the 
three-part drama of creation-fall-redemption. "Images of 
Sin and Salvation". The same sort of point is made by 
Richard Niebuhr when he declares that "the doctrine of sin 
is meaningful only as it presupposes the doctrine of 
creation and furnishes the presupposition of the doctrine 
of redemption." "Man as Sinner", p.280. 
12. Cf. Chapter 4 pp.213ff, 219. 
13. Cf. Chapter 5, pp.266. 
14. Cf. Chapter 3 pp.l27. and Chapter 4 pp.217 and 222. 
15. CD II/2 p.417-8, cf. 422; Humanity of God, p.6lf. Cf. 
also C.Brown, Karl Barth, p.l36 and B.Milne's discussion of 
universalism in Barth, "The Idea of Sin in the Thought of 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth." 
16. Van Leeuwen, The Surplus of Meaning, p.93. 
17. S.Hiltner, "A Christian Understanding of Sin", says that 
sin "has worn thin through constant necessity until its 
meaning has been reduced to an immoral act", and he 
suggests a "broader" definition incorporating the three 
metaphors of rebellion, alienation and missing the mark; 
Richard Niebuhr argues against sin's reduction to moral 
categories, "Man as Sinner". A number of writers see an 
extension of sin's meaning as necessary to incorporate its 
collective or communitarian nature. 
On the need for a corporate understanding of sin cf. 
Schoonenberg's work {Appendix A. p.342f) H.Morris, "Shared 
Guilt"; J.Muller The Christian Doctrine of Sin,II, p.310ff; 
H.Rondet, Original Sin, p.2l4ff. Cf. also R.Trigg, "Sin 
and Guilt as Fate of Freedom", 3EC; H.Gorman, "Original Sin 
and Responsibility",3EC; K.O'Shea, "The Reality of Sin"; 
H.Morris, "Shared Guilt". This is a particular emphasis in 
recent Catholic writing on sin. 
Other writers call for a concept of sin which will 
incorporate the usually alternative poles of Protestantism 
and Catholicism, classical and Christian anthropology, 
O.Piper, "Sin and Guilt" in Twentieth Century Theology in 
the Making, ed.J.Pelikan; Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and 
Destiny of Man, and sin as negative and positive. 
J.Macquarrie argues this from a theological perspective, In 
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Search of Humanity, and M.Midgley from a philosophical one, 
Wickedness. Another specific way in which sin is seen to 
be narrow a concept is in its "monolithic" interpretation 
as pride or self-assertion, J.Plaskow, Sex, Sin and Grace, 
and W.W.Berry, "Images of Sin and Salvation". This is seen 
as a particularly male understanding of sin and is linked 
to a critique of Niebuhr, among others. 
18. Quell, in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 
ed.Kittel, describes sin as a "theological" rather than a 
"religious" concept, meaning that it is a systematic 
theological clarifiction of religious processes whose 
content must therefore be derived from its immediate 
context. Scripture thus uses a variety of ways of 
expressing and using sin in its attempts to represent a 
religious phenomenon whose roots escape human 
understanding. He indicates the main Hebrew roots which 
have a range of meanings including the sense of missing the 
mark, a lasting state of guilt, freeing onself from sin, 
rebellion as a volitional human action, bending and error, 
with an element of the irrational or tragic. Quell also 
notes a promiscuity in the use of sin and guilt with no 
sharp terminological distinction because there was never 
any doubt of the causal connection between abnormal action 
and abnormal state. He notes the absence of the usual 
terminology of sin in the fall story unless the very 
general term for evil is included - but nonetheless links 
it to sin's meaning. He sees the fall aetiologically: the 
author's intention was not to give a correct theological 
account but to popularise a basic theological concept, it 
is not so much "theology" as true and profound piety 
speaking out of the compelling experience of inner tension. 
All of this is consonant with my interpretation and use of 
Ricoeur, as is his conclusion on the later, more developed 
Israelite concept of sin, by which 
the simple man could not be told more simply or 
clearly what was the significance of the unrest 
of his heart in the presence of the holy than by 
such terms as transgression, deviation from a 
required norm, repudiation of every norm, or 
error which is to be corrected thereby. 
Criticism of human conduct, the assertion of 
guilty conduct and above all the inescapable 
knowledge of a demanding will of deity all meet 
in these pregnant concepts and give them the 
force of powerful formulae which exhaustively 
interpret the significance of all the situations 
of human destiny controlled by creaturely 
feeling.p.276. 
Sin has a 
Testament as 
similarly 
W.Gunther 
"all-embracing" 
notes in the 
nature in the New 
New International 
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Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed, C.Brown. The 
overall emphasis is that sin is seen in the context of the 
Christ-event, within two strands, the subjection of all 
people to the power of sin from which they are redeemed 
only through Christ, and the call for Christians to be 
servants of Christ not of sin. The different Biblical 
expressions, while not "completing" each other, are 
mutually illuminating and Berkouwer claims that "no one has 
ever defined our sin in a way that embraces the 
multiplicity of the Biblical expressions." Berkouwer, Sin, 
p.255f. Gelin and Deschampes, Sin in the Bible, similarly 
outline a broad range of meaning in their analysis of sin 
in the Bible. Deschampes gives a particularly inclusive 
range of the meanings of sin in the New Testament. 
19. Cf. Chapter 5, pp.256. 
20. Cf. Schoonenberg in particular, Man and Sin, cf. Appendix 
A. 
21. Adriaanse sees the traditions of original sin as too deep 
to allow us to understand sin exclusively as deliberate and 
avoidable transgression, H.Adriaanse, "Original Sin and 
Responsibility", 3EC, p.l28. 
We have already seen that R.R.Williams recognises the 
"tragic flaw" in human freedom, although he does not think 
this can be done in terms of the concept of sin itself, as 
I am suggesting, but thinks that evil must be dealt with as 
a distinct category apart from sin. R.R.Williams, "Sin and 
Evil", p.l9lf. Niebuhr and Schoonenberg also see the need 
for the paradox to be maintained, although it is 
questionable whether they succeed in doing so themselves. 
Cf. Appendix A pp.339f,342f. Vandervelde places 
Schoonenberg within a modern trend of situationalism which 
sees sin as historical, Rahner and Weger also being part of 
this trend, over against the opposite ~rend of personalism, 
seen in two other Catholic writers, Vanneste and Baumann. 
Although Vandervelde sees the two positions as 
philosophically and theolcgically incompatible, he claims 
that historical, trans-personal power and personal 
enslavement in sin can be seen as mutually inclusive if the 
historical power of sin is confessed from the immanent 
position of the actuality of personal sin, rather than 
being beheld from a transcendent speculative position: i.e. 
there should be both-and, not either-or. Original Sin. 
Two Major Trends. Cf. the criticisms of Niebuhr Qy_ 
J.Plaskow, Sin Sex and Grace, and Berry, "Images of Sin and 
Salvation". 
22. We might add with Don Carson, concluding his study of the 
and human responsibility, 
the tension, it only 
Sovereignty and Human 
"the ... tension is not a 
problem of divine sovereignty 
that reductionism never eliminates 
changes its shape, Divine 
Responsibility, p.220, and that 
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problem to be solved; rather it is a framework to be 
explored." p.2. 
23. Further limits are suggested by Ricoeur, the value of which 
-~s supported by- some of the criticisms above. These limits 
are that we should not speculate about original sin as if 
it had proper consistency, that we should not speculate 
about the evil which exists already (this is the ultimate 
mystery of sin), and that we should not speculate on evil 
at all without reference to the history of salvation. 
"Original Sin: A Study in Meaning", CI, p.286. 
24. L. von Bertalanffy, General System Theory, p.37,89. 
p.30. 
It is necessary (in biology, psycholgy and social 
sciences) to study not only parts and processes 
in isolation, but also to solve the decisive 
problems found in the organization and order 
unifying them, resulting from dynamic interaction 
of parts and making the behaviour of parts 
different when studied in isolation or within the 
whole. 
25. W.Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory p.5,9 . 
... a complex of elements or components directly 
or indirectly related in a causal network, such 
that each component is related to at least some 
others in a more or less stable way within any 
period of time ... 
and such that the whole is more than the sum of the parts, 
p.4l. 
26. Cf. Chapter 3 pp.llB and God and Man, p.63. 
27. Bertalanffy, p.l07. 
28. ibid, Cf. Buckley, p.50ff, who notes that whereas closed 
systems increase in entropy and run down, open systems are 
negentropic, entropy decreases as the system reaches a 
higher level of complexity. 
29. Dillistone, Myth and Symbol, p.l06ff. 
30. Buckley, p.50f, Bertalanffy, p.l28ff. 
31. "The Hermeneutics of Symbols" p.57, The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur. Cf. also Berkouwer who talks of the enigma, 
inexplicability and fathomlessness of sin and notes the New 
Testament view of sin as "strange"; he warns against 
"integrating sin in a crystal-clear or rational mold. We 
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cannot give sense to the senseless." Sin, p.l45ff. 
32. Muller attempts to resolve the paradox in a mythology of 
the beginning, despite his own avowal of the necessity of 
the paradox and of meeting it with the "comprehension of 
incomprehensibility", The Christian Doctrine of Sin, II, 
pp.358ff, cf. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century, Chapter 22. Cf. Appendix A. 
33. God and Man p.63f. 
34. Cf. Chapter 3 pp.ll7f. 
35. "The Antimony of Human Reality", p.35, in The Philosophy of 
Paul Ricoeur. 
36. Pascal, Pensees, 434. 
37. The Nature and Destiny of Man, I,p.278. 
38. Cf. Muller, II, p.lOBf, suggests that the most inadequate 
explanation of a contradiction may be better than an 
attempt to do away with the contradiction altogether. 
39. Systematic Theology,II p.l84. 
40. Brunner, God and Man, p.64ff. 
41. Chapter Five p.264. 
42. "The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection", 
in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, p.56. 
43. Dogmatics in Outline, p.l06. 
44. SE p.325. 
45. Systematic Theology, II p.286f, 289ff. 
This emphasis is found also in the thought of Niebuhr, 
The suffering of God is on the one hand the 
inevitable consequence of sin's rebellion against 
goodness; and on the other the voluntary 
acceptance by divine love of the consequence of 
sin. 
The Nature and Destiny of Man, II p.57f, as also in that of 
Berdiaev, 
It was not only the most just of men who was thus 
crucified, but also the Son of God. Unjust 
suffering is divine suffering. And unjust divine 
suffering brings about the expiation of all human 
suffering. 
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Spirit and Reality, p.98, quoted Moltmann, The Trinity and 
the Kingdom of God, p.43. 
46. Cf. H.E.W.Turner, in his patristic study of the doctrine 
of redemption, notes the two themes, within the tradition, 
of Christ as Victor and as Victim, The Patristic Doctrine 
of Redemption, Mowbray, 1952, p.22f. 
Cf. also Ricoeur: 
According to 'Christology', that suffering is a 
moment in divinity; that moment of abasement, of 
annihilation of the divine life, both completes 
and suppresses tragedy. Tragedy is consummated, 
for the evil is in God: 'Do you not know that the 
Son of Man must be delivered up?' That •must' 
exalts fate and includes it in the divine life. 
But tragedy is suppressed because it is 
inverted... On the contrary, it is as an 
absolute Victim that the Christ of the Gospels is 
glorified - that is to say, elevated in being. 
The •must', then, is unintelligible except in the 
light of the 'gift'. 'No one takes my life from 
me, but I give it of myself,' says Christ, 
according to John. That absolute Fate should 
also be absolute Gift there is tragedy 
completed and suppressed. 
SE p.328. 
332 
Appendix !2 
The structuring of sin: the monograph tradition. 
The monograph tradition begins with Julius Muller (The Christian 
Doctrine of Sin, 2 vols.,l839, E.T.l868), a prominent 
conservative German Protestant, influenced, as was 
Schleiermacher, by pietism but representative, according to 
Barth(l), of the unrest with which his generation took over the 
heritage of Schleiermacher. He opposed the Hegelianism of the 
Tubingen school, and Mackintosh places him as a leader of the 
"mediating" school.(2) certainly Muller could not accept 
Schleiermacher's understanding of sin which he saw, like that of 
Augustine and Kant, as tending towards an unacceptable dualism, 
and as involving an unchristian optimism about humanity. 
Neither would Muller accept the opposite tendency towards a 
deterministic monism which he also saw as a threat to the 
Christian doctrine of sin. These particular concerns reflect 
Muller's isolation of the central problem of the doctrine as the 
tension between the inevitability of sin as inherited, and the 
essential nature of sin as individual free action. His position 
can certainly be described as mediating in that he tried to 
maintain inevitability and responsibility, as well as both the 
private and negative aspects of sin(3). This he did in his 
analysis of the doctrine which he deals with thematically, 
examining the historical material under the headings of "The 
Reality of Sin", its nature and imputation, "Principal Theories 
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explaining Sin'', "The Possibility of Sin" and "The Spread of 
Sin". Having explored the hazards of defining sin as either 
negative or positive, as either inevitable or free, Muller 
declares that an inadequate explanation of a contradiction may 
be better than doing away with the contradiction altogether. 
However he is not content to stop at the point of understanding 
sin as an undeniable, contradictory and inexplicable reality, (a 
position which Barth notes would have been more satisfactory 
than, and would have marked Muller out from his contemporaries), 
but he goes beyond this understanding in a quest for 
intelligibility, the validity of which he himself has already 
questioned.{4) This quest leads him to the assertion of a 
Kantian-sounding individual, extra-temporal, spiritual decision 
for good or evil, which raises a number of problems, including 
some of those he himself has examined. Muller's analysis of the 
nature of the problem is thus more helpful than his own 
solution. 
With F.R. Tennant's Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall 
and Original Sin (1903) we begin to see the impact of 
evolutionary theory on explanations of sin and the fall. 
Tennant, a liberal Anglican, represents the assimilation of 
evolutionary theory into Christian theology which corresponded, 
for him, with an optimistic estimate of humanity, although often 
this assimilation accompanied pessimism about the influence of 
the lower, animal nature of humanity. Tennant is significant as 
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an exception to the general liberal silence about sin, wanting 
to insist on the necessity of the sinner's responsibility, while 
also wanting his explanation to be considered respectable by the 
disciplines of logic, psychology, ethics and evolutionary 
science. In his work of 1903 he outlined the history of the 
doctrine in order to demonstrate that the Church fathers neither 
took over Jewish ideas of original sin, nor deduced the fall 
from Paul, but rather they derived their thought from other 
sources, particularly from contemporary speculation applied to 
current ideas. His conclusion is that the resulting view of 
hereditary sin, revealed by evolutionary theory to be 
unacceptable, need not be maintained, by Christians because it 
is not part of the original Christian message. 
Seven years later James Orr's Sin as 3 Problem of Today 
(1910) expressed the conservative reaction against the inroads 
of evolutionary theory and particularly against Tennant's 
rejection of hereditary sin. Orr was concerned about the 
decline of the concept of sin due, he believed, to general 
emancipation from external authority, and changes in philosophy 
because of the influence of comparative religion. He was also 
concerned about evolutionary theory's supposed denial of 
transcendence and immanence. Accepting the ordinary categories 
of evolution, he held that Darwinism should be modified in line 
with Christian doctrine in an understanding of sin as an 
acquired category in human development. He was also critical of 
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pre-existent fall theories such as that of Muller.(5) 
The Concept of Sin (1912), dubbed "the most elaborate of 
modern Pelagian treaties",(6) continued Tennant's argument in 
which he sought to defend the idea of sin by defining it in a 
very limited way, on the basis of empirical observation, and it 
takes the form of the failure to perform the necessary task of 
the moralisation of these impulses. Sin, Tennant explains, 
develops with humanity's growing moral awareness to which it is 
necessary. Tennant optimistically assumed that human reason was 
uncorrupted by sin.(7) 
With the work of R.S. Moxon, a post-modernist 
Anglo-Catholic, the liberal and optimistic trend continued, 
seeing evolutionary theory as the key for interpreting original 
sin, and as thus enabling Christian theology to free itself, 
finally, from the harmful influence of Augustinianism. Moxon 
writes his history of sin, The Doctrine of Sin. ~ Critical and 
Historical Investigation into the Views of the Concept of Sin 
held in early Christian, Medieval and Modern Times, (1922), 
specifically from this standpoint. His survey is intended to 
show that Augustine's teaching, although seminally present 
throughout the preceeding centuries, is not to be identified 
with the totius Ecclesiae but is Augustine's own 
construction, albeit influenced by the general emphasis of 
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"Western'' speculation. He admits the influence on Augustine of 
Origen, an Easterner, and his categorisation of Western and 
Eastern traditions involves a dubiously clear distinction 
between these traditions which do not fall as easily as he 
suggests into the categories of once- and twice-born. The point 
of his history is to question whether Pelagius is so erroneous 
or Augustine so orthodox as has been suggested. He sees 
evolution as the true key to the problem of evil (i.e. the 
problem of freedom and necessity), a key not available to 
Augustine: 
On the thought of sin it was scarcely possible for 
Augustine to arrive at the truth by mere logic. He 
had not the facts of science before him. 
Moxon examines modern theories influenced by the developing 
sciences of humanity, including those of Kant, Muller, 
Schleiermacher and Tennant, and although he is critical of them 
he claims that such application of modern research to the 
problem of sin has resulted undeniably in the discovery that 
evolution is the true key to the problem of evil, freedom and 
necessity. He goes on to define sin in psychological terms as 
the selfish use of ''natural" instincts - a definition very 
similar to that of Tennant, including a characteristically 
liberal understanding of Christ's work as providing the world 
with a "will to serve", and with an example of sacrifice.(8). 
N.P.Williams, also an anglo-Catholic, produced a more 
notorious work on sin, The Idea of the Fall and Original Sin 
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(1924) which stands within the same tradition of evolutionary, 
anti- Augustinian optimism. Like Moxon he claims that Augustine 
does not represent the vox totius Ecclesiae but only the 
"Western", "twice-born", "African" type of thought of which we 
see only traces in the pre-Augustinian tradition. Williams is 
championing the cause of the alternative, Eastern, once-born 
Hellenic type, free from the morbid attitude towards sex and the 
personal idiosyncracies exemplified in Augustine, Luther and 
Calvin.(9) This categorisation of once- and twice-born is the 
basis and the conclusion of Williams' outline of the historical 
development of the doctrine of sin. The once-born is supposedly 
revealed by Williams' history as the basic belief and he sums up 
the development of the nineteenth century as "away from 
Augustine and back to Origen". 
Origen here represents the once-born, hellenic type of 
thought, despite Williams' own conclusion, earlier in the book, 
that we find in Origen's speculations, side by side, the 
dissecta membra of both the Hellenic and the African 
anthropologies. The critical point in the historical 
development, for Williams, is the enlightenment. He concludes 
from his analysis of enlightenment thought that: 
The primitive, Hellenic, 'once-born' version of the 
Fall doctrine now stands clearly revealed as the basic 
or residual belief.(lO) 
While it may be possible to see the development of the doctrine 
of sin in terms of broad trends, this interpretation of 
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enlightenment thought, as the final return of the doctrine from 
the confusion and distortion of its erroneous Augustinian form 
to its normative and ecumenical once-born form, is highly 
misleading. It does justice neither to the complexity of the 
tradition, nor to enlightenment thought; neither does it allow 
for further, contrary development after Williams' own time. 
Williams too easily defines into starkly contrasted opposites a 
tradition which involves many different strands of thought.(ll) 
To deal with the problems which have stood in the way of 
this return to the correct Eastern view, Williams looks to 
psychology for something corresponding to "hereditary 
infirmity", and to evolutionary theory for the gradual 
development of moral self-consciousness. His solution to the 
determination-freedom debate is a single, collective fall of the 
race-soul or world-soul.(l2) Recent work on sin is more 
disparate than the last few writers we have considered and has 
been less eager to abandon the Augustinian understanding of 
original sin in favour of evolutionary or psychological 
theories. This is due, in part, to reactions against the 
supposed optimism of liberalism and against the too hasty 
welcome of evolutionary theory as an answer to the key problems 
of theological anthropology. Recent dogmatic monographs on sin 
attempt to reinterpret, not to repudiate, original sin in the 
light of evolutionary theory (this is a particular concern of 
Catholic scholars) and there are frequent calls for new 
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understandings and re-assessment. 
Reinhold Niebuhr is important as a key example of renewed 
interest in sin, also as the author of the impressive and 
influential two volume work, The Nature and Destiny of Man 
(1939). Niebuhr was a chief exponent and driving force of the 
trend of "American Realism"(l3), rejecting any kind of optimism 
about the perfectibility of humanity and society. Influenced by 
Barth and especially Brunner, Niebuhr was critical of liberal 
theology in general and of metaphysical and purely academic 
theology, being very concerned with the practical application of 
theology to the ethical and social process. He saw the problems 
of ethics and morality as set by human nature and as thus 
requiring first of all an understanding of humanity and of sin. 
He was particularly interested in original sin as an idea which 
has potential to create the necessary attitude of vigorously 
contending for the right while admitting one's own 
self-interestedness; also as an idea which is psychologically 
true.(l4) Niebuhr traces the history of Christian anthropology 
and, in this context, sin, and states the problem as a conflict 
between Christian and Classical, Protestant and Catholic, 
Renaissance and Reformation thought. He sees the way forward as 
involving a synthesis of these polarit1es and a reassessment, in 
particular, of the Augustine-Pelagius debate. His own 
conclusion, from an analysis of this debate, is the assertion 
that both necessity and freedom must be maintained as a 
"dialectical truth": 
It expresses a relation between fate and freedom which 
cannot be fully rationalized, unless the paradox be 
accepted as a rational understanding of the limits of 
rationality, and as an expression of faith that a 
rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to a 
truth which logic cannot contain.(l5) 
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Niebuhr sees the paradox of freedom and finiteness as a basic 
constituent of human being, and as giving rise inevitably to 
anxiety which is the precondition of sin. He draws heavily on 
Kierkegaard's understanding of anxiety, although this anxiety is 
not to be identified with sin as such. Original sin is inferred 
from the universality of actual sin as its presupposition, it is 
a bias or defect in the will which, however, cannot be 
attributed to a taint in human nature (which would preclude 
freedom) because the will presupposes freedom.(l6) Actual sin 
is, in its basic form, pride, the denial by human beings of 
their own finitude or, alternatively, the escape from the 
anxiety of the paradox into sensuality. Niebuhr's "realistic" 
and ethical approach is refreshing and important, and his 
analysis of sin as pride is excellent and particularly valuable 
in its inclusion of the individual and the collective aspects of 
sin. However it is questionable whether Niebuhr's explanation 
of sin, the way he defines it in practice, actually preserves 
this paradox, upon which he insists. He is criticised widely 
for relying too heavily on his understanding of sin as pride, at 
the cost of other types of sin.(l7) There is also an emphasis on 
the inevitability of sin which leads to charges of fatalism, 
pessimism and monism. Niebuhr tries to protect the paradox by 
getting away from those historical-literalistic interpretations 
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of the fall which see original sin either as the total 
destruction of humanity's essence as the image of God or as the 
loss of something inessential to humanity. His own 
interpretation is an essentialist one, original righteousness 
being part of human essential, transcendent nature, outside but 
not prior to history, and therefore standing in judgement over 
the actions of humanity's sinful existence. Here it seems that 
the fall and humanity's responsibility and freedom are reduced 
to human beings' knowledge that what they do is wrong, 
knowledge which does not necessarily precede action. The 
essentialist definition of humanity as finite and anxious is 
linked so closely, as explanation, to the inevitability of sin 
that the eventness of the fall is lost, and with it the paradox 
of sin; love and justice become almost unattainable and anxiety 
almost incurable.(l8) 
In 1946 ~- Thelen, in contrast with Williams' declaration 
of the movement from Augustine to Origen, described the current 
understanding of sin as a trend back to Augustinianism, in Man 
as Sinner in Contemporary American Realistic Theology. She 
couples Marx with Freud as the presiding genius at the birth of 
"realistic" theology, such as that of Niebuhr, reacting against 
the optimism of liberal ethics and the philosophy of religion 
and anthropology. She refers also to Richard Niebuhr, Horton, 
Calhoun and Bennett, charting further the increasing seriousness 
with which sin has been taken after the first third or so of 
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this century. 
In the work of Piet Schoonenberg, Man and Sin (1965) we 
have an indication of Roman Catholic concern over sin and one of 
the ways of reinterpreting original sin in the light of 
evolutionary theory. It is amongst Catholic scholars that such 
reinterpretations have been most at issue, with the pressure to 
take account of contemporary theories of humanity and yet to 
conform to the Church's teaching. Schoonenberg is a 
representative of the "situationalist" interpretation of 
original sin, the other major trend being "personalism", 
typified in the work of Vanneste and Baumann.(l9) Schoonenberg 
uses the concept of situation to traverse the chasm between the 
biblical idea of human solidarity in sin and the post-Tridentine 
understanding of sin as privation, with the privation of grace 
becoming a concrete situation of determination, through the free 
decisions and actions of others. The situation of privation, 
which began with the first Adam or Adams, leads to personal 
sins, which in turn contribute to a growing situation of 
original sin. Situation here includes bad example and pressure, 
the obscuration of values and norms and the lack of love which 
leads to the lack of integration of the human drives necessary 
for the realisation of human destiny in Christ. Schoonenberg's 
intention is to maintain the paradox of original sin which he 
interprets in terms of the dialectic of individualism and 
corporate personality. He, like Niebuhr, has something 
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important to say about the inexplicable relationship between the 
sin which is already there and the sin we choose to do. However 
he abstracts the two elements to such an extent that the 
emphasis falls on the externality of original sin as situation, 
and the internality of actual sin as free decision, so that it 
is not clear how the two elements can or should be integrated 
again; it is not clear how the situation is "inner" as 
Schoonenberg claims, nor how it is really rooted in the 
moral-religious realm, and thus called sin, even analogously. 
Since his abandonment of an explanation of the crucifixion as 
the fall (20) Schoonenberg has also failed to explain how this 
definition of sin relates to salvation. 
Berkouwer's Sin (1971) represents a reaction against 
liberalism from a conservative, Calvinist standpoint. His work 
is intended as a restatement of the reformed view of sin 
understanding sin in terms of human corporeity and emphasizing 
sin's nature as senseless enigma, but not taking into account 
non-theological estimates of humanity. 
J.L.Connor, "Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches", 
(1968), H.Rondet, Original Sin. The Patristic and Theological 
Background, (1972) and G.Vandervelde, Original Sin. Two Major 
Trends in Contemporary Roman catholic Interpretation, (1981), 
are further representative of the Roman Catholic concern to take 
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account of the implications of evolution for sin. Connor looks 
at the questions of the Christological perspective on sin and 
its reformulation as ''being-in-the-world". Rondet also notes 
the significance of Christocentrism which he understands as the 
attempt to integrate evolutionism into theology by uniting 
nature and grace in Christ. Vandervelde outlines the trends of 
personalism, seen in Baumann and Vanneste, and situationalism, 
seen in Rahner and Schoonenberg. 
The tendency towards ~ Christological view of anthropology 
and sin is noted also by R.R.Williams, "Sin and Evil'', and 
D.Kelsey, "Human Being", both in Christian Theology.(2l) They 
put this tendency alongside the loss of the Adamic narrative and 
historical fall as decisive for contemporary theological 
understanding. Williams notes the relationship between 
fallibility and sin as a key issue. He isolates the rejection 
of the literal historical schema of creation and fall as one 
ofthe constituents of the problem, the others being the 
re-emergence of the gnostic identification of finitude and sin 
and of the inevitability-responsibility debate. The direction 
in which he looks for a solution is an Irenaean theodicy as seen 
in Schleiermacher. I have already indicated some of the 
problems in Schleiermacher's view (cf. Chapter Two, p.52ff), 
but I would also question whether the concreated imperfection 
and immaturity of humanity can really function as the antecedent 
evil which Williams sees as vital without thereby leading to the 
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Manichean dualism he wants to avoid. In the ordaining of sin by 
God, for redemption, and in its "point of entry" ~n the human 
need for development, sin either becomes necessary or 
superficial. Either way, by using this schema to explain sin 
and to deal with the dilemma it seems that the "central 
intention of the doctrine - the self-imposed bondage of the will 
is lost" in the face of the "virtually inescapable" nature of 
sin. If the Irenaean theodicy does provide a way forward we 
must first have a basis for guarding against these consequences 
more specifically: the myths are iconoclastic towards each 
other, as well as influential. Kelsey, in his excellent and 
important essay, sees this situation within the context of the 
"turn to the subject" of enlightenment theology, which sees 
man's relationship to God as a mode of consciousness.(22) 
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APPENDIX R FOOTNOTES 
1. Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, SCM,l972. 
2. H.R.Mackintosh, ~ of Modern Theology. p.l38. 
3. Muller was particularly concerned to refute the 
understanding of sin as privative, and as a matter solely 
of self-consciousness, which he saw to be expressed in 
Rothe's Theological Ethics. 
4. Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 
Ch.22. Cf. MUller, II, p.358ff, l47ff. Cf. also 
N.P.Williams, p.XXXlll, Moxon, p.l84ff and Pannenberg, 
Theological Anthropology,p.l29ff. Laidlaw was almost one 
of those contemporaries who, in 1879, gave some 
consideration to sin in the context of a concern with the 
doctrine of humanity. His emphasis was on sin as free 
choice not heredity. 
5. R.Mackintosh is another example of conservative interest in 
sin and the effects on it of evolutionism, Christianity and 
Sin,l915. Also critical of Tennant, he held that Darwinism 
could well shed fresh light, but should not be seen as 
"supreme". 
6. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, I.p.262. 
7. N.P.Williams notes our obligation to Tennant for 
proclaiming the ''moral neutrality" of the appetite, 
"thereby sweeping away at one blow the endless confusions 
which clustered around the word 'concupiscence'". The 
Ideas of the Fall, p.535. Thelen notes Tennant as part of 
the "religious realism" or "philosophical theism" against 
which contemporary realists such as Niebuhr are reacting. 
Greeves criticises Tennant as atomistic, understanding 
"sin" on the basis of "a sin", and particularly opposed 
himself to Tennant's understanding of sin as ignorance, The 
Meaning of Sin, 1956. F.Greeves exemplifies a conservative 
reaction against liberalism. He follows the theme of 
ignorance, as part of sin's meaning and nature, through 
brief analysis of the development of the doctrine 
(particularly in recent thought), with particular emphasis 
on Tennant, for whom sin requires conscious knowledge, and 
against whom Greeves is reacting. 
8. A more recent view similar to Moxon's, although not based 
on Moxon's belief in evolution as supplying the answers to 
the problem, is that of Richard Swinburne, who sees 
original sinfulness as a proneness to wrongdoing which 
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exists because of the genes giving rise to genetically 
inherited desires (desires for happiness, not for the bad, 
and not in themselves bad) which conflict with socially 
inherited moral beliefs and often also with the happiness 
of others. "Original Sinfulness",l985. 
9. G. Rupp notes that William's work on Luther is entirely 
based on Mohler's Symbolism, but that Williams makes 
inferences which Mohler was too careful to make, The 
Righteousness of God. 
10. N.P.Williams, The Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin, 
p.450. 
11. Niebuhr also comments on Williams' "implausible thesis'', N 
& D I.p.244 n3. 
12. Cf. R.R.Williams, "Sin and Evil", p.lBB, notes that this 
is wholly speculative and that Williams has merely 
exchanged one myth for another. Rondet, Original Sin, 
p.245ff: "··· however imaginative, Williams' theory is too 
far removed from Catholic dogma for constructive use by the 
latter." 
13. Cf. M.Thelen, Man as Sinner in Contemporary American 
Realistic Theology; Horton & van Dusen, "A Study of 
Reinhold Niebuhr" in G.Hammar ed., Christian Realism in 
Contemporary American Theology, pp.l67-253. 
14. M.Thelen, p.lllf. 
15. N & D I,p.278. 
16. op.cit.,p.257. 
17. Niebuhr is generally criticised for concentrating too much 
on his definition of sin as pride, understating the 
alternative he suggests of sensuality, or indeed, any other 
interpretations. Cf. Milne, The Idea of Sin in the 
Theoloqy of Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth; Plaskow, Sex, 
Sin and Grace; J.C.Berry, "Images of Sin and Salvation in 
Feminist Theology"; J.C.Raines, "Sin as Pride and Sin as 
Sloth". 
18. Cf. B.Milne, op.cit.,p.388f, criticises Niebuhr as too 
pessimistic, and almost monistic. Vlastos also makes this 
criticism, "Sin and Anxiety in Niebuhr''. Thelen notes that 
for realistic theologians in general, that humanity is a 
sinner has come to mean that human beings cannot attain 
perfection within history, and that Jesus' perfectionist 
ethics may need to be abandoned. 
19. Cf. Vandervelde, Two 
personalistic approach 
Major 
leads 
Trends, notes 
to a question 
that 
about 
the 
the 
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universality of sin, with its emphasis on sin as only 
individual free action and that both Vannest and Baumann in 
response to this difficulty become almost fatalistic in 
their explanation of sin, which would indicate the failure 
of a purely personalist definition of sin. 
20. Schoonenberg is influenced by Teilhard de Chardin in his 
evolutionary understanding of the developing history of 
sin, which parallels the developing history of salvation. 
At one point he maintained that this history of sin 
climaxed in the crucifixion which was the real fall, 
leading to a situation of gracelessness. He has now 
virtually abandoned this idea. 
21. Ed. P.Hodgson and R.King. 
22. R.Trigg and R.S.Anderson also comment on the significance 
of subjectivism for the doctrine of sin. R.Trigg, "Sin and 
Guilt as Fate of Freedom", notes that the contemporary 
emphases on subjectivity and consciousness often produce 
the same conclusions as those of Kant and Kierkegaard in 
seeing evil as "the shadow cast by freedom" because of 
their extolling of human freedom and autonomy. 
R.S.Anderson On Being Human. Essavs in Theological 
Anthropology, notes the "general abandonment of ontology as 
a basis for determining the nature of human personhood in 
favour of a more phenomenological approach, based on either 
existentialist or rationalist interpretations of human 
existence." p.5. 
349 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Note: Some of the articles from the 3rd European Conference on 
Philosophy of Religion, "Philosophical Problems of the Concept 
of Sin", 1982 (3EC), are reprinted in Religious Studies 20,2 
(June, 1984). 
Adr iaanse, H. , 
"Original sin and responsibility", 3EC 
Anderson, R., 
On Being Human. Essays in Theological Anthropology. 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982. 
Aquinas, 
Summa Theologiae. la 44-49 Vol.VIII; la 90-102 
Vol.XIII; la2ae 71-80 Vol.XXV; la2ae 81-85 Vol.XXVI; 
la2ae 86-89 Vol.XXVII. Various editors. London: 
Blackfriars & Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964-74. 
d'Arcy, M. et al., 
~ Monument to St.Augustine. 
1930. 
Augustine, ed. P.Schaff, 
London: Sheed & Ward, 
~ Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers 
of the Christian Church. 
Vol.lJ The City of God, Christian Doctrine. 
Vol.y Anti-Pelagian Writings 
Vol.VIII Expositions on the Psalms. 
Buffalo: The Christian Literature Co., 1886. 
Bacik, J.J., 
Apologetics and the Eclipse 
according to Karl Rahner. 
Notre Dame Press, 1980. 
Baker, J., 
of Mystery. Mystagogy 
Indiana: University of 
"The Myth of Man's 'Fall' - a Reappraisal". Exp.Times 
92 (May,l981): 233-39. 
Barth, K., 
"Nein!" in Natural Theoloqv. trans. P.Fraenkel, 
London: Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary Press, 1946. 
........ , 
Church Dogmatics. ed. G.W. Bromiley & T.F.Torrance, 
trans. G.W.Bromiley et al., Edinburgh: T & T Clark. 
I/1 The Doctrine of the Word of God. 1936 
II/1,2 The Doctrine of God. 1957. 
III/1,2,3 The Doctrine of Creation. 1958-60. 
IV/1 The Doctrine of Reconciliation. 1956 . 
. . . . . . . . , 
Dogmatics in Outline. 
SCM, 1949 . 
trans. G.T.Thomson, London: 
. . . . . . . . , 
The Humanity of God. London: Collins, 1961 . 
. . . . . . . . , 
Evangelical Theology: An Introduction. 
G.Foley, London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963 . 
. . . . . . . . , 
trans. 
Protestant Theology in the 
Background and History. 
London: SCM, 1972. 
Nineteenth Century. Its 
trans. B.Cozens & J.Bowden, 
• • • • • • '• I 
The Christian Life. CD IV/4, Lecture Fragments. 
trans. G.W.Bromiley, Edinburgh: T & T Clark. 
Berkouwer, G., 
Sin. trans. 
1971. 
Berry, w.w., 
P.C.Holtrop, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
"Images of sin and salvation in feminist theology", 
Anglican Theological Review LX:l (1979): 25-54. 
Bertalanffy, L.von., 
General System Theory. 
Applications. London: Penguin, 1971. 
Betty, c.c., 
"Piet Schoonenberg's theory of original sin", Thought 
XLV (1970) : 83-101. 
350 
Bonner, G. 
St. Augustine of Hippo. London: SCM, 1963. 
Bourgeois, P., 
"Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: 
Paul Ricoeur." Philosophy Today 15 (1971) :231-241. 
Bowker, J., 
The Sense of God. The Wilde Lectures 1972, Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1973. 
Braaten, C.E., 
"The current controversy on revelation. 
and his critics", Jnl. of Religion XLV 
225-37. 
Brock, W., 
Pannenberg 
(1965) 
An Introduction to Contemporary German Philosophy. 
Cambridge: CUP, 1935. 
Bromiley, G.W., 
An Introduction to the Theology of Karl 
Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1979. 
Brown, C., 
Barth. 
Karl Barth and the Christian Messaqe. London: Tyndale 
Press, 1967. 
Brown, J., 
Subject and Oblect in Modern Theology, The Croall 
Lectures, 1953. London: SCM, 1955. 
Brown, P., 
Auoustine of Hippo. 
Faber, 1967. 
~ Biography. London: Faber & 
Brummer , V. , 
"Divine Impeccability". 3EC. 
Brunner, E., 
The Theology of Crisis. 
Scribner's Sons, 1929. 
N.y., London: Charles 
351 
........... ' 
The Mediator. 
1934 . 
trans. O.Wyon, London: Lutterworth, 
. . . . . . . . . . . ' 
God and Man. trans. D.Cairns, London: SCM, 1936 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . ' 
The Divine Imperative. 
Lutterworth, 1937 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . ' 
trans. O.Wyon, London: 
Man in Revolt. trans. O.Wyon, London: Lutterworth, 
1939 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
The Divine-Human Encounter. trans. A.W.Loos, London: 
SCM, 1944 . 
. . . . . . . . . .. . , 
Dogmatics. trans. O.Wyon, London: Lutterworth. 
Vol.I. The Christian Doctrine of God, 1949. 
Vol.II The Christian Doctrine of Creation and 
Redemption, 1952 . 
. . . . . . .. .. . . . , 
"The New Barth. Observations on Karl Barth's Doctrine 
of Man". Scottish Jnl. of Theology 4 ( 1951) : 
123-135 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . ' 
"Nature and 
P.Graenkel, 
Press, 1946. 
Grace" 
London: 
in Natural Theology. trans. 
Geoffrey Bles: The Centenary 
Buckley , W. , 
Sociology and Modern Systems ]::tteor_y. Prentice-Hall 
Sociology Series, ed. 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967. 
Burhenn, H., 
"Pannenberg•s Doctrine of God". 
Theology 28 (1975) : 535-549. 
H. Blumer. N.J. 
Scottish Jnl. 
352 
Burke, P., 
"Man without Christ: An Approach to Hereditary Sin". 
Theological Studies 29 (1968) : 4-18. 
Burnaby, J. , 
Amor Dei. 8 Study of the Religion of St. Augustine. 
The Hulsean Lectures 1938, London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
Burns, J.P., trans. and ed., 
Theological Anthropology. Phila: Fortress, 1981. 
Cairns, D., 
The Image of God in Man. London: SCM, 1953. 
Calvin, J., 
The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Library of 
Christian Classics, ed. J.T.McNeill, trans. 
F.L.Battles, Phila: Westminster, 1960. 
Carson, D.A., 
Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility. Atlanta: 
John Knox Press, 1981. 
Chenu, M.-D., 
Towards Understanding St.Thomas. trans. A.M. 
Landry, D.Hughes. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1964. 
Cherbonnier, E., 
Hardness of Heart: 
the Doctrine of Sin. 
1956. 
Childs , B . S . , 
8 Contemporary Interpretation of 
London: Victor Gollanz Ltd., 
Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture. 
London: SCM, 1979. 
Clines, D., 
"Sin and Maturity". Jnl.of Psychology and Theology 
5.3 (Summer 1977) : 183-196. 
Cobb, J.B., 
"Wolfhart Pannenberg's 'Jesus: God and Man'". Jnl. 
of Religion XLIX (1969) : 192-201. 
353 
.......... , 
The Structure of 
Lutterworth, 1968. 
Cochrane, A.C., ed., 
Christian Existence. London: 
Reformed Confessions 
London: SCM, 1966. 
the Sixteenth Century. 
Collins, J. , 
The Mind of Kierkeqaard. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 
1953. 
Condon, K., 
"The Biblical Doctrine of Original Sin." 
Theological Quarterly 34 (1967). 
Connor, J.L., 
"Original Sin: Contemporary Approaches". 
Studies XXIX (1968) : 215-40. 
Theological 
Corduan, W. , 
Handmaid to 
Prolegomena. 
1981. 
Culianu, I.P., 
Theology. An 
Grand Rapids: 
essay 
Baker 
"Mircea Eliade at the Crossroad 
Neue Zeitschrift fUr Theologie und 
(1985) : 123-~31. 
Curran, C.E., 
in Philosophical 
Book House Co., 
of Anthropology". 
Philosophie 27.2 
Themes in Fundamental Moral Theology. Indiana: Univ. 
of Notre Dame Press, 1977. 
Dalferth, I., 
"HovJ is the concept of sin related to the concept of 
moral wrongdoing?" 3EC. 
Daly, G., 
"Theological 
Heythrop Jnl. 
Models in the Doctrine of Original Sin". 
XIII.2 (1972) : 121-142. 
Dillistone, F.W., Ed., 
354 
Myth and Symbol. London: SPCK, 1966. 
Dolch, H., 
"Sin in an Evolutive World". 
(1967) : 35-40. 
Doran , R. M. , 
Concilium III. 6.3 
"Paul Ricoeur: Toward the Restoration of Meaning." 
Anglican Theological Review 55.4 (1973) :443-458. 
Dornische, L., 
A Theological Interpretation of the Meaning of Symbol 
in the Theory of Paul Ricoeur and Possible 
Implications for contemporary Education. PhD 
Marquette University. Univ. Microfilms: Ann Arbor, 
1973 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
"Symbolic Systems and the interpretation of Scripture: 
an introduction to the work of Paul Ricoeur". Semeia 
4 (1975) : l-19. 
Dowey, E.A., 
"Tillich, Barth and the Criteria of 
Theology Today XV (April, 1958) : 43-58. 
Theology". 
Earle, W., 
"Anthropology in 
The Philosophy of 
N.Y: Tudor Pub. 
Evans, D., 
the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers" in 
Karl Jaspers. ed. D.A.Schilpp, 
Co. , 1957. 
The Logic of Self Involvement. London: SCM, 1963. 
Fagan, s., 
Has Sin Changed? London: Gill & Macmillan, 1978. 
Fairlie, H., 
The Seven Deadly Sins Today. Washington: New Republic 
Books, 1978. 
Ferre, N., 
"Three Critical Issues in 
Theology". Scottish Jnl. 
Tillich's Philosophical 
of Theology X (1957) : 
355 
225-228. 
Flick, M. , SJ. , 
"Original Sin and Evolution". The Tablet, London 17th 
September 1966. 
Forell U., 
"The concept of sin from a logical point of view". 
3EC. 
Fransen, P., 
"Towards a Psychology of Divine Grace". 
12 (1957) : 203-232. 
Fuchs, J., 
"Sin and Conversion". Theology Digest Vl4 (4) (1966) 
: 292-301. 
Galloway, A.D., 
"The New Hegelians". Religious Studies 8 (1972) 
367-371. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
Wolfhart Pannenberg. 
1973. 
London: George Allen & Unwin, 
Geismar, E., 
Lectures on the Religious Thouqht of 
Kierkegaard. Stone Foundation Lectures 
Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub.House, 1937. 
Gelin, A., & A.Deschampes., 
Soren 
1936, 
Sin in the Bible. 
Desclee Co., 1965. 
trans. C.Schaldenbrand, N.Y.: 
Gerhart, M., 
"Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Theory as Resource for 
Theological Reflection" Thomist XXXIX.3. (July, 1975) 
:496-527. 
Gilson, E., 
~ History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages. 
Vol.VIII. London: Sheed & Ward, 1955. 
356 
• • • • • • • • • • I 
The Christian Philosophy of St. 
London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1957. 
Thomas Aquinas. 
• • • • • • • • • • I 
The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine. London: 
Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1961. 
Glaser, J. W. , 
"The Transition 
Perspectives". 
260-274. 
Gorman, u., 
between Grace and 
Theological Studies 
"Original sin and responsibility". 3EC. 
Greeves, F. , 
Sin: Fresh 
29 (1968) 
The Meaning of Sin. The Fernley-Hartley Lecture, 
1956. London: Epworth, 1956. 
Gunther, w. , 
"Sin", in The New 
Testament Theology, 
pp.573-587. Devon: 
Zondervan, 1978. 
Gustafson, J.M., 
International Dictionary for New 
ed. C.Brown. Vol.III. 
Paternoster, Grand Rapids: 
"Interdependence, Finitude and Sin: Reflections on 
Scarcity". Jnl. of Religion 57.2 (1977) : 156-168. 
Haag, H., 
"The Original Sin Discussion, 1966-1971". Jnl. of 
Ecumenical Studies X (1973) : 259-289. 
Hamilton, w., 
"New Thinking on Original Sin". Herder Correspondence 
4 (1967) : 135-41. 
Hauerwas, S., 
"On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological", in 
Revisions: Changing perspectives in moral philosophy. 
ed. A.Mcintyre & S.Hauerwas, Indiana: Notre Dame 
u. p.' 1983. 
357 
Hefner, P., 
"Questions for Moltmann and Pannenberg". 
25.3 (1968) : 32-51. 
Helm, P., 
"God and the approval of sin". 3EC. 
Hendry , G. W. , 
Una Sancta 
"Review of Tillich's Systematic Theology Vol.II". 
Theology Today XV (April 1958) : 78-83. 
Hiltner, s., 
"The Christian Understanding of Sin in the Light of 
Medicine and Psychiatry". Medical Arts and Sciences 
20.2 (1966) : 35-49. 
Hodgson, P., & R.H.King, eds., 
Christian Theology. Phila: Fortress, 1982. 
Hubbeling, H.G., 
"Symbols as Representation and Presentation". Neue 
Zeitschrift flir Theologie und Philosophie 27.2 (1985) 
: 82-84. 
Idhe, D., 
Hermeneutic Phenomenoloqv. The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur. Northwestern Studies in Phenomenology and 
Existential Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 
1971. 
Johnson, R.C., 
"A Theologian 
(April, 1958) 
Kaufman, G.D., 
of Synthesis". 
36-42. 
Theology XV 
"Can a man serve two masters?". 
(April, 1958) : 59-77. 
Theology Today XV 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
"The Imago Dei as Man's Historicity". 
Religion 36 (1956) : 157-168. 
Kelsey, D., 
Jnl. 
358 
The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology. 
SCM, 1975 . 
. . . . . . . . . . , 
London 
The Fabric of Paul Tillich's Theology. New Haven & 
London: Yale U.P., 1967. 
• • • • • • • • • • I 
"Human Being", in Christian Theology. ed. Hodgson & 
King, Phila: Fortress, 1982. 
Kierkegaard, s., 
The Concept of Anxiety. trans. & ed. R.Thomte, 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1980 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' 
The Sickness unto Death. trans. & ed. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P., 1980. 
King, J. N., 
W.Lowrie, 
The God of Forgiveness and Healing in the Theology of 
Karl Rahner. Wahsington: U.P. of America, 1982. 
Kittel, G. ed., 
Theoloqical Dictionary of the New Testament. trans. 
& ed. G.W.Bromiley, Vol.I, Grand Rapids & London: 
Eerdmans, 1964. 
Kunz, H., 
"Jasper's concept of Transcendence", in The Philosophy 
of Karl Jaspers. ed. P.A.Schilpp, N.Y.: Tudor 
Pub.House, 1957. 
Lacey, T.A., 
Nature, Miracle and Sin: R study of St. Augustine's 
conception of the natural order. Pringle Stuart 
Lectures 1914. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1916. 
Langford, T.A., 
"Michael Polanyi and the Task of Theology". Jnl. of 
Religion XLVI (1966) : 45-55. 
Lapointe, F. H., 
"A Bibliography on Paul Ricoeur". Philosophy Today 
359 
16.1 (1972) :28-33. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
"A Bibliography on Paul Ricoeur". 
17.2 (1972) :176-182. 
Philosophy Today 
Leach, E., 
Genesis as Myth and other Essays. London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1969. 
Lindsey-Hertz, J., 
"Contrasting Experiences of 
American Behavioral Scientist 
689-704. 
McCool, G.A., 
Shame 
27.6 
and Guilt". 
(August 1984) : 
"The Philosophy of the Human Person in Karl Rahner's 
Theology". Theological Studies 22 (1961) : 537-562 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . , 
"Rahner's Anthropology". 
31.1970) : 343-4. 
• • • • • • • • • • • 1 ed. I 
America 123 (October 
"h_ Rahner Reader. 
1975. 
London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
McGill, A.C., 
Suffering: £ Test of Theological Method Phila: 
Westminster Press, 1982. 
Mackintosh, H.R., 
Tvpes -~·.f Modern Theoloqv. Schleiermacher to Barth. 
London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1937. 
Mackintosh, R., 
Christianitv and Sin. N.Y.: Charles Scribners Sons, 
1915. 
McLean, S.D., 
Humanitv in the Thought of Karl Barth. Edinburgh: T & 
T Clark, 1981. 
Macleod, A.M., 
360 
Tillich. An Essay on 
Philosophical Theology. 
the Role of Ontology in his 
London: Allen & Unwin, 1973. 
Macmurray, J., 
The Form of the Personal. Vol.I, The Self as Agent. 
Gifford Lectures 1953. London: Faber & Faber, 1956. 
Macquarrie,J., 
In Search of Humanity. 8 Theological and 
Philosophical Approach. London: SCM, 1982 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
"The Anthropological Approach to Theology". 
Journal XXV (1984) : 272-287. 
McWilliams, W. , 
Heythrop 
"Divine Suffering in Contemporary Theology". Scottish 
Jnl. of Theology 33 (1980) : 35-53. 
Martin, B., 
Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man. Herts: Nisbet & co. 
Ltd., 1966. 
Menninger, K. , 
Whatever Became of Sin? N.Y.: Hawthorne Books Inc., 
1973. 
Midgley, M. , 
Wickedness. London: Routledge-Kegan Paul, 1984. 
Milne, B., 
The Idea of Sin in the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr and 
Karl Barth. PhD Thesis, Edinburgh, 1970 . 
. . . . .. . . . . , 
"The Idea of Sin in Twentieth-Century Theology". 
Tyndale Bulletin 26 (1975) : 3-34. 
Mitchell, B., 
"How is the concept of sin related to the concept of 
moral wrongdoing?" 3EC. 
Moehler, J.A., 
361 
Symbolism or Exposition of the Doctrinal Differences 
Between Catholics and Protestants as evidenced Q¥ 
their Symbolical writings. London: Charles Dolman, 
1843. 
Moltmann, J., 
Man. Christian Anthropology in the Conflicts of the 
Present. trans. J.Sturdy, London: SPCK, 1974. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • I 
The Crucified God. 
London: SCM, 1974 . 
trans. R.A. Wilson, J.Bowden, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . , 
The Trinity and the Kingdom of God. 
London: SCM, 1981. 
Morgan, J.H., 
trans. M.Kohl, 
"Religion, Myth and Symbol, a convergence of 
philosophy and anthropology". Philosophy Today 18.1-4 
(Spring, 1974) : 58-84. 
Morris. H., 
"Shared Guilt" in Wisdom: Twelve Essays. ed. 
R.Banbrough, Oxford & N.Y.: Blackwell, 1974. 
Mowrer, O.H., 
The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion. 
N.J: D. van Nostrand Co.Inc., 1951. 
Princeton, 
Moxon, R.S., 
The Doctrine of Sin. 
Ltd. I 1922. 
Muller, J., 
London: George Allen & Unwin 
The Christian Doctrine of Sin. 2 Vols. 
W.Urwick, Edinburgh: T & T Clar, 1858. 
trans. 
Neie, H., 
The Doctrine of the 
Wolfhart Pannenberg. 
Gruyter, 1978. 
Niebuhr, Richard., 
Atonement in the theology of 
Berlin, N.Y.: Walter de 
352 
"Man as Sinner". Jnl. of Religion XV (July 1935) 
272-280. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion. 
1965. 
London: SCM, 
Niebuhr, Reinhold., 
The Nature 
1939, 2 vols. 
Nunberg, H., 
and Destiny of Man. The Gifford Lectures 
London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1941, 1943. 
"The Sense of Guilt and the need for Punishment". 
Intern. Jnl. of Psychoanalysis VII (October 1926) : 
420-33. 
O'Connell, P., 
Original Sin in the Light of Modern Science. Houston, 
Texas: Lumen Christi, 1973. 
Orr, J., 
Sin as Problem of Today. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1910. 
Osborne, K. B., 
New being: 8 Study on the Relationship between 
Conditioned and Unconditioned Being according to Paul 
Tillich. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. 
Osborne, R. T., 
"Faith as Personal Knowledge". 
Theology 28 (1975) : lOlff. 
Scottish Jnl. 
0' Shea, K. F. , 
"The Reality of sin: a Theological and pastoral 
critique". Theological Studies 29 (1968) : 241-459. 
Pannenberg, W. , 
What is Man? 
Perspective. 
1972. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • I 
Contemporary Anthropology in Theological 
trans. D.A.Priebe, Phila: Fortress, 
Man. trans. L.L.Williams & 
363 
D.A.Priebe, London: SCM, 1968 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' 
Revelation as History. trans. E.Granskow & E.Quinn, 
London & Sydney: Sheed & Ward, 1969 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
Theology and the Kingdom of God. 
Phila: Westminster, 1969 . 
ed. R.J.Neuhaus. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
Basic Questions in Theology. 
G.H.Kehm & R.A.Wilson. Vol.I, 
Vol. I II, 197 3. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
London: SCM. 
1970, Vol. II, 
trans. 
1971, 
"A Theological Conversation with Wolfhart Pannenberg". 
Dialog XI (1972) : 285-295. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
Human Nature, Election 
Westminster, 1977. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
History. Phila: 
Faith and Reality. trans. J.Maxwell, London: Search 
Press, 1977. 
Christian Spirituality and Sacramental 
London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1984. 
Community. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
Anthropology in Theological Perspective. 
M.J.O'Connell, Phila: Westminster, 1985. 
trans. 
Pasquariello, R.D., 
"Pannenberg's Philosophical Foundations", Jnl. of 
Religion 56 (1976) : 338-347. 
Pelikan, J., ed., 
Twentieth Century Theology 
The Theological Dialogue 
trans. 
1970. 
R.A.Wilson, London: 
in the Making. Vol.II. 
Issues and Resources. 
Harper & Row & Fontana, 
364 
Pellauer, D., 
"Paul Ricoeur on the Specificity of Religious 
Language". Journal of Religion 61.3 (1981) : 264-284. 
Perrin, N., 
"The Interpretation of a Biblical Symbol". Jnl. of 
Religion 55 (1975) : 348-370. 
• • • • • • • • • • I 
Jesus and the Language of the 
Metaphor in New Testament 
Fortress, 1976. 
Kingdom. Symbol and 
Interpretation. Phila: 
Peters, T., 
"Truth in History: Gadamer•s 
Pannenberg's Apologetic Method". 
(1975) : 36-56. 
Hermeneutics and 
Jnl. of Religion 55 
Plaskow, J. , 
Sex, Sin and Grace. Women's Experience 
theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul 
Washington: U.P. of America, 1980. 
and the 
Tillich. 
Proudfoot, W. , 
"Conceptions of God and the Self". Jnl. of Religion 
55.1 (1975) : 57-75. 
Rahner, K., 
Theological Investigations. 
London: Darton, Longman & Todd. 
1963; VK, 1969; IX, 1972; XI, 
1979; XVII, 1981; XVIII, 1984. 
• • • • • • • • • • I 
Various translators, 
Vols. I, 1961; II, 
1974; XIII, 1975; XVI, 
Sacramentum Mundl. London: Burns & Oates Ltd. Vols. 
2. "Existence", "Faith", "Freedom", "Grace", 1968; 3. 
"Christology", "Anthropology", 1969; 4. "Original 
Sin", 1969; 5. "Potentia Dbedientialis", 
"Revelation", "Salvation", l97C; 6. "Sin", "The 
States of Man", 1970. 
• • • • • • • • • • I 
Nature and Grace. trans. D.Livingstone & G.R.Dimler, 
London: Sheed & Ward, 1963. 
365 
.......... , & J.Ratzinger., 
Revelation and Tradition. trans. W.J.O'Hara, London: 
Burns& Oates, 1965 . 
. . . . . . . . . . , 
"Evolution and Original Sin". 
(1967) : 30-35. 
• • • • • • • • • • I 
Concilium III.6.3 
Grace in Freedom. trans. H.Graef. London: Burns & 
Oates, N.Y.: Herder & Herder, 1969. 
• • • • • • • • • • I 
Christian at the Crossroads. trans. Search Press 
Ltd., London: Burns & Oates, 1975 . 
. . . . . . . . . . , 
Foundations of the Christian Faith. trans. W.V.Dych, 
London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1978. 
Raines, J., 
"Sin as Pride 
Crisis XXIX.l. 
and Sin as Sloth". 
(Feb.3 1969) : 4-8. 
Christianity and 
Ramsey, I . T. , 
Religious Language. 
Theological Phrases .. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . , 
An Empirical Placing 
London: SCM, 1957. 
Models and Mystery. London: O.U.P., 1964. 
Reagan, C.E., ed., 
Studies in the Philo~ 
Athens,Ohio: Ohio U.P., 1979. 
Ricoeur. 
Renckens, H. , 
Israel's Concept of the Beginnlnq. The Theology of 
Genesis l-3. trans. C.Napier. N.Y: Herder & Herder, 
1964. 
Ricoeur, P., 
"The Hermeneutics of 
Reflection". Intern. 
Symbols and Philosophical 
Philosphical Quarterly 2 (1962) 
366 
: 191-218 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . ' 
Freedom and Nature Voluntary 
Involuntary. trans. E.V.Kohak, Northwestern Studies 
in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, ed. 
J.Wild, J.M.Edie, Evanston: Northwestern U.P., 1966 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . ' 
Fallible Man. trans. 
Regnery Co., 1967 . 
C.Kelbley, Chicago: Henry 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
The Symbolism of Evil. trans. 
Perspectives Series XVII, ed. 
Beacon Press, 1967. 
E.Buchanan, Religious 
R.N.Anshen, Boston: 
• • • • • • • • • • • I 
"Structure-Word-Event". Philosophy Today 12 (1968) 
116-126. 
• • • • • • • • • • • I 
"From Existentialism to Philosophy of Language", 
"Creativity in Language", "The Task of Hermeneutics", 
"The Hermeneutical Function of DisLanciation", all in 
Philosophy Today 17.1.4 (1973) : 88-141. 
• • • • • • • • • • • I 
"The Language of Faith". Union Sem.Q.Rev. 20 (1973) 
: 213-24. trans. R.Bradley. 
• • • • • • • • • • • I 
"The Crit:ique 
(1973) :205-12. 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
of Religion". Union 
trans. R.B.Deford . 
"Philosophy and Religious 
Religion 54 (1974) : 71-85. 
Language". 
• • • • • • • • • • • I 
Sem.Q.Rev. 28 
Jnl. 
"Listening to the Parables of Jesus''. Criterion 13 
(1974) : 18-22 . 
........... , ed. D.Idhe, 
367 
The Conflict of Interpretations. Essays in 
Hermeneutics. Northwestern Studies in Phenomenology 
and Existential Philosophy. ed. J.M.Edie, Evanstone: 
Northwestern U.P., 1974 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
"Metaphor and the Main Problem of Hermeneutics". New 
Literary History 6 (1974-5) : 95-110 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of 
Meaning. Fort Worth, Texax: Texas Christian U.P., 
1976 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
"'Response' to Karl Rahner•s 
Incomprehensibility of God". 
(1978) : 126-131. 
Lecture On the 
Jnl. of Religion 58 
• • • • • • • • • • • I 
The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. An Anthology of his 
Word. ed. C.E.Reagan & D.Stewart. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1978. 
Ringleben, J., 
"Sin and Guilt as fate of freedom". 3EC. 
Roberts, L. , 
The Achievement of Karl Rahner. 
Herder, 1967. 
Roberts, R.H., 
N.y.: Herder & 
"Sin, Saga and Gender: The Fall and Original Sin in 
Modern Theology", lecture delivered at Lancaster 
University, January 1986. 
Robinson, H.W., 
Suffering, Human and Divine. London: SCN, 1940. 
Robinson, J.M., & J.B.Cobb, eds., 
Theology 
VOl. III. 
Rondet, H., 
as History. New Frontiers 
N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1967. 
in Theology 
368 
Original Sin. 
Background. trans. 
Ecclesia Press, 1972. 
Patristic 
C.Finegan. 
and Theological 
Shannan, Ireland: 
Rout ley, E. , 
creeds and Confessions. The 
Modern Ecumenical Implications. 
Co. Ltd., 1962. 
Reformation and its 
London: Duckworth & 
Rowe, W.L., 
Religious Symbols and God. h Philosophical Study of 
Tillich's Theology. Chicago & London: Chicago U.P., 
1968. 
Scharlemann, R.P., 
"The Scope of Systematics: An Analysis of 
Two Systems". Jnl. of Religion 48 
:136-149. 
Schleiermacher, F., 
Tillich's 
2 (1968) 
The Christian Faith. Ed. H.R.Mackintosh and 
J.S.Stewart, Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1928. 
Schneider, C., 
"The End of Shame". Concilium 16 (June 1982) 34-39. 
Schneider, H.W., 
"Sin and Society". Rev. of Religion VI (May, 1942) 
407-13. 
Schoonenberg, F., 
Man and Sin. h Theological View. trans. 
London & Melbourne: Sheed & Ward, 1965. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
J.Donceel, 
Covenant and Creation. London& Sydney: Sheed & Ward, 
1968. 
Schwarz, H., 
our cosmic Journey. Christian Anthropology in the 
Light of current Trends in the Sciences, Philosophy 
and Theology. Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub.House, 1977. 
Scobie, G.E.W., 
369 
"The Concept of Sin in Modern Theology", 
Birmingham, 1970. 
Segundo, J .L., 
M.A. I 
Evolution and Guilt. trans. J.Drury, Mary Knoll,New 
York: Orbis Books 1974. 
Slack, K., 
"Recent Thinking on Christian Beliefs VI Sin and 
Salvation". Exp.Times 88 (May, 1977) : 228-32. 
Smith, J. Z. , 
Map is not Territory. 
of Studies in Judaism 
Neusner. 
Spidell, S., & D.Libermann., 
Leiden: EJ Brill 1978. Vol.23 
in late Antiquity, ed. J. 
"Moral Development and the Forgiveness of Sins". Jnl. 
of Psychology and Theology 9.2 (1981) : 159-163. 
Stafford, VJ. , 
"Repentance on the Eve of the English Reformation: 
John Fisher's Sermons of 1509", Durham, May 1985. 
Stewart, D. , 
"Paul Ricoeur's Phenomenology of EVil". 
Int.Phil.Quaterly 9.4. (Dec. 1969) :572-589. 
Swinburne, R. , 
"Original Sinfulness". Neue Zeitschrift flir Theologie 
pnd Philosophie 27.3 (1985) : 235-250. 
Sykes, s.w., 
Friedrich Schleiermacher. 
Theology, ed. D.E.Nineham and 
Lutterworth, 1971. 
• • • • • • • • • • • I ed • I 
Makers of Contemporary 
E.H.Robinson, London: 
Karl Barth Studies of his Theological Method. 
Oxford: Clarendon, 1979. 
• • • • • • • • • • • I & D.Holmes, eds., 
New Studies in Theology 1, London: Duckworth, 1980. 
370 
Tennant, F.R., 
The Origin and Propagation of Sin. 
lectures 1901-2, Cambridge: CUP, 1903 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
The Hulsean 
sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin. 
Cambridge: CUP, 1903 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
The Concept of Sin. Cambridge: CUP, 1912. 
TeSelle, E., 
Augustine the Theologian. 
1970. 
London: Burns & Oates, 
Thelen, M.F., 
Man as Sinner. 
Theology. N.Y.: 
Thomas, J.H. 
In Contemporary American Realistic 
Kings Crown Press, 1946. 
Paul Tillich: An Appraisal. London: SCM, 1963. 
Tiebout, H.M., 
"Tillich and Freud on Sin". Religion in Life XXVIII 
( 1958-9) : 223-35. 
Tillich, P. , 
"The Concept of Man in Existential Philosophy", Jnl. 
of Religion XIX (July, 1939) : 201-215 . 
. .. . . . . . . . . . , 
"Estrangement and Reconciliation in Modern Thought". 
Rev. of Religion IX (Nov.l944) : 5-19 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
"Psychotherapy and a Christian Interpretation of Human 
Nature". Rev. of Religion XIII (March 1949) 
264-268 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
Systematic Theology. London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 
Vol.I, 1953, Vol.II, 1957, Vol.III, 1964. 
371 
........... , 
Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality. 
Chicago: Chicago U.P., 1955 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
The Courage To Be. London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd., 1952 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
The Dynamics of Faith. N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1958 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
Ultimate Concern. Tillich in Dialogue. London: SCM, 
1965 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
"The Religious Symbol", in Myth and sumbol. ed. 
F.W.Dillistone, London: SPCK, 1966 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . , 
What is Religion? 
Row, 1969. 
ed. J.L.Adams, N.Y.: Harper & 
Torrance, T.F., 
Calvin's Doct:c_ine of Man. London: Lutterworth, 1949 . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 
Karl Barth. 
1910-1931. 
An Introduction to his early theology, 
London: SCM, The Preachers Library, 1961. 
Trigg, R., 
"Sin and Guilt as fate of freedom", 3EC. 
Tupper, E.F., 
The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg. 
Westminster, 1973, London: SCM, 1974. 
Van den Hengel, J.W., 
Phila: 
The Home of Meaning. The Hermeneutics of the Subject 
of Paul Ricoeur. N.Y., London: University Press of 
America Inc., 1982. 
Vandervelde, G., 
372 
Original Sin. Two Major Trends in contemporary Roman 
Catholic Reinterpretation. Washington: U.P. of 
America, 1981. 
Van Leeuwen, T.M., 
The surplus of Meaning. Ontology and Eschatology in 
the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
1981. 
Vanneste, A., 
"Towards a Theology of Original Sin". Theology Digest 
XV (1967) : 209-14. 
Van Til, c., 
The New Modernism. An Appraisal of the Theology of 
Barth and Brunner. London: James Clarke & co. Ltd., 
1946. 
Vlastos, G. , 
"Sin and Anxiety in Niebuhr's Religion". The 
Christian century (Oct.l, 1941) : 1202-1204. 
Vas, A., 
"The Concept of sin from a logical point of view", 
3EC. 
warfield, B.B., 
"Augustin and the Pelagian Controversy" in P.Schaff 
ed., ~ Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers of the Christian Church. Buffalo: CLC, 1886. 
Warlick, H.C., 
"Tillich's 
Thinking". 
Welch, c., 
Consciousness of Guilt and Autonomous 
Foundations 16 (1973) :25-40. 
Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century. New 
Haven & London: Yale U.P., 1972. 
Wendel, F., 
Calvin. London: Collins, Fontana, 1963. 
White, G., 
"Karl Barth's Theologican Realism". Neue Zeitschrift 
373 
fUr systematische Theologie. 2.1 (1984) 54-68. 
Williams, D.D., 
"Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Forgiveness" Pastoral 
Psychology 19 (Feb. 1968) : 17-23. 
Williams, N.P., 
The Ideas of the Fall and of 
Historical and Critical Study. The 
1924. London: Longmans Green & co. 
Williams, R.R., 
Original Sin. ~ 
Bampton Lectures 
Ltd., 1927. 
"Sin and Evil", in Christian Theology. ed. Hodgson 
and King, Phila: Fortress, 1982. 
Wingren, G. , 
Theology in Conflict. 
trans. E.H.Wahlstrom. 
Boyd Ltd., 1958. 
Wood, c., 
Nygren, Barth, Bultmann. 
Edinburgh & London: Oliver & 
The Formation of Christian Understanding. An Essay in 
Theological Hermeneutics. Phila: Westminster,l98l. 
Zizioulas, J.D., 
"Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological 
Exploration of Personhood". Scottish Jnl. of 
Theology 28 (1975) : 401-448. 
374 
